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1 Preface
The continuing trend towards globalization has become one of the most decisive
forces shaping the environment in which firms operate. Rapid technological progress,
the digitalization of production processes and the lifting of trade barriers allow firms
to organize production in international value chains, sell products across borders
and assign profits to various locations around the globe. This development has sub-
stantially changed the way in which firms are affected by corporate taxation. For
instance, firms can avoid paying corporate income tax by setting up cross-border
structures and shifting income to low-tax locations. These responses to international
tax differences are well-documented by the existing literature (e.g. Hines & Rice,
1994; Huizinga et al., 2008; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008; Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013;
Dharmapala, 2014) and should in principle lead to lower tax burdens for multina-
tional firms. On the one hand, lower effective tax payments reduce the sensitivity of
corporate decisions with respect to statutory tax rate changes. On the other hand,
however, the tax-sensitive organization of multinational groups distorts the corpo-
rate structure (Voget, 2011; Devereux et al., 2015; Feld et al., 2016a). Furthermore,
multinational firms have been identified as important international transmitters of
country-specific shocks (Cravino & Levchenko, 2017). The possibility of profit shift-
ing means that tax changes in one jurisdiction may affect corporate investment de-
cisions in another jurisdiction not only on the extensive (Devereux & Griffith, 1998)
but also on the intensive margin. Finally, when establishing cross-border links or
expanding within countries, firms do so not only through greenfield investments but
increasingly also through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) which made up 49.7%
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) around the world in 2016.1 Fiscal policy that
inhibits the efficient allocation of assets, such as the taxation of capital gains, may
have adverse effects on the functioning of the market for corporate control.
To design an efficient corporate tax system it is crucial to understand the implica-
tions of tax policy in the context of a globalized economy. This thesis sheds light on
two important issues. First, I study the impact of taxation on both the frequency
1Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017.
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and the outcome of M&As. Taxation is identified as an important driver of takeover
dynamics and as a determinant of productivity gains in cross-border mergers. Sec-
ond, I explore the cross-border effect of taxation on corporate R&D activity in the
context of profit shifting. Tax cuts on income from intellectual property that do not
require the establishment of nexus in the corresponding location benefit all firms of a
multinational group with an affiliate in this location because income can eventually
be shifted there. These tax cuts thus exert a positive cross-border effect on R&D
activity.
Which fiscal policy emerges in a world where firms operate across borders? Pre-
vious studies have argued that an increase in capital mobility eventually leads to a
so-called “race to the bottom” because countries compete for internationally mobile
firms (Zodrow & Mieszkowski, 1986). Decreasing corporate income tax rates appear
to support this line of argument (see Slemrod, 2004). However, not much is known
about how such fiscal competition evolves in the context of growing public debt
burdens which have become a relevant feature for many countries after the financial
and economic crisis 2008-2009. I address this issue in a theoretical analysis in the
final part of this thesis.
This thesis is organized in four self-contained chapters. I begin by analyzing the
impact of capital gains taxation on corporate acquisition activity in Chapter 2 which
is co-authored with Lars Feld, Martin Ruf, Ulrich Schreiber and Johannes Voget. In
principle, shareholders demand to be compensated for the capital gains tax which
comes due when they sell their shares. This price-increasing lock-in effect has been
well-documented for M&A deals that are eventually completed (Ayers et al., 2003).
However, high capital gains tax payments may also increase premium demands above
potential acquirers’ reservation prices. In this case, sellers may prefer to retain their
stock and the deal fails. Thus, capital gains taxation does not only affect deal prices
but also the overall quantity of M&A deals and may thus constitute an important
obstacle in the market for corporate control which should, in principle, assign assets
to the owners that generate the highest value (Manne, 1965). We test this quantity
effect of capital gains taxation on acquisition activity using a comprehensive dataset
of corporate M&As around the globe. The lock-in effect is identified through sub-
stantial variation in corporate capital gains tax rates resulting from several reforms
that have been implemented in different countries at different points in time and by
contrasting deals with targets operating in industries with a high level of accumu-
lated capital gains at the deal announcement with those that involve targets with
low capital gains. We find that a one percentage point increase in the capital gains
2
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tax rate reduces acquisition activity by around 1% annually. Combining this esti-
mate with information on deal premia realized in comparable deals, we compute the
total cost to shareholders of capital gains taxation in the form of foregone synergy
gains. It amounts to $9.3 billion each year for the United States.
In Chapter 3, which is co-authored with Johannes Voget, I turn to the effect of
international taxation on the outcome of M&As. M&A deals are often succeeded
by the reorganization of operations within the newly formed group. This involves
the concentration of tasks in certain entities according to within-group productivity
differences and constitutes an important source of productivity gains resulting from
the acquisition. However, international tax differentials are likely to distort such re-
organizations because they incentivize firms to establish nexus in low-tax locations
by leaving some activities in potentially less productive affiliates. Thus, cross-border
tax differences reduce the productivity gain in M&A deals similar to a mechanism
described in Becker & Fuest (2011) and Devereux et al. (2015). We test this mecha-
nism using a set of M&A deals in which we observe production factors and output of
both the target and the acquiring firm before and after deal completion. We estimate
total factor productivity applying the Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) method and relate
its evolution before and after the deal completion to the tax differential between
the target and acquirer location. We estimate that a one percentage point increase
in the absolute tax differential between the locations of two merging firms reduces
the subsequent total factor productivity gain by 4.5%. This effect is less pronounced
when firms can use international profit shifting to attenuate effective differences in
taxation.
Chapter 4 is co-authored with Thomas Schwab. We study the cross-border effect
of tax cuts on R&D activity in the context of profit shifting. The direction of this
effect is of high relevance in a world where countries use fiscal policy to compete
for R&D investment and talents (Akcigit et al., 2016; Moretti & Wilson, 2017).
If a tax cut in one country requires firms to establish a nexus in this location to
benefit from it, such policy is likely to draw away activity from other jurisdictions.
However, in the absence of nexus requirements, firms can conduct R&D activity at
the location of their choice and subsequently attribute the resulting profits to the
low-tax location. Thus, the lower tax rate benefits the whole group and exerts a
positive cross-border effect on R&D output. We test this mechanism by combining
administrative data on corporate patent applications with firm-level information on
ownership structure and economic activity in a difference-in-difference identification
strategy. We estimate the response of a firm’s patent output to a tax cut for income
3
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from intellectual property in one of its foreign affiliate locations. For firms with
cross-border links, a tax cut in one country raises R&D output abroad by about
15%.
Finally, in Chapter 5 I analyze how differences in initial government debt levels
affect fiscal competition. This chapter is co-authored with Eckhard Janeba. We set
up a stylized two-period, two-jurisdiction framework in which countries compete for
mobile firms using a source-based tax rate and long-run public infrastructure invest-
ments that require expenditure in the first period and make the jurisdiction more
attractive in the second period. Jurisdictions differ in the initial debt repayment
burden in period 1. If additional borrowing between the two periods is unrestricted,
we find that initial debt levels do not affect fiscal policy. The more indebted ju-
risdiction redistributes the additional burden across the two periods by increasing
public borrowing in period one. This result is overturned when public borrowing is
restricted. In this case, the government in the more indebted region turns to public
infrastructure investments as the second-best option to smooth consumption across
periods. It reduces public infrastructure investments in the first period and partially
compensates the resulting disadvantage in the second period by lowering tax rates.
Through the interaction in the fiscal competition game, the less indebted jurisdic-
tion raises tax rates but is still better off in terms of the number of investing firms.
Thus, differences in initial debt levels induce a divergence in tax policy which in
turn further deteriorates the fiscal position of the more indebted jurisdiction.
4
2 Taxing Away M&A: Capital Gains
Taxation and Acquisition Activity
2.1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important component of the market for
corporate control (e.g. Manne, 1965). In principle, corporate takeovers allocate assets
to the owners that use them to generate the highest shareholder value. Any obstacle
in the takeover market may thus be harmful to value creation and, potentially, the
economy as a whole. Capital gains taxes are an important source of such a distortion
as sellers demand compensation for the capital gains tax levied when they dispose of
their shares which impedes the completion of deals. Some countries have recognized
this problem and have repealed capital gains taxation for inter-corporate M&A deals.
In the United States, the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has abolished capital gains
taxes at the corporate level as far as the selling of foreign subsidiaries is considered.
However, the large majority of domestic affiliates held by U.S. corporations still face
a substantial capital gains tax burden if sold in an M&A deal.
The price-increasing lock-in effect of capital gains taxation has been well docu-
mented for stock prices and acquisition premiums (Ayers et al., 2003; Dai et al.,
2008). Less is known about whether these price distortions eventually lead to some
deals not being completed at all. Are shareholders negatively affected by the lock-in
effect of capital gains taxation as it inhibits value-creating M&As? In this paper, we
address this question using a comprehensive dataset on domestic and international
M&As. We provide empirical evidence on the impact of capital gains taxation on
acquisition activity and estimate its effect on the location choice of an acquirer.
After controlling for other determinants of location and target choice, the acquir-
ing firm favors the location with the lower capital gains tax rate because it faces
a lower seller reservation price there. We also take into account that capital gains
taxation could affect the overall number of observed deals and estimate the impact
of the capital gains tax rate on aggregate takeover dynamics. High capital gains tax
5
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payments may increase premium demands above potential acquirers’ willingness to
pay. In this case, sellers prefer to retain their stock and the deal fails.
Our estimations are based on micro-level data from 29,546 M&A deals in North
America, Asia and Europe in the period from 2002 until 2013. M&As in the sample
are dominated by transactions between incorporated entities (93.4%). Our interna-
tional tax panel data exhibits many substantial changes in corporate capital gains
tax rates by more than 10 percentage points. These take place in different coun-
tries at different points during the sample period, which allows us to control for
unobserved factors.
We employ several empirical strategies to identify the quantity effect of capi-
tal gains taxation on acquisition activity via the lock-in of target shares. First, a
number of large economies (e.g. United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy) have
implemented full or partial exemptions from corporate taxation for capital gains
realized in M&As. Similar to an approach used by Lel & Miller (2015) and Des-
saint et al. (2017), the staggered implementation of these reforms over the sample
period serves as a quasi-experiment in our empirical analysis which allows us to
control for potentially confounding factors (e.g. regulatory reforms) and unobserved
firm- and location-specific effects. Second, we exploit variation in the capital gains
tax exposure across targets operating in different industries to further ensure that
the estimated association between capital gains taxation and acquisition activity is
caused by the lock-in effect on target shares. Then the effect of capital gains taxation
is present for targets with high capital gains, while it is absent for targets without
capital gains. This additional variation allows us to filter out any unobserved factor
that coincides with capital gains tax reforms. Finally, we note that changes in corpo-
rate capital gains tax rates should only affect M&A deals in which the selling party
is incorporated. Contrasting the cases of corporate and non-corporate sellers, we find
that deals with non-corporate sellers are not affected. This again points to capital
gains tax reforms indeed driving our results rather than some omitted variable.
When estimating the quantity effect of capital gains taxation, we initially take the
global number of M&As as given and focus on how capital gains taxation affects the
location choice of acquirers and hence the distribution of M&A activity. A country
with a high corporate capital gains tax rate exhibits a smaller number of M&As
because acquirers choose other locations with a lower tax burden on capital gains
and thus also a lower premium demanded by sellers. We employ a McFadden (1974)
choice model to estimate how capital gains taxes affect the acquirers’ choice of target
location. We then back out the own-region elasticity of the number of deals with
6
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respect to the capital gains tax rate for each country. This allows us to determine
the effect of capital gains taxation on the number of realized deals in a country.
The sensitivity to capital gains taxes is estimated at the deal level using con-
ditional logit and mixed logit regressions. It also allows us to control for bilateral
acquirer-target-country specific as well as firm-specific characteristics. We find that,
if a country decreases its corporate capital gains tax by one percentage point, the
likelihood that a target of this country is chosen increases by 0.7%. These estimates
imply that the total volume of M&As in the United States would increase by 24%
or $16.1 billion per year if U.S. corporate capital gains taxes on M&As were to be
abolished. Using additional variation across target firms in the capital gains tax ex-
posure at the deal announcement, we confirm that this effect is linked to the lock-in
of target shares.
In a second step, we no longer take the overall number of M&A deals as given. For
large capital markets like the United States it is reasonable to assume that acquir-
ers do not always have a feasible acquisition option in another location. Therefore,
a high level of capital gains taxation may decrease the number of M&As globally.
To address this point, we also implement an alternative estimation approach which
allows the total number of deals to decrease with rising capital gains tax rates. We
employ a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator to analyze aggre-
gate measures of M&As in a panel fixed effects framework. Individual deals are
aggregated at the country-level or, alternatively, the country-industry level to cap-
ture the industry-specific dynamics of acquisition activity such as regulatory reforms
(e.g. Andrade et al., 2001; Ovtchinnikov, 2013). We find that a one percentage point
decrease in a country’s corporate capital gains tax rate raises the number of M&As
in that location by about 1 percent per year. This implies that a full tax exemption
of capital gains in inter-corporate M&As in the United States would increase total
M&A volume by $34.4 billion annually.
If capital gains taxation prevents the closing of deals, then shareholders would
benefit less from the gains of industrial reorganization by means of M&As. These
benefits have been shown to result from increased productivity (e.g. Devos et al.,
2009), increased innovation activity (e.g. Stiebale, 2016), knowledge spillovers (e.g.
Bresman et al., 1999; Bena & Li, 2014), enhanced corporate governance (e.g. Rossi
& Volpin, 2004), as well as increased management efficiency (Manne, 1965; Wang
& Xie, 2009) and management discipline (Scharfstein, 1988; Sapra et al., 2014; Lel
& Miller, 2015).1 The price effect of capital gains taxes on acquisitions identified by
1Most of these benefits go to target shareholders. With respect to acquirer returns, empirical
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the literature is, by itself, not sufficient to infer the implied losses to shareholders
(Auerbach, 2006). For that, it is necessary to estimate the degree to which capital
gains taxes inhibit the realization of M&As, which is the contribution of our study.
We first estimate the quantity effect of capital gains taxation on M&As and then
simulate the impact on M&A volume of a full tax exemption of capital gains realized
in acquisition deals. This estimate is combined with observed acquisition premiums
of realized deals to compute the potential shareholder gain of such an exemption
which corresponds to the value loss of taxing these transactions.
Using our coefficient estimates we arrive at an estimate of the potential shareholder
loss associated with corporate capital gains taxation. The corresponding foregone
synergy gains of these unrealized M&As are proxied by premiums specific to tar-
get firms in particular industries. Using estimation results from the location choice
model, this amounts to an estimated shareholder loss for the U.S. of $4.2 billion per
year. Since in the choice model the total number of M&As is taken as given, this
estimate does not reflect the possibility of acquirers withdrawing from the M&A
market due to high capital gains taxation instead of merely switching their focus to
more attractive locations. Our second estimation approach allows the global num-
ber of M&A deals to decrease with a higher level of capital gains taxation. The
estimated shareholder loss is therefore higher. It amounts to $9.3 billion per year in
the United States. The magnitude of this estimate reflects that for many potential
M&A deals in the U.S. there may not exist a comparable outside option in another
country. Then, capital gains taxation ultimately prevents some M&As which implies
a considerable impact on value creation.
Our findings suggest capital gains taxes substantially reduce shareholder value by
inhibiting the market for corporate control. By investigating the quantity effect of
corporate-level capital gains taxation on acquisition activity, we expand the existing
literature which examines the price effect of capital gains taxes in takeovers (Ayers
et al., 2003; Huizinga et al., forthcoming). Furthermore, our paper relates to Edwards
et al. (2004), who study the capital market effect of a corporate capital gains tax
reform in Germany. Consistent with our findings, they report a positive market
response to this particular reform in expectation of future efficiency gains. Our
study shows that capital gains taxation is indeed an important determinant of M&A
activity and thus complements prior studies by Rossi & Volpin (2004), Erel et al.
(2012), John et al. (2015) and Dessaint et al. (2017) who show that economic and
evidence is mixed (e.g. Agrawal et al., 1992; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Fuller et al., 2002; Savor
& Lu, 2009).
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institutional factors such as international trade integration, quality of accounting
disclosure, shareholder protection and labor market regulations have a substantial
influence on domestic and cross-border M&As. At the aggregate level, the estimation
also allows for a comparison to Ayers et al. (2007), who found that time-series
measures of acquisition activity on American stock exchanges are negatively related
to changes in the U.S. federal capital gains tax rate on individual shareholders.2
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we use a stylized theoretical
framework to analyze the lock-in effect in the case of inter-corporate acquisitions
and describe the institutional setting. Section 2.3 explains the empirical approach.
We present the estimation results in Section 2.4 and quantify the shareholder loss
in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 contains concluding remarks.
2.2 Capital Gains Taxes and Corporate M&As
2.2.1 A Stylized Framework
The following model serves to clarify the relationship between capital gains tax
rates and inter-corporate acquisition activity via the lock-in effect on the seller’s
reservation price and demonstrates how the tax effect can be estimated either by a
multinominal logit regression or, alternatively, by count regressions at the aggregate
level.
We consider a corporation that has decided to acquire another firm and faces a
choice between a set of potential target locations i = 1, ..., l. This is an assump-
tion frequently used as a starting point in the empirical corporate finance literature.
For instance, Harford (1999) argues that cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt
acquisitions. Hanlon et al. (2015) and Edwards et al. (2016) show that foreign sub-
sidiaries of U.S. multinationals engage in corporate acquisitions in order to make
use of their locked-out cash due to repatriation tax costs. Both cases give plausible
reasons why certain firms might exogenously become acquirers which then search
for the best available option.
We first derive the acquisition prices for each potential target location i which we
denote by pi. Suppose that the acquirer is looking for a target with a discounted
2In contrast to acquisitions from individual shareholders, inter-corporate acquisitions often involve
private targets and these deals have been shown to yield quite different outcomes (e.g. Fuller
et al., 2002). Furthermore, dispersed individual shareholders are likely to behave differently in
M&A deals than concentrated corporate sellers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
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pre-tax cash flow of d per share. In the absence of an acquisition, a corporate seller3
of such a target earns a discounted after-tax cash flow of
(
1− τCITi
)
d per share.
τCITi is the effective profit tax rate from the seller’s perspective where the subscript
indicates that the seller is taxable in the target location.4 If the seller decides to
dispose of the target, it receives pi and pays capital gains taxes on the realized gains
at a rate τCGi . For simplicity, we assume that the seller bought the target firm at
a price normalized to zero, such that pi is equal to the capital gain per share. The
selling company accepts the deal offer only if pi is above its reservation price p˜i
which satisfies the following condition:
(
1− τCGi
)
p˜i =
(
1− τCITi
)
d.
At pi = p˜i, the seller is indifferent between accepting or rejecting the offer as the
net revenue from selling is equal to the net cash flow from holding. An implicit
assumption underlying this condition is that the seller reinvests the revenue from
selling the target into an asset which generates an identical after-tax cash flow.5
Moreover, we assume an infinite life of the target and neglect any write-down of the
target’s shares. Though of simplifying nature, these assumptions allow us to isolate
the lock-in effect. Assuming a reinvestment in shares, we abstract from any mode of
payment effect that occurs if the deal triggers a change in the cash flow received by
the seller which could potentially be related to a difference in tax treatment.
Since in our model the acquirer has the choice between targets in several locations
it retains all the bargaining power and pays the reservation price of each seller.6 The
acquisition price is then given by
pi = p˜i =
1− τCITi
1− τCGi
d, i = 1, ..., l. (2.1)
3We focus on corporate sellers because they represent by far the largest share in M&A deals.
4The effective tax rate generally corresponds to the corporate income tax rate since inter-corporate
dividends are usually exempt or credited in the domestic case and exempt by many countries
(except for the United States) in the case of cross-border dividends.
5This is equivalent to assuming perfect capital markets.
6Assigning the full bargaining power to the acquirer makes the model simple. Note, that the results
of the theoretical analysis only rely on the acquirer having some degree of bargaining power
but are independent of its exact distribution between selling and acquiring firm. In practice,
the distribution of bargaining power depends on various factors (e.g. target scarcity, see Ahern,
2012) and determines how the merger gain is divided between the deal participants (Bradley
et al., 1988) which is also relevant for the tax incidence in an M&A (Huizinga et al., 2012).
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pi is equal to the expected discounted after-tax cash flow if and only if τCGi = 0.
A positive capital gains tax rate raises the reservation price above the value of the
after-tax cash flow of the target. More generally, the capital gains tax imposes an
additional burden on the act of selling the target which ceteris paribus makes the
deal less attractive from the seller’s perspective.
Turning to the acquiring company, we assume that it has an ownership advantage
(e.g. through better management or complementary technology) that enables it to
increase the discounted cash flow from the target by ∆ percent per share. One may
also refer to ∆ as the synergy gain. The discounted after-tax return per share of
the target from the acquirer’s perspective is then given by r =
(
1− τA
)
d (1 + ∆)
where τA is defined as the effective tax rate faced by the acquiring firm and again
is assumed to be identical across locations for simplicity.
The acquirer receives a payoff of vi = r − pi if it makes an acquisition in loca-
tion i. Assume for the moment that the acquirer can only make one acquisition. It
will therefore only consider the optimal target firm within each location and then
compare options across locations. It chooses i such that
vi ≥ vj∀j ∈ (1, ..., l) . (2.2)
From this discrete choice model, we can derive the probability of the acquirer choos-
ing a target in i which is given by
Φ
(
vi ≥ vj|x, τCG
)
=
exp vi
(
xi, τ
CG
i
)
∑l
j=1 exp vj
(
xj, τCGj
) (2.3)
where τCG is a vector of capital gains tax rates at all potential locations and x is a
vector of other location-specific variables that may drive the location choice. Ceteris
paribus an increase in τCGi reduces the probability of a target location in i:
∂Φ
∂τCGi
=
(∑
h6=i exp vh
(
xh, τ
CG
h
))
exp vi
(
xi, τ
CG
i
)
(∑l
j=1 exp vj
(
xj, τCGj
))2 ∂vi∂τCGi < 0. (2.4)
Throughout our derivation, we have assumed for simplicity that target locations
only differ with respect to the applicable tax rates τCITi and τCGi . One could easily
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extend the model to account for other location-specific characteristics such as dif-
ferences in the pre-tax cash-flow d. Such extensions would not alter the sign of (2.4)
which is solely driven by the lock-in effect of the capital gains taxes. However, while
the proposed mechanism is unaffected, location-specific variables would impact the
magnitude of the effect.
Empirically, the effect in (2.4) can be tested and quantified using a multinominal
logit model for the location choice of individual deals. Such a model can account for
differences across locations or across acquiring firms. For example, acquirers may
differ in their preference for certain target types d.
An important assumption underlying the choice model is that the overall number
of acquisitions is fixed and not affected by tax changes in individual locations. This
appears less realistic for large markets such as the United States. An acquirer may
not have a potential acquisition target outside the United States available and a
high level of capital gains tax payments may thus ultimately prevent the acquisition
which reduces the overall number of M&As.
To address this, we relax the assumption of a fixed total number of acquisitions
and move to a count model. We now assume that there is a multitude of acquisi-
tions in each location by various firms. Conceptually, we describe the latter by a
single representative acquirer which chooses between acquisition targets with differ-
ent synergy gains ∆. The acquirer realizes all acquisition projects in location i with a
positive return vi = r−pi ≥ 0 where r =
(
1− τA
)
d (1 + ∆) and pi = 1−τ
CIT
i
1−τCGi
d. From
this we can derive the cutoff level of synergy ∆˜i such that any deal with ∆ ≥ ∆˜i is
completed:
vi ≥ 0⇐⇒ ∆˜i ≥ φi1− τCGi
− 1 with φi = 1− τ
CIT
i
1− τA (2.5)
It is apparent from (2.5) that without capital gains taxation and no differences
in seller and acquirer taxation, we have ∆˜i = 0 such that all acquisitions with a
positive economic gain are completed. In contrast, a positive capital gains tax rate
requires strictly positive and sufficiently large synergy gains to compensate for the
tax payment resulting from the deal.
In location i there exists a continuum of potential targets with synergy gains con-
tinuously distributed on the interval ∆ ∈
(
¯
∆i, ∆¯i
)
. ∆ follows a cumulative distribu-
tion function F and a corresponding probability function f . Under the assumption
that ∆˜i is interior, all deals with ∆ ≥ ∆˜i are completed. We can thus define the
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number of deals in i as
Ni =
∆¯iˆ
∆˜i
∆′d∆ = 1− F
(
∆˜i
)
.
As long as F is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing, we can express
the number of completed deals as a function of the corporate capital gains tax rate
and a vector of covariates x:
Ni = Ni
(
τCGi ,xi
)
(2.6)
Note that ∂Ni(τ
CG
i ,xi)
∂τCGi
= −f
(
∆˜i
)
∂∆˜i
∂τCGi
< 0 implies that an increase in the capital
gains tax rate decreases the number of acquisitions. This is commonly referred to
as the lock-in effect of capital gains taxation on market activity (e.g. Feldstein &
Yitzhaki, 1978). Intuitively, the capital gains tax imposes a transaction cost that
prevents some inter-corporate acquisition deals.
Empirically, the effect of the capital gains tax on the number of acquisitions can
be tested using a count model. One can also reformulate such a model so that Ni
represents the total volume of all completed deals. As the economic impact of M&As
may well depend on the size rather than the count of the deals this is useful when
measuring the response of acquisition activity to changes in the corporate capital
gains tax rate.
2.2.2 Capital Gains Taxation in Corporate M&As
At the center of our analysis lies the corporate-level tax rate on capital gains realized
in M&A deals. Countries usually tax gains realized in the form of cash payments
received in exchange for target shares. The relevant tax rate is often proportional to
the general rate on corporate income and varies substantially across countries. Some
apply the full corporate tax rate (e.g. Australia, Japan, United States) whereas oth-
ers allow for partial exemption (e.g. Canada, Portugal) or fully exempt capital gains
from taxation (e.g. New Zealand). Many countries provide preferential treatment in
the form of a full exemption for gains realized from substantial holdings (e.g. Nether-
lands, Ireland) which is particularly relevant for firms holding controlling majorities
in other companies. A small number of countries also exempt acquisitions executed
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Table 2.1: Corporate Capital Gains Tax Reforms
This table summarizes the corporate capital gains tax reforms in our sample. ∆τCG is the percentage point change
in the corporate capital gains tax rate that resulted from the respective reform. Germany: From 2004 onward, 5%
of the gains is added back to the taxable income. Sweden: Excluding non-substantial holdings on the stock market.
Italy: 95% exemption from 2008 onward. France: 95% exemption for substantial holdings from 2007 onward. Turkey:
In 2006, Turkey replaced its participation exemption with a new regime that required firms to keep capital gains in
a reserve fund for at least 5 years in order not to be taxed. Iceland: Restricted to substantial holdings from 2011
onward. Source: IBFD.
Year Type ∆τCG
Germany 2002 General exemption -38.9
Portugal 2002 50% exemption for substantial
holdings
-18.7
United Kingdom 2002 Exemption for substantial holdings -30.0
Sweden 2003 General exemption -28.0
Italy 2004 General exemption -19.0
Ireland 2004 Exemption for substantial holdings -20.0
Finland 2004 Exemption for substantial holdings -29.0
Slovenia 2007 50% Exemption for substantial
holdings
-23.5
Norway 2004 Exemption for substantial holdings -28.0
France 2006 Reduction of tax rate from 19% to 8% -11.0
Turkey 2006 Exemption regime abolished +30.0
Iceland 2009 General Exemption -18.0
on the stock market from taxation (e.g. Malta, Cyprus). Deals involving the transfer
of assets rather than shares and deals involving stock-for-stock exchange instead of
a cash payment are usually treated differently. For instance, buyers can generate tax
benefits through a step-up of the target’s depreciable assets while these deals may
lead to double taxation from the seller perspective. In line with previous studies, we
focus on share deals which are less complex than and thus often preferred to asset
deals. Stock-for-stock deals are often classified as tax-free deals since gains may be
deferred until the stock is finally sold. These deals are included in our sample but
they make up only a small fraction of our sample of non-listed targets. We account
for their differential treatment with regard to capital gains taxation in a separate
robustness check.
In our empirical estimation, we consider the tax rate applicable to capital gains
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realized by corporations when selling shares in substantial holdings not listed on the
stock market to proxy for the taxation of corporate capital gains. Since the begin-
ning of the century, many European countries have cut corporate capital gains tax
rates for substantial holdings. Table 2.1 provides an overview of these tax reforms.
Besides the United Kingdom and Germany, who abolished capital gains taxation for
corporations in 2002, the group of reforming countries includes Italy and France as
well as several Scandinavian countries. The timing and magnitude of the tax cuts
differed across reforming countries. Figure 2.1 displays the changes in corporate cap-
ital gains tax rates for all countries in our sample.7 The resulting tax rates in 2013
after these reforms are listed in Table 2.2 below.
Figure 2.1: Capital Gains Tax Reforms
This figure displays the accumulated corporate capital gains tax rate changes in the sample period 2002-2013.
Changes in the corporate capital gains tax rate refer to changes in the rate charged on capital gains realized by
corporations when selling shares in substantial holdings not listed on the stock market.
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2.3 Empirical Identification
2.3.1 Micro-level Evidence
In the first part of our analysis, we identify the impact of corporate capital gains
taxation on acquisition activity via the location choice of acquirers. We relate the
empirical estimation to equation (2.3) and reformulate this expression in an empirical
setting to obtain the probability that an acquirer f chooses target location i at time
7Note that for the United Kingdom, Germany and Portugal, the changes displayed refer to changes
that occurred after the implementation of substantial capital gains tax exemption reforms in
2002.
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t:
Φ
(
vift ≥ vjft|x1ft, τCG1t , ...,xlft, τCGlt
)
= exp (vift)∑l
j=1 exp (vjft)
. (2.7)
where vift is the value of this choice to the acquirer. We model vift as a function of
the corporate capital gains tax rate in i as well as a large number of other variables
that determine the location choice in M&A deals such as acquirer characteristics,
target-location-specific variables and characteristics of the relation between acquirer
and target location:
vift = γτCGit + βxift + φi + ift (2.8)
τCGit is the tax rate applicable to capital gains realized by corporations when selling
shares in substantial holdings. xift is a vector of time-varying control variables and
φi is a set of location-fixed effects that controls for level differences in the location
choice. Following McFadden (1974), both the coefficient of interest γ and the other
parameters, β, can be estimated in a conditional logit regression on the sample of
deals.
In this setting, identification of the lock-in effect of capital gains taxation relies
on the exogenous variation in the capital gains tax rate that is driven by the stag-
gered implementation of tax exemptions for M&As in various countries. In order to
maintain causality, one needs to make sure that these reforms are not endogenous to
M&A activity. Such endogeneity may, for example, result from an omitted variable
bias. In our model specification, we control for a large range of factors that have
been identified by the literature to affect takeover dynamics and may also be corre-
lated with capital gains tax reforms. For instance, one needs to account for the fact
that tax reforms may be associated with other regulatory changes that also affect
M&A activity. Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) show that industry deregulation is an
important driver of takeover dynamics and Dessaint et al. (2017) identify a negative
impact of employment protection on the number of completed acquisitions. We ac-
count for this by including industry-specific indicators (3-digit SIC) for the strength
of regulation that vary across time and locations as well as an indicator for the ease
of laying off workers. Furthermore, we follow Rossi & Volpin (2004) and include
annual GDP growth to account for macroeconomic conditions in the target country.
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Economic growth may be correlated with tax rate changes (see Levine, 1991) and is
thus crucial to control for in our regression. As pointed out by La Porta et al. (1999),
changes in corporate taxation may coincide with changes in the quality of institu-
tions. Rossi & Volpin (2004) and Erel et al. (2012) show that institutional features,
such as the quality of accounting disclosure or investor protection, are crucial for a
well-functioning market for corporate control. We use an annual index for audit and
reporting quality to control for this feature. The index is based on a comprehen-
sive survey among business executives in a large number of countries and is closely
related in concept to the well-known legal indices developed by López de Silanes
et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008). An important advantage for the purpose
of our study is that, in contrast to the legal indices, it varies both across countries
and time. In addition, we also control for other determinants of institutional quality
such as judicial independence and the restrictiveness of credit market regulation.
Finally, a country’s degree of integration with international product markets may
put downward pressure on domestic tax rates due to increased competition from
abroad and also raise the number of corporate takeovers. We control for the open-
ness of countries using the logarithm of trade as a percentage of GDP where trade
is defined as the sum of exports and imports.
After controlling for the full set of location-specific factors any remaining concern
about identification would relate to an unobserved omitted factor. We note that
this concern is somewhat alleviated because of the staggered implementation of the
capital gains tax exemptions that drive the within-country variation of the corporate
capital gains tax rate. For an omitted variable to cause endogeneity it must be
systematically related to both corporate capital gains tax exemptions for M&As
and takeover dynamics in different years and different countries. We address this
remaining concern by exploiting additional variation in capital gains accumulation
across target industry sectors over time. Griffin & Stulz (2001) and Bekaert et al.
(2009) show that corporate stock returns are strongly correlated within industries
and systematically vary across sectors. Sellers of targets operating in industries with
a stronger increase in firm value prior to the deal are likely to realize a higher level
of capital gains upon deal completion. They are thus more negatively affected by the
capital gains tax rate than sellers of targets in industries with smaller gains. Such
within-location variation in the impact of capital gains taxation allows us to single
out any endogeneity resulting from unobserved events that coincide with changes in
the corporate capital gains tax rate. We implement this strategy by including the
interaction of sector-level capital gains with the corporate capital gains tax rate as
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a proxy for capital gains tax exposure of the target in our choice value model
vift = γ1τCGit + γ2τCGit × CGft + βxift + φi + ift. (2.9)
CGft is the median capital gain at the deal announcement in the industry in which
the target operates (2-digit SIC). We follow Ayers et al. (2003) and compute the
5-year and 3-year maximum gain. In this model, the coefficient of the interaction
(γ2) captures the lock-in effect of capital gains taxation as the size of the capital
gains tax rate only becomes relevant if there exist locked-in capital gains. Hence,
it is identified not only from variation in the capital gains tax rate but also from
variation in both the capital gains tax rate and the accumulated capital gains of the
target.
Besides the location-specific control variables mentioned above, we augment our
model by a range of other factors that have been found to influence M&A activity.
For instance, the corporate capital gains tax rate is usually related to the standard
income tax rate (τCIT ) for corporations. We thus include the latter in the estimation
to capture any changes in location choices caused by corporate income tax changes.
Furthermore, we include a set of control variables that may influence acquisition
activity at the aggregate level, in particular if acquirers reside in the same location as
the target. These include GDP (see Erel et al., 2012; Rossi & Volpin, 2004), inflation,
the size of the stock market, the amount of credit provided to firms (Di Giovanni,
2005), and the size of the service sector. In line with previous research, we lag the
macroeconomic variables by one year to reflect that the decision makers’ information
set is based on completed rather than contemporaneous periods and to mitigate
potential endogeneity problems. Finally, we include target-country fixed effects and
thus account for any time-constant bias towards particular target locations.
While target-location-specific characteristics are a key factor in determining lo-
cation choice, the relationship between the target and acquirer location may also
be important. Following Feld et al. (2016a), we include a set of bilateral acquirer-
target-country controls comprising the distance between the two location’s capitals
as well as dummies indicating a common language, a common border, a former colo-
nial relationship, and whether the acquirer and the potential target location are or
were the same country. The latter indicator captures the home bias in the location
choice.
Target-country fixed effects in our model are a feasible way to avoid an unob-
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served variable bias by controlling for unobserved country characteristics that may
drive location choice. However, the underlying assumption in such a model is that
the preferences captured by these fixed effects are the same for each acquirer. This
appears restrictive given that acquirers vary substantially in their acquisition objec-
tives, capability and performance (e.g. Moeller et al., 2004; Arikan & Stulz, 2016;
Bird et al., 2017). We thus exploit the detailed micro-level information in our M&A
data to control for heterogeneity in the location choice with respect to acquirer-
specific characteristics. For example, M&As usually constitute a high fixed cost
investment (see Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2002), part of which is related to the admin-
istrative burden which differs across countries. While this would deter acquisitions
by small firms, larger acquirers are likely to be less affected. We therefore allow the
time-invariable preference towards individual locations to vary with the size of the
acquirer. That is, we add the interactions between the target-country fixed effects
and the logarithm of acquirer total assets in the last available year prior to the
acquisition as an additional set of control variables.
Finally, acquirers may not only be heterogeneous with respect to their preferences
for certain locations, but may also differ in their response to the capital gains tax
rate itself, which would violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
assumption. Most importantly, acquirers may differ in the level of synergy gains they
expect from buying a particular firm. To account for this, we relax the assumption
of a uniform response to capital gains tax rates and estimate a mixed logit model
as described by Train (2009), which allows the estimates of γ in specification (2.7)
as well as of γ1 and γ2 in specification (2.9) to vary across acquirers. Unlike the
conditional logit model, results of a mixed logit model are also consistent when the
IIA assumption does not hold.
2.3.2 Aggregate Acquisition Activity
Having identified the lock-in effect of capital gains taxation on the acquirer’s location
choice using deal-level data, we relax the assumption of a fixed number of overall
acquisitions and turn to the effect of corporate capital gains tax rates on the level of
M&A activity within a location. Guimaraes et al. (2003) show that a discrete choice
model in the conditional logit framework of McFadden (1974) can be rewritten as
a Poisson count model that relates the number of deals in a particular location to
its characteristics. Applying this in the context of M&As, one would focus on the
second perspective outlined in Section 2.2: A firm acquires all economically feasible
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targets instead of choosing between potential targets in a set of different locations
i = 1, ..., l.
As the second step of our empirical analysis, we thus estimate a reduced form
of expression (2.6), aggregating the number of deals first on the country and then
alternatively on the country-industry level. We model the number and volume of
acquisitions as a non-linear function of the corporate capital gains tax rate and a
range of control variables:
Nit = exp (x′itβ) with x′itβ = γτCGit + βzit + φi + φt + it (2.10)
whereNit denotes the number or total value of acquisitions in country i at time t, τCGit
is the corporate capital gains tax rate and zit denotes the vector of location-specific
control variables described for the choice model above. φi and φt are country- and
year-fixed effects, respectively. The model is estimated using the Poisson pseudo-
maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator proposed by Silva & Tenreyro (2006). The
PPML specification includes time and country fixed effects to account for time trends
and unobserved variables that are constant over time but differ across countries.8 As
is shown in Guimaraes et al. (2003), this yields estimates that are equivalent to the
results in the conditional logit model as long as the factors that determine the choice
of target are purely location-specific. Note that the various corporate capital gains
tax reforms presented in Table 2.1 provide the source of within-country variation
necessary to identify γ in the aggregated model.
In a third step, we conduct an industry-level regression to account for the ob-
servation that a large part of acquisition activity is driven by shifts within specific
industries (see Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). The following disaggregated model is
estimated using the PPML estimator9:
Nist = exp (x′istβ) with x′istβ = γτCGit +βzit+δsist+φi+φs+φt+ ist (2.11)
where the dependent variable Nist is the number of M&As in country i, in industry
s and in year t, where a corporate seller disposes of shares in a target firm. We
8See Fally (2015) for a feasible implementation of fixed effects in the PPML model.
9Silva & Tenreyro (2011) show that the PPML estimator is well suited for analyzing data with
a disproportionate number of zeros. This is important for our industry sample which contains
some country-industry-year observations with no M&A deals at all.
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disaggregate the country-level deal count to 3-digit U.S. SIC code industry cells
within each country. zit are the same country-level controls described above.
An advantage of the industry-level regression is that we can explicitly control for
various factors that drive takeover dynamics within sectors. To begin with, we aug-
ment the fixed-effects model above by including industry-fixed effects as well as U.S.
SIC division specific year fixed effects to account for differential time trends within
sectors. Furthermore, we include a vector sist of country-industry-year-specific con-
trols which are available from the OECD: growth of unit labor costs, the respective
industry’s contribution to overall labor productivity, growth in employment and
growth in employment compensation.10
Our final estimation approach exploits the fact that the corporate tax reforms
providing the source of variation in our estimations should generally not affect ac-
quisitions where the seller is not incorporated.11 We test this using the number of
deals that involve an unincorporated seller as a control group in a pooled regression.
Using M&A deals with non-corporate sellers as a comparison group, we can test
whether our results are driven by any unobserved events that coincide with corpo-
rate capital gains tax changes and affect M&A activity. These include regulatory
measures that provide incentives for corporate investment or economic shocks that
drive corporate consolidation.
We estimate a PPML model of the following form
Nikt = exp (x′iktβ)
with x′iktβ =γ1τCGit + γ2τCGit × CORPSk + γ3CORPSk
+ βzit +αzit × CORPSk + φi + φt + φi × CORPSk
+ φt × CORPSk + ikt (2.12)
where Nikt indicates the number of deals in country i at time t for seller type k.
With regard to the seller type, we sort deals into two groups. CORPSk = 1 indicates
deals with sellers that are fully liable for corporate capital gains taxes (type-C deals).
CORPSk = 0 indicates those deals that are mainly affected by individual taxation
(type-I deals), that is, the sellers include individuals or entities for whom corporate
10Since most of these sector-level variables are only available for OECD member countries, non-
OECD countries are excluded from the analysis, when we include these controls.
11Non-corporate sellers such as sole proprietors and most partnerships formed by natural persons
pay individual income but no corporate tax on realized gains from the sale of shares.
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taxation is not applicable. zit, φt and φi are the same sets of controls and fixed
effects as in the country-level regression above.
In equation (2.12), γ1 captures the effect of changes in the corporate capital gains
tax rate on M&As involving sellers that are not liable to pay corporate income
tax. Since these deals are not subject to the lock-in effect of corporate capital gains
taxation, γ1 picks up indirect effects of reforms in corporate capital gains taxation
on deals with non-corporate sellers as well as other events that coincided with the
capital gains tax rate change and also influenced acquisition activity. γ2 measures
the effect of corporate capital gains tax changes on the number of deals involving
only sellers which are directly affected. Consistent with a lock-in effect on acquisition
activity, we expect γ2 to be negative. Country-specific and time-specific differences
in the level of acquisition activity are captured by the interaction of CORPSk with
the corresponding fixed effects. Level differences across seller types are measured by
γ3.
2.3.3 Data
Data on corporate acquisitions is obtained from the Zephyr database provided by
Bureau van Dijk. Zephyr contains detailed seller characteristics for each deal. Such
information is critical to identify the deals associated with corporate capital gains
tax payments and to exclude deals with individual shareholders as sellers.12 The
sample consists of acquisitions of shares in the period 2002-2013 where a corporation
sold one of its domestic subsidiaries.13 We use the seller’s legal form and name to
establish whether it is liable for a corporation tax according to the regulations of
the country it is registered in.14 As noted by Erel et al. (2015), the majority of deals
(>95%) involve an unlisted target. Our study focuses on these deals because deals
with listed targets often involve a substantial number of non-corporate sellers15 for
12Moreover, as pointed out by Erel et al. (2015), Zephyr’s coverage of acquisitions outside the stock
market is superior to alternative databases. This is convenient as, for reasons explained below,
we expect acquisitions of non-listed targets to be particularly affected by corporate capital gains
taxes. See Bollaert & Delanghe (2015) for a detailed analysis of data quality in Zephyr.
13We do not consider sellers disposing of their holdings in foreign firms since these deals are
taxed differently in some countries (e.g. Australia). In a robustness check we also include deals
where seller and target reside in different countries and obtain qualitatively similar results. An
overview of these deals can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
14For some deals no seller information is available. It is reasonable to assume that in this case the
sellers comprise mainly individual shareholders and we therefore exclude these deals.
15Deals involving listed targets are a more appropriate subject of study when investigating the
role of shareholder-level taxation as in Ayers et al. (2003).
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Table 2.2: Corporate M&As, 2002-2013
This table presents the number and volume of deals with corporate sellers per country from 2002-2013 as recorded
in the Zephyr database. Listed targets and targets not residing in the country of the seller are excluded. Data is
trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile according to deal value. The deals are assigned to the country of residence of
the seller company. The revealed deal volume is the sum of reported deal values. The total deal volume is obtained
by multiplying the average revealed deal volume in each country with the number of deals observed in this country.
Number of deals
Deal volume in bn US$ Corporate capital gains
tax rate, 2013Revealed Total
Australia 1,093 45.69 67.58 30.00
Austria 329 8.83 54.84 25.00
Belgium 456 10.84 53.15 0.04
Canada 810 31.60 57.53 20.27
Croatia 67 0.32 0.52 20.00
Cyprus 55 2.88 3.60 20.00
Denmark 724 13.84 66.35 0.00
Finland 1,126 8.53 57.84 0.00
France 1,695 57.30 227.45 4.33
Germany 2,263 62.22 322.20 1.48
Greece 171 2.92 5.37 26.00
Iceland 48 0.88 3.26 0.00
Ireland 120 7.02 11.54 0.00
Israel 118 5.10 6.68 25.00
Italy 1,181 65.28 122.77 1.57
Japan 2,144 44.19 89.72 42.00
Luxembourg 31 2.88 7.44 0.00
Mexico 58 5.98 10.21 30.00
Netherlands 1,619 39.80 261.90 0.00
New Zealand 166 4.91 10.31 0.00
Norway 870 16.55 51.79 0.00
Portugal 218 11.03 22.69 12.50
Slovenia 39 0.60 1.80 8.50
South Korea 209 13.39 15.38 24.20
Spain 1,216 45.51 125.49 0.00
Sweden 1,507 25.13 92.58 0.00
Switzerland 633 11.81 108.33 0.00
Turkey 237 22.39 30.14 20.00
United Kingdom 4,458 162.55 306.80 0.00
United States 5,885 335.81 823.10 39.28
Total 29,546 1,066 3,018.35
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Deals
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
τCG 886,380 13.110 13.775 0 42.1
τCIT 886,380 28.374 7.278 10 42.1
GDP 886,380 26.855 1.587 23.093 30.375
Growth 886,380 2.073 2.878 -9.132 11.113
Inflation 886,380 2.868 3.959 -5.205 52.851
Trade 886,380 4.310 0.502 3.009 5.853
Stock Market 886,380 0.737 0.495 0.080 3.264
Credit 860,160 1.018 0.471 0.002 3.122
Service Sector 843,120 67.911 14.125 0.561 87.470
Audit Quality 886,380 5.586 0.635 3.952 6.532
Industry Regulation 871,650 0.131 0.595 0.000 6.000
Start-up Time 886,380 19.207 19.793 0.500 138.000
Judicial Independence 856,834 7.246 1.818 2.333 9.597
Ease of Hiring 856,834 6.786 2.542 2.200 10.000
Credit Market Regulation 856,834 9.044 0.977 4.667 10.000
Contiguity 843,840 0.074 0.262 0 1
Language 843,840 0.128 0.334 0 1
Colony 843,840 0.075 0.263 0 1
Distance 843,840 8.045 1.184 2.951 9.885
Home 886,380 0.037 0.188 0 1
Total Assets 358,230 38.823 5.178 8.517 44.145
which the corporate capital gains tax rate is not relevant.16
For the analysis of corporate capital gains tax rates on total acquisition activity,
we aggregate the number and total value of deals by industry, country and year
according to the 3-digit U.S. SIC code of the target, residence of the selling firm
and the completion date of the deal. Using the completion date avoids a bias of
our estimate caused by timing issues when corporations anticipate tax changes and
announce deals in advance. Where the completion date is not available in Zephyr,
we compute it by taking the median number of days between announcement and
completion across the deals with available data in the same year and country and
adding this duration to the announcement date provided.17
16We have verified that the results are robust to including deals with listed targets.
17We conduct a robustness check by computing the time between announcement and completion
using nearest neighbor matching. In particular, we take the power-distance weighted average
over the five closest deals regarding announcement within the same country. Results are dis-
played in Table A.4.
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Table 2.2 gives an overview of the deals included in our estimation. It reports the
number and volume of deals by country of residence of the selling company. In total,
we consider 29,546 acquisitions with a revealed volume of $1,066 billion. In most of
these deals, the seller resided in one of the largest economies (i.e. the United States,
the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany) but a substantial number and volume of
deals are completed in several smaller countries such as Finland and Sweden, where
corporate capital gains tax reforms may have spurred acquisition activity.
Information on the industry-level variation in capital gains accumulation which
we exploit in our research design is obtained from CRSP. Consistent with Ayers
et al. (2003), we compute for each firm contained in CRSP the maximum capital
gain over 3 and 5 years as a share of the original price by dividing the difference
between the current price and the 3-year or 5-year low price by the latter. We take
the median within each industry (2-digit SIC code) and month and assign it to each
target according to the announcement date of the deal and the corresponding target
industry. In Table A.3 in Appendix A, we report median capital gains in our sample
for individual SIC divisions. The majority of targets operate in an industry of the
services and manufacturing division for which we estimate a median 3-year gain of
49.07% and 52.24%, respectively, which is within the range of figures obtained by
Ayers et al. (2003).
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics: Industries
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
No. of Deals (dom. target, all payments) 160,680 0.197 1.145 0 77
No. of Deals (dom. target, cash payment) 160,680 0.190 1.108 0 73
No. of Deals (all targets, all payments) 160,680 0.019 0.226 0 28
Value of Deals in bn US$ 160,680 0.007 0.077 0 5.557
Regulation 162,120 0.064 0.438 0 6
Prod. Growth Contribution 110,345 0.269 1.155 -5.545 7.099
Employment Growth 117,772 0.253 3.577 -33.872 28.632
Compensation Growth 114,947 2.749 4.338 -47.255 165.344
Unit Labor Cost Growth 114,947 1.780 6.896 -39.754 158.651
Summary statistics for the main variables are displayed in Table 2.3 and 2.4.
Macroeconomic controls were obtained from the World Banks’s World Development
Indicators Database. The audit and reporting quality indicator is an index provided
by the Global Competitiveness Report conducted by the World Economic Forum.
Additional industry-level controls were obtained from the OECD which provides
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industry-level indicators on the level of regulation as well as sector-level macroeco-
nomic variables. Table 2.4 presents summary statistics for these variables. A full list
of variables used in the analysis is presented in Table A.2 in the A.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Micro-level Evidence
Table 2.5 presents the results of the first step of our empirical analysis based on a
multinominal choice model. Column (1) displays the results of a conditional logit
regression. We consider a firm that has decided to acquire another firm and needs to
choose between a set of potential target locations i = 1, ..., l. The dependent variable
is equal to one if a location i is the actual location of the chosen target and equal
to zero if a location is a counterfactual target location.
We find a significant and negative coefficient of -0.007 for the corporate capital
gains tax rate, which translates into a semi-elasticity of -0.7% per percentage point
change in the corporate capital gains tax rate. Thus, a one percentage point increase
in the capital gains tax rate reduces the probability to observe a target there by
0.7%. Using derivations by Schmidheiny & Brülhart (2011) and Cameron & Trivedi
(2005), this implies, for instance, that the abolition of capital gains taxation of
inter-corporate acquisitions in the United States (39.28% in 201318) would increase
the number of acquisitions taking place there by 24%. To account for a potential
correlation of the target choice within industries and acquirer locations, we report
robust standard errors which are adjusted for clustering.19
In column (2), we add the interactions of the target location-fixed effects and the
acquirer size as additional controls. Table A.5 in Appendix A lists the coefficients of
the target-specific variables per acquirer location except for the United States which
serves as the country of reference. The coefficient on the corporate capital gains tax
rate remains significant and increases in magnitude to -0.01 (i.e. a semi-elasticity
of -1.0%). This points to a potential omitted variable bias when not controlling for
acquirer specific characteristics.
18Including state taxes.
19In particular, we allow for clustering on the location-industry level (double-digit SIC code) of
the acquirer. Clustering on the country choice level is not a feasible option because this leads to
inconsistent estimates of the corresponding variance-covariance matrix such that cluster-robust
standard errors cannot be computed (Cameron & Miller, 2011). As suggested by Cameron &
Miller (2015), we include country fixed effects to absorb within-alternative clustering while
allowing for standard errors clustered on the acquirer-location-industry level.
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Table 2.5: Multinominal Choice Model
This table reports the results of estimating a multinominal choice model where the dependent variable is equal to one if a location i
is the actual location of the chosen target and equal to zero if a location is a counterfactual target location. CG3Y and CG5Y are the
median maximum capital gains in the industry in which the target operates (2-digit SIC) at the deal announcement relative to the
3 and 5 years, respectively, prior to the deal announcement. Regressions (1) to (4) use a conditional logit model with target-country
fixed effects (not reported). Regression (2) adds the interactions of target-country fixed effects with the logarithm of total assets in the
acquirer as reported in the last available year prior to the acquisition as additional controls. Regressions (5) to (8) repeat regressions
(1) to (4) using a mixed logit model where the coefficient for the capital gains tax rate is randomized. All regressions include country-
fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at the acquirer-location-industry level) are provided in parentheses. Stars
behind coefficients indicate the significance level, ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
(1)
Conditional
(2)
Conditional
(3)
Conditional
(4)
Conditional
(5)
Mixed
(6)
Mixed
(5)
Mixed
(6)
Mixed
Logit Logit: Logit Logit Logit Logit: Logit Logit
Interaction Interaction
with Size with Size
τCG -0.007*** -0.010** -0.003 -0.005 -0.007** -0.013*** -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
τCG × CG3Y -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
τCG × CG5Y -0.003* -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002)
Audit Quality 0.315*** 0.166 0.302*** 0.308*** 0.314*** 0.179* 0.301*** 0.305***
(0.069) (0.103) (0.068) (0.069) (0.071) (0.106) (0.070) (0.070)
Growth 0.003 -0.016 0.006 0.004 0.000 -0.019 0.004 0.003
(0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012)
Trade 0.416 0.029 0.320 0.381 0.424 -0.003 0.315 0.371
(0.301) (0.434) (0.301) (0.301) (0.305) (0.441) (0.307) (0.305)
Credit 0.092 -0.092 0.087 0.099 0.090 -0.101 0.083 0.100
(0.111) (0.163) (0.111) (0.111) (0.113) (0.167) (0.113) (0.112)
GDP -0.150 1.221* -0.129 -0.099 -0.221 1.033 -0.196 -0.147
(0.468) (0.741) (0.468) (0.468) (0.486) (0.757) (0.486) (0.487)
Stock Market -0.203** -0.101 -0.202** -0.202** -0.206** -0.094 -0.204** -0.205**
(0.092) (0.139) (0.092) (0.092) (0.096) (0.143) (0.096) (0.096)
Inflation -0.017** -0.037*** -0.016** -0.016** -0.018*** -0.039*** -0.018*** -0.017**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Service Sector -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
τCIT -0.009 -0.019** -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.021** -0.011* -0.012*
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Start-up Time 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Jud. Independence 0.113*** 0.073* 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.115*** 0.080** 0.112*** 0.114***
(0.027) (0.039) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.040) (0.028) (0.028)
Ease of Hiring 0.023 0.014 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.015 0.017 0.018
(0.020) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021)
Credit Market Reg. -0.040 -0.075* -0.048* -0.042 -0.051* -0.081** -0.060** -0.054*
(0.029) (0.039) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.041) (0.029) (0.029)
Industry Regulation -0.146** -0.223*** -0.147** -0.147** -0.153** -0.232*** -0.152** -0.152**
(0.070) (0.079) (0.070) (0.070) (0.073) (0.081) (0.073) (0.073)
Contiguity -0.496*** -0.203* -0.491*** -0.492*** -0.417*** -0.150 -0.413*** -0.413***
(0.103) (0.111) (0.102) (0.102) (0.100) (0.104) (0.100) (0.100)
Language 0.491*** 0.172 0.485*** 0.485*** 0.402*** 0.157 0.397*** 0.398***
(0.101) (0.138) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100) (0.132) (0.100) (0.100)
Colony 0.628*** 0.536*** 0.632*** 0.632*** 0.506*** 0.416*** 0.510*** 0.509***
(0.081) (0.120) (0.081) (0.081) (0.078) (0.117) (0.078) (0.078)
Distance -0.891*** -0.973*** -0.891*** -0.890*** -0.992*** -1.115*** -0.991*** -0.991***
(0.036) (0.044) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.048) (0.039) (0.039)
Home 2.461*** 2.293*** 2.462*** 2.463*** 2.457*** 2.187*** 2.459*** 2.459***
(0.076) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076) (0.078) (0.075) (0.077) (0.077)
Observations 714,795 297,430 712,134 712,134 714,795 297,430 712,134 712,134
Pseudo LL -26,012 -11,936 -25,927 -25,930 -25,907 -11,895 -25,820 -25,822
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In columns (3) and (4) we add the interactions between the corporate capital
gains tax rate and the 3-year and 5-year capital gain in the industry that the target
operates in. In this specification, the coefficient for the interaction term captures the
direct impact of capital gains taxation on the location choice via the lock-in effect
on seller shares as the size of the capital gains tax rate only becomes relevant if
there exist locked-in capital gains. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term
is significantly negative, which implies that the association of capital gains taxation
and takeover dynamics is indeed caused by a lock-in of seller shares in targets with
high capital gains accumulation.
Besides the corporate capital gains tax rate, we find inflation, corporate taxa-
tion and distance to have a significant and negative effect on M&A activity. High
inflation may deter M&A activity, since it is associated with greater uncertainty.
The negative coefficient on the corporate tax rate expresses the well-known nega-
tive effect of corporate taxation on FDI. Distance increases transaction costs and
thus decreases the likelihood to observe FDI. The indicators Home and Colony also
proxy for transaction costs: Acquiring a target in the acquirer location facilitates
the transfer of ownership for various reasons (legal, language, culture, etc.). To a
lesser extent, the same argument applies to acquisitions in former colonies. Consis-
tent with prior studies, industry regulation reduces the probability of locating in a
particular country while an increase in institutional quality, as measured by the au-
dit and reporting quality index and the judicial independence index, has a positive
impact on takeover dynamics.
The conditional logit regressions may be inconsistent if the assumption of inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is violated. In the mixed logit approach,
in which the vector of coefficients for τCG is allowed to be random, one can relax
this assumption. In column (5) to (8) of Table 2.5, we apply a mixed logit estima-
tor following Train (2009, p. 138). We report the average coefficient obtained from
simulating the maximum likelihood as a benchmark. Apart from the different esti-
mation approach, the specifications in columns (5) to (8) are identical to the ones
in columns (1) to (4), respectively, in terms of covariates and the computation of
standard errors. The coefficient obtained in column (5) is similar to that for the
conditional logit estimation and suggests that the average probability for an M&A
deal to take place in a particular location increases by 0.7% per percentage point
decrease in the corporate capital gains tax rate.
Switching to the mixed logit approach does not affect the results but it increases
the coefficient from 0.010 to 0.013 (compare column (2) and (6)), when we include the
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interaction of acquirer characteristics and target location-fixed effects. The estimated
average coefficient of -0.013 in column (6) implies a semi-elasticity of 1.29%. For
specification (5), we also simulate specific values for each acquirer following Train
(2009, p. 256). The density estimates for the latter are presented in Figure A.1 in
Appendix A. The estimated standard deviation in each case is highly significant.
This suggests that randomizing the coefficient of τCG is indeed a valid approach.
2.4.2 Country-level Aggregation
In Table 2.6, we present the results of the second step of our empirical analysis
using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator and the number
of M&A deals aggregated at the seller-country level as the dependent variable. We
cluster standard errors at the country level. Column (1) presents the results of
our main specification. We obtain a negative and significant coefficient for τCG. A
1 percentage point decrease in the corporate capital gains tax rate increases the
number of M&As by about 1% per year. To demonstrate that our estimation result
does not suffer from inappropriate clustering over a small number of clusters, we
follow the suggestion of Cameron & Miller (2015) and also present an estimation
using the score wild bootstrap method developed by Kline & Santos (2012) to obtain
standard errors in column (3).
Audit and reporting quality, global economic integration and economic growth
all increase the level of M&A activity. For instance, the results suggest that an
increase in our index for audit quality by 1 point, which approximately resembles
the institutional improvements in Turkey between 2006 and 2012, increases M&A
activity by 85.52%.
In column (4) we verify that the results are not driven by countries that position
themselves as a preferable location for holding companies. Potential candidates in
our sample are Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and Switzer-
land because of their lack of substantial Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules
and the dividend and capital gains tax exemption granted.20 While these countries
have low tax rates for corporate capital gains, the factors that actually raise acqui-
sition activity there may be unrelated to taxation. This could induce a downward
bias in our estimate. We thus re-estimate the model excluding the countries cited
above. The coefficient for τCG remains significantly negative with very similar point
estimates.
20Smith (2011) reviews the relevant rules in these countries in more detail.
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Table 2.6: Corporate Capital Gains Tax and Acquisition Activity
Estimation with PPML. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is the number of M&A deals per year and country in which a
corporate seller disposes of shares in a target firm residing in the same country. Regression (3) repeats regression (2) sample and
computes standard errors using the score wild bootstrap method proposed by Kline & Santos (2012). Wald test t-statistics for this
approach are reported in parentheses. In regression (4) countries which are referred to as preferred holding locations are excluded.
Regression (5) uses as dependent variable the sum of all values of M&A deals per year and country in which a corporate seller
disposes of shares in a target firm residing in the same country. All regressions include target-country- and year-fixed effects. Cluster
robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are provided in parentheses for Regressions (1), (2), (4) and (5). Stars behind
coefficients indicate the significance level, ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
(1)
Full Sample
(2)
Full Sample
(3)
Bootstrap
(4)
w/o Holding
(5)
Deal Value
Locations
τCG -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (-2.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Audit Quality 0.619*** 0.443*** 0.443*** 0.390*** 0.370**
(0.163) (0.113) (2.793) (0.129) (0.148)
Growth 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.040** 0.040*** 0.011
(0.012) (0.014) (2.373) (0.015) (0.020)
Trade 1.427** 1.310** 1.310** 1.544*** 0.436
(0.621) (0.591) (1.353) (0.568) (1.141)
Credit 0.122 0.058 0.058 0.121 -0.803***
(0.121) (0.126) (0.407) (0.120) (0.246)
GDP -0.829 -0.889 -0.889 -0.601 3.136***
(1.293) (1.060) (-0.774) (0.996) (1.116)
Stock Market 0.214 0.178 0.178 0.277* 0.456**
(0.166) (0.148) (1.063) (0.167) (0.222)
Inflation -0.020** -0.021** -0.021 -0.019** -0.048***
(0.009) (0.008) (-1.375) (0.009) (0.014)
Service Sector 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.060**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.454) (0.015) (0.025)
τCIT 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.018* 0.005
(0.013) (0.011) (0.778) (0.011) (0.023)
Start-up Time -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.004
(0.002) (-0.498) (0.001) (0.003)
Jud. Independence 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.187*** 0.074
(0.056) (2.444) (0.055) (0.073)
Ease of Hiring -0.034 -0.034 -0.031 0.042
(0.033) (-0.946) (0.038) (0.059)
Credit Market Reg. 0.072** 0.072* 0.088*** -0.003
(0.028) (1.618) (0.026) (0.053)
Observations 333 313 313 266 313
No. of countries 30 29 29 24 29
Pseudo LL -1,453 -1,310 -1,422 -1,137 -7.006e+07
If our results capture a quantity effect of corporate capital gains taxes, we should
be able to observe this in both the count and volume of M&A deals. To verify that
this is indeed the case, we re-estimate our results using aggregated deal values as the
dependent variable. The results are presented in column (5). Again, the coefficient
for the capital gains tax rate is significantly negative. With a magnitude of -0.014
in our main specification, it suggests that decreasing the corporate capital gains
tax rate by one percentage point raises the total volume of acquisitions by 1.39%
per year. As the effects on the number and the volume of M&As are similar, the
quantity effect of corporate capital gains taxation appears to be homogeneous across
size classes. Thus, the results regarding the quantity of the lock-in effect caused by
30
2.4 Empirical Results
corporate capital gains taxes cannot simply be explained by a change in the size of
M&A deals.
2.4.3 Industry-level Aggregation
Table 2.7 presents the results of the third step of our empirical analysis based on
an industry-level aggregation. Column (1) contains the basic fixed-effects estimation
with target-location-specific controls. The coefficient for the corporate capital gains
tax rate is significantly negative and similar in magnitude to those estimated using
country-level aggregates. Again, a one percentage point decrease in the capital gains
tax rate is expected to increase the number of M&As per industry by 1%. This find-
ing is robust to adding further controls with respect to industry-specific policies and
macroeconomic shocks in column (2). Consistent with previous findings, industry
deregulation, indicated by a decrease in our regulation index, raises M&A activ-
ity in the respective industry. However, these industry-level developments cannot
explain the decreasing effect of corporate capital gains taxation on M&A activity
as the respective coefficient remains similar to the previous specification. The re-
sults are also not driven by holding locations which we exclude from the sample in
the regression of column (3). In column (4), we again use the total deal volume in
the industry-country-year cell as the dependent variable. The coefficient of interest
remains negative and significant, and is similar in magnitude to estimates at the
country-level.
2.4.4 Comparison Group Approach
Table 2.8 reports the results of the final step of our analysis. We compare the evolu-
tion of acquisition activity between individual and corporate sellers. While corporate
sellers are affected by changes in the corporate capital gains tax rate, non-corporate
sellers are not. However, all deals are affected by general macro-economic and policy
shocks. This approach therefore allows us to separate the direct impact of capi-
tal gains tax changes on acquisition activity from the influence of other coinciding
events. In column (1), we report the results of a regression including only the cor-
porate capital gains tax rate and time and location specific fixed effects as well as
their interactions with the seller-type indicators CORPS. As expected, the coef-
ficient of τCG × CORPS is negative and significant. This suggests that corporate
capital gains taxation has a negative effect on the number of acquisitions involving
corporate sellers relative to the number of acquisitions involving sellers which are
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Table 2.7: Regression Results: Industry Level
Estimation with PPML. The dependent variable is the number of M&A deals per year, country and 3-digit U.S. SIC in which the seller
disposes of shares in a target firm residing in the same country and receives a compensation that involves a cash payment. Regression
(1) contains the main specification. Regression (2) adds industry-level controls. In regression (3) countries which are referred to as
preferred holding locations are excluded. Regression (4) uses as dependent variable the sum of all values of M&A deals per year and
country in which a corporate seller disposes of shares in a target firm residing in the same country. All regressions include target-
country-, year- and industry-fixed effects, as well as U.S. SIC division-specific year fixed effects. Cluster robust standard (clustered
at the country level) errors are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗
1%.
(1)
Benchmark
(2)
Industry
(3)
w/o Holding
(4)
Deal Value
Controls Locations
τCG -0.010*** -0.009** -0.011*** -0.013**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Audit Quality 0.452*** 0.414*** 0.342*** 0.481***
(0.113) (0.105) (0.113) (0.168)
Growth 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.035** 0.032
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.026)
Trade 1.214** 0.849* 0.969** 0.552
(0.615) (0.482) (0.476) (1.129)
Credit 0.062 -0.083 -0.036 -0.832***
(0.134) (0.110) (0.120) (0.245)
GDP -0.946 0.165 0.359 4.000***
(1.083) (1.132) (1.120) (1.499)
Stock Market 0.188 0.235 0.310 0.499*
(0.156) (0.174) (0.190) (0.267)
Inflation -0.023*** -0.031 -0.023 -0.049*
(0.009) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027)
Service Sector -0.001 0.033 0.042** 0.069
(0.002) (0.021) (0.020) (0.044)
τCIT 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.013
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.024)
Start-up Time -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Jud. Independence 0.172*** 0.178*** 0.186*** 0.099
(0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.077)
Ease of Hiring -0.035 -0.026 -0.012 0.039
(0.035) (0.032) (0.031) (0.064)
Credit Market Regulations 0.070** 0.091*** 0.101*** -0.002
(0.029) (0.025) (0.023) (0.068)
Regulation -0.267** -0.253* -0.147
(0.136) (0.136) (0.188)
Prod. Growth Contribution 0.046 0.044 0.068
(0.036) (0.037) (0.059)
Employment Growth 0.018 0.019 0.003
(0.014) (0.015) (0.022)
Compensation Growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Unit Labor Cost Growth 0.004 0.005 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Observations 118,030 76,543 71,871 75,037
No. of countries 30 24 21 24
Pseudo LL -43497.586 -36671.113 -34119.912 -1.742e+09
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not liable for corporate income taxation.
Our findings are robust to including the full set of control variables as well as their
interaction with the seller-type indicator in column (2). The estimated semi-elasticity
for inter-corporate acquisition activity with respect to a percentage point change in
the corporate capital gains tax rate (i.e. γ1 + γ2 from specification (2.12)) is -0.011
(p-value 0.003), which is similar to our benchmark estimates reported in Table 2.6.
In columns (3) and (4), we verify that this result is consistent across various sample
specifications. We first exclude all stock-for-stock deals in column (3) thus reducing
the sample to deals with cash payments which are directly affected by capital gains
taxation. In column (4), we relax the sample restriction on sellers disposing their
domestic subsidiaries and extend the sample to also include deals where a firm
sells a foreign subsidiary. In both specifications the coefficient for τCG × CORPS
is significant and negative with an estimated semi-elasticity of -0.014 and -0.012 in
regressions (3) and (4), respectively.
Table 2.8: Comparison Group Approach
Estimation with PPML. The dependent variable is the number of M&A deals per year, country and seller type. Column (1) and
(2) only include deals in which the seller disposes of shares in a target firm residing in the same country. Regression (3) restricts
the sample of regressions (1) and (2) to deals with cash payments. Column (4) presents the results of a regression including also
deals with foreign sellers. All regressions include seller-type specific year fixed effects and seller-type specific country-fixed effects.
Regressions (2) to (4) also include macro-level controls presented in Table A.6 in the Appendix. Cluster robust standard (clustered
at the country-level) errors are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗
1%.
Full Sample Only Cash Including Foreign
Payments Sellers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τCG 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
τCG × CORPS -0.018** -0.013** -0.014** -0.012*
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
CORPS 0.363 -40.356 -38.499 -55.223
(0.321) (51.025) (54.019) (56.827)
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 780 626 626 626
No. of countries 30 29 29 29
Pseudo LL -3,286 -2,311 -2,257 -2,326
Throughout the various specifications in Table 2.8, the estimated coefficient for
τCG, which captures the effect of corporate capital gains taxation on deals involving
primarily individual sellers, is small and not significant. This indicates that these
deals are not affected by reductions in the corporate capital gains tax rate. Given
that deals with individual sellers are affected by changes in the macro-economic
environment as well as policy adjustments unrelated to corporate taxation, this
finding reassures us of the causality in our empirical findings as it links the effect
of cuts in the corporate capital gains tax rate directly to the behavior of corporate
sellers.
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Finally, the estimated coefficients for CORPS in Table 2.8 capture general level
differences between the number of deals with and without individual sellers. Since
country-specific and time-specific level differences are already captured in the inter-
action with CORPS and the corresponding fixed effects, it is not surprising that the
estimated coefficient for CORPS is insignificant or even negative when conditioning
on macro-economic variables in columns (2) to (4).
2.4.5 Robustness
In this section, we present a range of tests to verify the robustness of our estimation
results. Columns (1a-c) to (3a-c) of Table 2.9 contain several sample checks. In
a first step, we note that our benchmark specification also includes deals that do
not include some form of cash payment but are exclusively paid through stock-for-
stock transfers. In many countries, these deals allow the seller company to defer the
realization and thus also the taxation of capital gains until the shares received in
compensation are eventually sold. As a consequence, such deals are generally less
affected by capital gains taxation than deals that involve some sort of cash payment.
There are two important reasons for including these deals in the benchmark sam-
ple. On the one hand, this ensures that the results are not driven by a choice of
payment effect, which has been reported for individual capital gains taxation by
Ayers et al. (2004). It would imply that corporate capital gains tax reforms merely
lead to different forms of payment, but do not affect the overall number of deals.
On the other hand, sellers that agree to deals in order to unlock corporate equity
may quickly sell shares received in stock-for-stock deals and may thus also be af-
fected by corporate capital gains taxation. Nevertheless, even though it is helpful to
include stock-for-stock deals in our main sample, the results should not be driven
by such transactions. We thus exclude them in columns (1a-c) and re-estimate the
choice and count models using our main specification. Again, we obtain negative
and significant coefficients of a very similar magnitude.
In a second check, we add deals with foreign sellers: a corporate seller resident in
country A sells shares in a subsidiary resident in country B. These transactions have
been excluded since many countries - differing from the case where the seller and
its subsidiary are resident in the same country - do not tax capital gains from these
deals (e.g. Australia, Turkey). Furthermore, multinational enterprises generally have
various possibilities to avoid taxation (e.g. through holding companies). Results from
a robustness check including deals with foreign sellers are reported in columns (2a-c)
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of Table 2.9. The estimated coefficients remain negative and significant and decrease
only slightly in magnitude. The latter observation may reflect that these deals are
indeed less affected by corporate capital gains taxation.
In columns (3a-c) of Table 2.9, we add industry shocks and the long-term interest
rate as further control variables which are only available for a limited number of
countries in our sample. Following Ayers et al. (2007), industry shocks are defined as
the standard deviation in value added growth across eight sectors within a country to
account for sector specific shocks that may increase acquisition activity by triggering
sector specific consolidation. Including both variables leaves the capital gains tax
rate coefficient virtually unchanged.
2.5 Shareholder Loss
We use our coefficient estimates to determine the potential value loss for share-
holders resulting from unrealized synergies due to the taxation of capital gains in
inter-corporate M&As. This is obtained by calculating the potential increase in
shareholder value resulting from a full exemption of inter-corporate M&As from
capital gains taxation. Acquisition premia reported in Zephyr are employed as a
market-based proxy of this gain. First, we compute the expected country-specific
and industry-specific shareholder gain per deal using the information on M&As
around the globe in the Zephyr database. Next, we derive the expected change in
the number of deals within a country and sector following a reduction in the corpo-
rate income tax rate on gains realized in M&As using our elasticity estimates from
the benchmark regressions above. Finally, these figures are used to calculate the an-
nual shareholder gain from such a tax reform which corresponds to the shareholder
loss of upholding capital gains taxation on corporate M&As.
The potential target shareholder gain of a deal f is derived from its acquisition
price. The latter can be expressed in terms of the underlying market value of the
target, mf and the premium pif (as a percentage of the market value) paid by the
acquirer and is given by pf = (1 + pif )mf . From this expression we back out the
shareholder gain of a deal as gf = pifmf = pif1+pif pf .
To compute the expected shareholder gain per deal, we use data on M&As from
Zephyr. p is approximated by the average transaction size in US$ within a country
and sector in our sample, p¯is. The acquisition premium pi of a deal is defined as the
deal value less the market price of the target one day prior to the announcement
divided by the latter. As an estimate of the expected acquisition premium, we use
36
2.5 Shareholder Loss
the average within each country and sector, p¯iis. The expected gain per deal in sector
s of country i is thus given by
g¯is =
p¯iis
1 + p¯iis
p¯is. (2.13)
Approximating gains of failed deals with those observed in realized deals is appropri-
ate as long as the distribution of synergies is similar for both groups. In our analysis,
we focus on deals that failed because of a high tax burden resulting from large capi-
tal gains accruing to the target. We thus require past gains of a firm to be unrelated
to the synergy gains resulting from a potential M&A. Given that synergistic gains
usually stem from structural complementarity between acquirer and target rather
than existing financial wealth in the target firm (see Bradley et al., 1988) and that
retained gains in the target should generally be fully captured by the acquisition
price, this appears to be a reasonable assumption in our setting.
In a second step, we simulate the impact of a full exemption of capital gains taxes
on the number of deals within a country and sector using our elasticity estimates
from the micro-level estimation. In doing so, we employ the most robust estimate
obtained from the mixed logit estimation in column (5) of Table 2.5. As shown
by Guimaraes et al. (2003) and Schmidheiny & Brülhart (2011), the change in the
expected number of deals in a country i with respect to a one percentage point
change in the capital gains tax rate for a particular deal f can be expressed as
if =
(
1− Φˆif
)
γˆf where Φˆif is the predicted probability for the acquisition of a
target in location i and γˆf is the estimated coefficient of τCGit for deal f . Φˆif and γˆf
are obtained from the mixed logit estimation. The mean elasticity of location i is then
given by ¯i =
(
1− ¯ˆΦi
)
¯ˆγi and the change in the number of deals following a capital
gains tax exemption in sector s in location i is N¯is ×
(
exp
(
¯i × dτCGi
)
− 1
)
where
N¯is is the average number of deals per year in this sector and dτCGi is the modeled
tax cut. We consider a full exemption of capital gains from corporate taxation at
the rates applied in 2013.
The yearly shareholder loss Γis in country i and sector s is then given by
Γis = N¯is ×
(
exp
(
¯i × dτCGi
)
− 1
)
× g¯is. (2.14)
We group deals according to their target SIC code into four broad sectors: Mining
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Table 2.10: Shareholder Loss (in million US$)
This table displays the yearly shareholder loss in million US$ caused by corporate capital gains taxation of the transfer of shares in
inter-corporate M&A. The shareholder loss is defined as the foregone gain from all failed M&A deals.
(a) Shareholder Loss from Relocation of Deals
Australia Canada Japan United States
Corporate Capital Gains Tax Rate, 2013 30.00 20.27 42.00 39.28
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 17.33 33.71 81.13 530.03
Manufacturing 37.45 38.12 196.82 1,238.80
Mining and Construction 44.05 22.64 4.42 147.48
Services 38.10 56.83 183.83 1,113.22
Other 35.04 28.46 79.48 1,198.79
Total 171.97 179.76 545.68 4,228.32
(b) Shareholder Loss from Failed of Deals
Australia Canada Japan United States
Corporate Capital Gains Tax Rate, 2013 30.00 20.27 42.00 39.28
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 29.02 55.43 143.74 1,166.78
Manufacturing 62.70 62.67 348.73 2,727.06
Mining and Construction 73.75 37.22 7.84 324.66
Services 58.66 46.79 140.83 2,638.97
Other 63.79 93.42 325.70 2,450.61
Total 287.92 295.53 966.84 9,308.08
and Construction (1000-1799), Manufacturing (2000-3999), Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate (6000-6799) and Services (7000-8999).
Panel (a) of Table 2.10 presents the computed annual shareholder loss related to
capital gains taxation in inter-corporate M&A deals for Australia, Canada, Japan
and the United States. All of these economies still levied capital gains taxes on
corporate acquisitions in 2013. The computed shareholder losses are substantial,
most notably in Japan and the United States where corporate sellers face particularly
high tax rates. Our estimates suggest that a full exemption of capital gains from
corporate M&A deals would generate a shareholder gain in the market for corporate
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control of $0.55 billion per year in Japan and $4.2 billion per year in the United
States.
The underlying assumption of the elasticity obtained in the mixed logit estimation
is that the overall number of M&As is constant and not affected by tax adjustments
in individual locations. The results in Table 2.10 (a) thus represent the shareholder
loss in a particular country that results from the location choice of the acquirers.
However, acquirers often have a strong preference for a particular location. This is
true especially for large capital markets such as the United States and leads to a
more pronounced decrease in acquisition activity there because not pursuing a deal
at all may be a more realistic outside option for acquirers than looking for a similar
target in another country. The effect of capital gains taxation on the number of
realized M&As in this setting is estimated in our PPML model in Table 2.6. The
coefficient estimate from a Poisson regression can directly be interpreted as the semi-
elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to the corresponding regressor. We
thus re-estimate the shareholder loss under the assumption that the overall number
of deals is not fixed by replacing ¯i with the coefficient estimate from our benchmark
regression presented in column (2) in Table 2.6.
The results of this exercise are presented in Panel (b) of Table 2.10. As expected,
the computed shareholder loss is significantly larger when compared to the figures
in Panel (a). The difference is especially pronounced for the United States which
has a large domestic M&A market. When allowing for the overall number of deals
to be affected by the capital gains tax rate, the resulting shareholder loss is $9.3
billion per year in the United States. The true value of the target shareholder loss
is expected to be somewhere between the estimates in Panel (a) and (b). However,
for a large economy such as the United States, it is more realistic to assume that it
is closer to the figure in Panel (b).
There are several benefits from using realized deal premia as a proxy for forgone
M&A gains from unrealized deals. First, the premium explicitly reflects the pre-
tax financial gains of the selling shareholders (or the shareholders of the selling
company). It thus measures the potential loss which the shareholders incur if the deal
fails. Second, the deal premium is related to the synergy measure in our theoretical
framework above (∆). If investors behave rationally, the premium should partly
contain the increase in the cash flow the acquirer is expecting to generate from
the target (e.g. through synergy gains, see Bradley et al., 1988). A higher level of
expected synergies should thus be reflected in higher premiums.
A disadvantage of using deal premia is that it only fully captures the seller gain
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while the acquirer gain is not directly included. The degree to which the premium
reflects the overall synergy gain from the deal effectively depends on the bargaining
power of each participant. The premium is equal to the full synergy gain only when
the seller has the full bargaining power. The premium thus constitutes a lower bound
for the overall synergy gain of the deal. Another issue is directly related to capital
gains taxation. As target shareholders may demand a higher premium to be com-
pensated for capital gains taxes due upon deal completion (see Ayers et al., 2003),
the actual gains to the seller may be overstated by the premium. Note, however,
that we are interested in the overall shareholder gain. Unless there exist substantial
information asymmetries, this cannot be smaller than the realized premium. Thus,
even if overestimating the seller gain, the premium remains a conservative lower
bound for the overall shareholder gain.
2.6 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate whether and to what extent corporate capital gains
taxes inhibit shareholder value creation by preventing M&A deals through the lock-
in effect. The results suggest a significantly negative impact of capital gains taxes
on the realization of M&As in a particular location. Presenting micro-level evidence
based on a conditional or mixed logit approach, we find that a decrease in a country’s
corporate capital gains tax rate by one percentage point increases the likelihood
to observe a target in that country by 0.7%. Our estimates of the magnitude of
this effect are larger when we account for acquirer size. These results are robust to
accounting for endogeneity due to unobserved confounding factors and heterogeneity
in the effect across acquiring firms.
Presenting country and country-industry level evidence based on a panel-data
PPML model, we arrive at a significantly negative coefficient for the corporate cap-
ital gains tax rate of -0.010. The estimate is slightly larger if we use the total deal
value instead of the number of acquisitions as the dependent variable. Here, we ob-
tain a coefficient of -0.014 which translates into an increase of acquisition activity
by 1.4% as a reaction to a capital gains tax rate decrease by one percentage point.
Based on these results, we estimate the potential shareholder loss caused by cor-
porate capital gains taxation in terms of foregone gains from M&A deals. For exam-
ple, we consider a decrease of the United States tax rate on corporate capital gains
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(39.28% in 201321) to zero. Evaluated at the country mean for 2002-2013, this would
imply an additional annual shareholder gain of $4.2 billion in the United States when
only considering the effect of the capital gains taxation on the location choice of the
acquirer. If we assume that capital gains taxation also affects the overall number
of deals, which is more realistic in large capital markets, the estimated shareholder
loss amounts to $9.3 billion per year in the United States.
These findings have several important implications. First, lowering the capital
gains tax rate at the corporate level appears to be an effective instrument to foster
acquisition activity. Tax cuts are thus worth considering, in particular in several large
economies where capital gains tax rates are still high (e.g. United States, Australia,
Canada, Japan) and the potential for M&As is substantial.
Second, using international data the results suggest a lock-in effect on inter-
corporate acquisitions that is smaller than those previously estimated in time-series
studies for individual shareholder taxation (e.g. Ayers et al., 2007). This may partly
reflect the use of different samples but also indicates that, on the global scale, cor-
porations are less reactive to capital gains taxes in their acquisition behavior than
individuals. One reason for this may be that capital gains taxation directly affects
individual shareholders’ income whereas managers who make decisions at the cor-
porate level are only indirectly affected via the impact of annual firm yields on their
reputation and can take a more long-term view on acquisitions. Nevertheless, the im-
pact of corporate capital gains taxation on the M&A market is still substantial since
inter-corporate acquisitions make up a much larger share of the overall acquisition
activity.
Third, our results imply that corporate tax reforms which reduce capital gains
taxes may be self-financing to a certain degree as has been previously suggested for
the case of shareholder taxation (e.g. Feldstein et al., 1980). Although the increase
in acquisition activity may not fully compensate the revenue loss, in particular if
capital gains are fully exempt, potential efficiency gains would still raise government
revenue from taxing higher corporate profits and shareholder returns.
Our estimate of the efficiency loss of corporate capital gains taxation in M&As
takes the shareholder perspective. The overall economic effect of increased M&A ac-
tivity caused by lower corporate capital gains taxation depends on a range of factors
not included in this measure. These encompass externalities such as the potentially
inefficient use of production factors in transition periods and market distortion re-
sulting from limited competition after mergers. Therefore, it remains an interesting
21Including state taxes.
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question for future research whether and under what circumstances lower corporate
capital gains taxation triggers acquisitions that improve corporate performance, for
example with regard to productivity. Besides broadening the understanding of the
market for corporate control, this would provide further insights into the distortive
impact of corporate capital gains taxes.
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3.1 Introduction
The international transmission of technologies and innovation is a major driver of
global productivity growth. An important device in this process are corporate merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&As) which provide direct inter-regional links between firms
and open up channels for technology transfers (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2008). How-
ever, whether or not the potential productivity gain in these transactions mate-
rializes strongly depends on the post-merger behavior of the combined firm.1 In
this paper, we investigate how firm-level adjustment after M&As is affected by dif-
ferences in profit taxation between the target and the acquirer. These differences
regularly occur in cross-border mergers and are thus likely to influence productivity
improvements in the firms involved in these deals.
Our main finding is that tax differentials between the target and the acquirer loca-
tion reduce post-merger productivity gains by distorting the reallocation of activity
within the combined firm. Since the firm’s objective is to maximize its net profit,
it takes into account both the productivity and the corporate tax implications of a
potential location choice. If the more productive unit resides in the location with the
more favorable tax regime, the resulting allocation choice assigns production to the
most productive units irrespective of the actual tax rate differential. However, if the
more efficient unit happens to reside in a location with a higher tax burden, firms
face a trade-off. Shifting activity to the high-tax location raises overall productivity
but also increases the tax burden on the resulting profits. For large enough tax dif-
ferences, the firm allocates activity to the less productive but more profitable unit.
With regard to the overall productivity of the merged firm, this decision is inefficient
1Throughout the paper we use the terms merger, acquisition and M&A interchangeably. Even
though the individual deal types certainly differ in their structure, they all result in a combi-
nation of two firms which is the key issue in our analysis.
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and leads to a lower gain in productivity resulting from the M&A. This mechanism
only occurs when firms cannot separate the location of productive activity from the
location of its taxation. If firms were able to assign profits to the location of their
preference (i.e. the location with the lowest tax rate), tax differences would not be
relevant. In practice, such profit shifting activity is limited by domestic and interna-
tional regulations and because firms usually incur some shifting cost. Nevertheless,
the impact of tax differentials may be mitigated if firms engage in profit shifting
activities such as transfer pricing.
The described effect is generally not unique to M&As but would be caused by any
event that changes tax differentials within multinational groups (e.g. tax reforms).
However, the reallocation of activity within existing groups of firms is usually as-
sociated with a high fixed cost and thus rarely observed. In contrast, while M&As
themselves usually constitute a high fixed cost investment (Jovanovic & Rousseau,
2002), the subsequent reorganization after such a transaction provides an oppor-
tunity to exploit returns to scale at a relatively small cost and consolidate units
operating in the merging firms that perform similar functions. As a consequence,
substantial restructuring within the newly formed enterprise is common. In such an
environment, the fixed cost of a reallocation of functions is weighted less heavily and
firms are likely to react to tax differentials.
Below, we formulate a simple theoretical model to demonstrate this mechanism.
We then investigate the impact of tax differentials on merger-induced productivity
gains empirically. For this purpose we combine data on M&As from Bureau van
Dijk’s Zephyr database with firm-level information on inputs and outputs from the
AMADEUS and ORBIS databases. An advantage of these databases is that they
provide balance sheet data that is comparable across borders which makes them a
prime data source for the study of firms in an international context (e.g. Cravino &
Levchenko, 2017). First, we derive total factor productivity (TFP) for each individ-
ual firm within the sample of industry peers using the estimation method of Levin-
sohn & Petrin (2003). We then compute the TFP change resulting from an M&A
deal and relate it to the absolute tax difference between the target and the acquirer.
Our estimations, which include a large set of country-, deal-, and firm-specific con-
trols, suggest that an increase in the absolute tax differential by 1 percentage point
lowers the merger-induced productivity gain by 4.5%. We also show that this effect
is mitigated when transfer pricing regulations are less strict. In a complementary
analysis, we turn to the underlying mechanisms of this effect. Results of a fixed
effects model and an event study suggest that the impact of the tax differential is
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asymmetric in the sense that the observed effect is mainly driven by deals where the
level of taxation in the target location is lower than the one in the acquirer location.
Following these transactions, the adjustment process in the target is hampered by
the distorting tax incentive as firms make less reductions to employment and capital
in the target firms involved. This finding is consistent with the notion that firms
leave activity in the location with the lower tax burden which raises after-tax profit
but also implies that some productivity gains from the M&A are not realized and
the overall increase in productivity is smaller or even negative.
Our paper thus contributes novel insights to the growing literature on corporate
M&As and taxation. Various studies have identified tax policy to be an impor-
tant driver of M&A activity (e.g. Di Giovanni, 2005; Erel et al., 2012; Feld et al.,
2016b,a).2 Furthermore, taxes do not only influence whether but also how firms con-
duct M&As. For example, Ayers et al. (2004) and Faccio & Masulis (2005) show that
capital gains taxation affects the method of payment in M&As. All of these studies
investigate the role of tax rates as a determinant of the observed pattern of M&As
and thus essentially focus on the effect of taxation before the M&A is completed. In
contrast, our paper highlights the importance of the tax environment after the M&A
completion. Existing studies with regard to this aspect have mainly examined the
importance of taxation on financial variables. For instance, Ayers et al. (2003) and
Huizinga et al. (2012) study realized deal values and show that shareholder-level
taxation has a strong effect on deal premiums. In our analysis, we are interested
in real outcomes of M&A. Huizinga & Voget (2009) and Voget (2011) show that
taxes are an important determinant for the post-merger choice of headquarter lo-
cation within the merged firm. However, while these allocation choices constitute
real behavioral responses of firms, they have only minor effects on the structure of
production within the firm. Our investigation focuses on taxation as a determinant
of post-merger allocation of productive input factors and therefore reveals new in-
sights into how tax differences affect the productive process and the evolution of
productivity within the firm.
Thus, we also complement the large literature on productivity effects of M&As.
Generally, M&As are perceived as an opportunity for productivity improvements.
Results by Li (2013) suggest that this potential is indeed realized, mostly because
the acquiring firm uses input factors of the target more efficiently. Other M&A
2In yet another study on M&A determinants, Rossi & Volpin (2004) do not include taxation in
their estimations but acknowledge that taxes are a potential determinant of the deal volume
which is, however, too complex an issue to deal with in the broad scope of their paper.
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outcomes that may have a positive impact on firm productivity are an increased level
of innovation (Stiebale, 2016), knowledge transfers (Bresman et al., 1999; Bena & Li,
2014) and increased management efficiency (Wang & Xie, 2009). For cross-border
takeovers, the positive effect of M&As on productivity is probably less pronounced.
Foreign firms usually acquire the most productive firms in a country (Criscuolo &
Martin, 2009) but the integration of these firms into the multinational group is
more complex such that productivity improvements are realized only after a longer
period of adjustment (Harris & Robinson, 2002). Indeed, a recent study by Wang &
Wang (2015) finds no difference in the productivity effect of domestic and foreign
acquisitions in a large sample of M&As in China. In contrast, Guadalupe et al.
(2012) find substantial improvements of productivity and an increase of innovative
activity following foreign acquisitions.3 The impact of cross-border acquisitions on
productivity probably depends on a large range of country-pair characteristics. In our
analysis, we argue that international taxation is a relevant factor in this regard. We
thus provide an important determinant of the realization of post-merger productivity
gains which may help explain part of the ambiguity in previous studies on M&A
and productivity.
Finally, our paper advances the debate on whether and how foreign profits should
be taxed in the presence of international M&As. Becker & Fuest (2010) and Dev-
ereux et al. (2015) emphasize that the answer depends on the resource allocation
mechanism within the firm after the merger. If adjustment in one part of the firm
affects production in another part, tax differentials distort the allocation mechanism
and lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Since a tax on foreign income may avoid these
differentials, such a policy is superior to an exemption regime in this case. We argue
that this situation occurs in the post-merger allocation of corporate activity and pro-
vide empirical evidence for the loss that arises in the form of foregone productivity
gains from M&As when tax neutrality is not ensured.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we develop a theoretical model
to formally analyze the relationship between merger-induced productivity changes
and tax differentials. We explain our empirical strategy in Section 3.3 and describe
the data in Section 3.4. Results are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3Here we focus on productivity effects within the acquired firm. However, spillover effects of foreign
activity on domestic firm productivity may also occur (e.g. Javorcik, 2004; Haskel et al., 2007;
Balsvik & Haller, 2010).
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3.2 M&As, Taxation and Productivity Gains
3.2.1 Tax Differentials and Productivity Change Through
Reallocation of Activity after M&As
In this section we develop a simple theoretical framework to analyze the impact of
tax rate differences on the realization of productivity gains in M&As. We consider a
merger or acquisition involving two firms, a and b. Each of these firms consists of a
set of separable units that each perform a different function and also differ in their
total factor productivity with respect to this function. Prior to the merger, a subset
of functions is performed in both firms. An obvious example are cross-divisional
functions such as distribution, promotion or research and development. Once the
deal is completed, the management decides for each of these functions whether the
respective task is performed by a unit in a or b. This reallocation of activity is a
potential source of post-merger productivity gains if a particular function is assigned
to the unit that is more productive with respect to this task. However, as managers
maximize net profit rather than output, the allocation decision may also be affected
by other factors such as taxes, which distort the allocation decision.4 We show that
tax differentials between the merged firms may lead to an allocation of functions
that is inefficient with respect to productivity. As a consequence, tax differentials
reduce or even revert productivity gains resulting from the merger.
We begin by deriving the profit of a unit performing function i in firm s = a, b. It
is given by
pis (i) = As (i) ks (i)α ls (i)β − rsks (i)− wsls (i) (3.1)
where ks (i) and ls (i) are capital and labor input of firm s in the unit performing
function i, rs and ws are the respective input prices and As (i) is the total factor
productivity of the unit performing function i in firm s. Within the unit, we assume
decreasing returns to scale, α + β < 1.5 For given input prices, the management of
the firm chooses the level of productive inputs for each individual unit i so as to
4The analysis thus follows a notion that is similar to the one proposed for firm replacement by
Foster et al. (2008).
5Note that this does not preclude increasing returns to scale across the firm. For example, units
may incur a fix cost fi such that merging two units reduces the average fix cost and generates
synergies through increasing returns to scale.
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maximize the unit-specific profit pis (i). This yields the set of optimal input choices
l∗s (i) = As (i)
γ
(
β
ws
)(1−α)γ (
α
rs
)αγ
, k∗s (i) = As (i)
γ
(
β
ws
)βγ (
α
rs
)(1−β)γ
(3.2)
where γ = 11−α−β . Substituting the input choices back into the profit function, we
obtain the optimal profit
pi∗i,s = As (i)
γ ϕs (3.3)
where
ϕs = ϕs (rs, ws) =
1− r(2−2β−α)γ−
1−β
α
s α
1−β
α − w(2−2α−β)γ−
1−α
β
s β
1−α
β(
wβs β−βrαs α−α
)γ
is a function of input prices and is decreasing in both rs and ws.
We first consider the post-merger production allocation decision without taxes. To
simplify our derivation, we assume that factor prices are identical for both firms, such
that ϕa = ϕb. This assumption is realistic, for example if capital input is purchased
on the international capital market and wages reflect some form of quality-adjusted
labor compensation. The latter can be assumed to be homogeneous across different
locations if the labor market is sufficiently integrated. Abstracting from input price
differentials allows us to clearly isolate the effect of tax differentials on post-merger
productivity changes. We note, however, that frictions in the markets for labor or
capital may preclude uniform input prices and we therefore relax this assumption
in our empirical analysis below.
To simplify notation, we define the difference in total factor productivity between
a and b for the unit performing function i by λ (i) = Aa (i) − Ab (i) and normalize
Ab (i) to 1 such that Aa (i) = 1 +λ (i). The objective function of the management is
the overall profit of the firm which is the aggregate of the profits of the individual
functions, Πs =
´
i∈I pis (i) di. Πs is maximized by optimally allocating the individual
functions to the most profitable unit, that is, the management allocates the function
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i to a unit in a instead of b if
pi∗a (i) ≥ pi∗b (i)⇐⇒ λ (i) ≥ 0. (3.4)
and vice versa.6 In this case, only the productivity differential λ (i) determines where
activity is located and the resulting post-merger productivity for the unit performing
function i in the merged entity is given by
A (i) =

Aa (i) if λ (i) ≥ 0
Ab (i) if λ (i) < 0.
(3.5)
In order to derive the total productivity change in the combined firm, we aggregate
the productivity of each individual unit. For analytical reasons, we assume that
there is a large continuum of functions i ∈ I. The overall productivity of the merged
firm is defined as the weighted aggregate of the productivity of all units, A =´
i∈I ω (i)A (i) di, where ωi are the unit-specific weights with
´
i∈I ω (i) di = 1 that
depict the importance of each unit in the combined firm.7
We assume that in the merged entity, a subset of functions J is of the interchange-
able sort described above while a subset of functions H are unique to each firm. The
overall productivity prior to the merger is thus given by
APre =
ˆ
i∈I
ω (i)A (i) di =
ˆ
i∈H
ω (i)A (i) di+
ˆ
i∈J
ω (i) (zAa (i) + (1− z)Ab (i)) di
(3.6)
The productivity of the units performing the interchangeable functions is again
given by the weighted mean of the productivity in both firms where 0 < z < 1 is
the relative weight of firm a in the merging entity. After the merger, productivity in
each of these units corresponds to the productivity of the respective units in one of
6Without loss of generality, we assume that the management has a slight bias towards a.
7This setup abstracts from complementarities between individual functions. Adding this feature to
the model would probably make it more realistic but would also imply that allocation decisions
are interdependent. This would lead to a high degree of complexity without adding new insights
to or contradicting our main result.
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the firms. The overall productivity is then given by
APost =
ˆ
i∈H
ω (i)A (i) di+
ˆ
i∈J
ω (i) (Aa (i)1 {λ (i) ≥ 0}+ Ab (i)1 {λ (i) < 0}) di
(3.7)
Eventually, we are interested in the productivity change after the merger or acqui-
sition is completed. We define this change as the difference of overall productivity
before and after the merger and denote it by Γ:
Γ =APost − APre
=
ˆ
i∈H
ω (i) (Aa (i)1 {λ (i) ≥ 0}+ Ab (i)1 {λ (i) < 0}
− zAa (i)− (1− z)Ab (i))di. (3.8)
Let λ (i) be distributed across some interval
[
¯
λ, λ¯
]
. We can then rewrite expression
(3.8) in the following way
Γ = (1− z)
ˆ λ¯
0
ω (i)λ (i) dλ (i) + z
ˆ 0
¯
λ
ω (i) (−λ (i)) dλi (3.9)
Expression (3.9) defines the productivity change as the weighted sum of productivity
changes realized by allocating functions. Here, we abstract from taxes and potential
factor price differentials such that the management allocates each function to the
most productive location with respect to this function. As a consequence, the merger-
induced productivity change is positive, Γ ≥ 0. Note that expression (3.9) comprises
both cases where each firm has a productivity advantage in some functions and
cases where one firm is generally more productive than the other (e.g. λ (i) > 0 ∀i).
The latter case often occurs in acquisitions when a large market leader takes over a
smaller firm.
We now introduce tax differentials to our model. For simplicity, we assume that
input costs are fully deductible such that the after-tax profit of the unit performing
function i in firm s is given by (1− τs) pi∗s (i). When allocating functions between
the two firms, the management now maximizes the overall after-tax profit of the
merged firm such that it allocates function i to a instead of b if
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(1− τa) pi∗a (i) ≥ (1− τb)pi∗b (i)⇐⇒λ (i) ≥ τ˜ =
(1− τb
1− τa
) 1
γ − 1 (3.10)
When taxes are identical for both firms, τa = τb, we have τ˜ = 0 and the setting is
identical to the case without taxes as no distortions are expected without tax differ-
entials. However, if taxation differs between the two firms, τ˜ 6= 0, the management
may allocate some activity to the firm with lower productivity but higher after-tax
profit. The expression for the productivity change now reads
Γˆ = Γ−
ˆ τ˜
0
ω (i)λ (i) dλ (i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
. (3.11)
The last term Λ (τ˜) describes the unrealized productivity gains that are caused by
the distorting effect of tax differentials with regard to the allocation of functions.
It disappears if τa = τb as limτ˜→0 Λ = 0. Note that we have Λ ≤ 0 irrespective of
the direction of the tax differential. This implies that any tax difference between
the target and acquirer location may lead to distorted allocations and thus reduces
productivity gains resulting from the merger. Also, Γˆ does not need to be positive.
For example, consider the case where firm a is more productive in all units, but is
taxed substantially more such that τ˜ is very large. In this extreme case, all functions
are performed by the less productive location because of the tax difference and the
productivity change is negative.
Furthermore, Λ is a decreasing function of the absolute tax differential. To illus-
trate this, consider the situation where τb > τa such that τ˜ > 0 or τa > τb such that
τ˜ < 0. In both cases, an increase in the absolute tax differential ∆τ = |τa − τb| raises
|τ˜ | and leads to more negative values of Λ. Thus, the merger-induced productivity
change is a negative function of the absolute tax differential:
∂Γˆ
∂∆τ ≤ 0. (3.12)
3.2.2 Cross-Border Profit Shifting
So far, we have assumed that statutory tax rate differentials between merging firms
correctly reflect the actual difference in taxation as perceived by the management.
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This is the case if the profit generated in each subsidiary of the merged firm is cor-
rectly attributed to the location of activity. In an integrated company, this could, for
example, be achieved through adequate transfer pricing. In practice, however, firms
may be able to manipulate their effective tax burden through profit shifting (e.g. see
Hines & Rice, 1994; Huizinga et al., 2008). While previous studies have identified
various forms of international profit shifting that use very different shifting vehicles8,
all of these approaches have in common that they reduce the tax payments in high
tax locations of a multinational company by shifting part of the profit generated
there to low-tax locations within the group. This leads to a convergence of effective
tax rates in the various affiliate locations of the firm towards the lowest statutory
rate in the multinational enterprise.
In the context of our framework above, this implies that the presence of profit
shifting leads to a decrease in the absolute tax differential. We formalize this notion
by assuming that a fixed proportion 0 < φ < 1 may be shifted between the two
entities after the merger.9 As the firm maximizes after-tax profit, shifting occurs
only towards the location with a lower tax rate. The effective tax rate in location s
is then given by
τs = (1− φ) τs + φmin (τa, τb) . (3.13)
φ can be viewed as a function of the strictness of transfer pricing regulations and
profit shifting opportunities between a and b. Substituting this into the absolute
tax rate differential, we obtain ∆τ = (1− φ) |τa − τb| where it is apparent that
more profit shifting opportunities (i.e. higher φ) imply a smaller effective tax rate
differential. Furthermore, we note that
∂2Γˆ
∂∆τ∂φ ≥ 0 (3.14)
such that an increase in the share of shifted profits mitigates the negative effect
8See Dharmapala (2014) for a comprehensive survey.
9Economic models usually assume that profit shifting induces some cost that is a convex function
of the amount shifted (e.g. Hines & Rice, 1994). In our reduced-form expression, this would
imply that φ is a function of the tax rate differential. However, since shifting is constrained to
the realized profit, we still have 0 < φ < 1 and would thus obtain the same results with respect
to the effect of the tax rate differential on the post-merger productivity change as described in
our more simple model.
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of statutory tax rate differentials on the productivity change after the merger. For
example, we expect that the distorting effect of tax differentials in a cross-border
merger is less severe if loose regulations regarding transfer pricing allow the manage-
ment to manipulate profit allocation and thus narrow the difference in the effective
tax burden between the two locations.
3.2.3 International Taxation
In the following, we briefly describe how tax differentials between different locations
of a multinational enterprise may arise in the international tax system.10 When ana-
lyzing the impact of tax rate differentials on the productivity change after an M&A
deal, the relevant perspective is that of the management of the merged firm. Most
M&A deals take the form of an acquisition and it is thus reasonable to assume that
allocation decisions are taken from the perspective of the acquirer country. In the
following we always refer to the tax rate faced by the acquiring firm when describ-
ing a tax rate as effective. The relevant tax rate differential is thus the difference
between the tax rate on profits that the acquirer firm receives from the target in the
form of dividends and the tax rate on profits realized at the acquirer location. The
tax burden in each location depends on the statutory corporate income tax rate and
the withholding tax rate (if applicable) for inter-corporate dividends.
The resulting difference depends strongly on the approach taken by the acquirer
country to relieve firms of double taxation. The exemption method, which is applied
by most European countries, fully or partially exempts foreign income from corpo-
rate taxation. The tax burden for profits received from the target is thus determined
by the corporate income and withholding taxes in the target location, and the re-
sulting tax rate differential is mainly driven by cross-border differences in these tax
rates. Some countries, like the United States and, until 2009, Japan and the United
Kingdom, apply the credit method instead. With this approach, foreign income is
taxed at the domestic corporate tax rate but taxes paid abroad are credited against
the domestic tax liability. This credit is usually limited to the amount of domestic
tax payments due. As a consequence, tax differentials only arise when the effective
tax rate of the acquirer country is below that of the target country. Credit regimes
differ in the scope of the credit. A direct credit only considers the withholding tax
paid abroad while indirect credits also include the underlying taxation of corporate
10See Huizinga & Voget (2009) for a comprehensive description of double-taxation of cross-border
dividends.
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profits.
Table 3.1: Tax Rate Differentials
This table summarizes the computation of the difference between the effective tax rate on profits that a firm in location a receives
from a firm in location b in the form of dividends and the tax rate on profits realized in location a. τCITa and τ
CIT
b
are the top
statutory tax rates in location a and b, respectively. τw
ba
is the final withholding tax rate on dividends paid from location b to location
a. ψ is the exemption rate.
Double Tax
Relief Method
Absolute Effective Tax Rate Difference ∆τ
Exemption
∣∣τCITa ψ − (1− (1− ψ) τCITa )(τCITb + (1− τCITb ) τwba)∣∣
Indirect Credit
∣∣τCITa − τCITb − (1− τCITb ) τwba∣∣ if τCITb + (1− τCITb ) τwba ≥ τCITa
0 if τCIT
b
+
(
1− τCIT
b
)
τw
ba
< τCITa
Direct Credit
∣∣τCITa − τCITb − (1− τCITb )(τCITa − τwba)∣∣ if τwba < τCITa∣∣τCITa − τCITb − (1− τCITb ) τwba∣∣ if τwba ≥ τCITa
For our empirical analysis, we compute the effective tax rates on profits realized
by the target and the acquirer, respectively, for each individual M&A deal from the
perspective of the acquiring firm . We then use the absolute difference between these
effective tax rates one year after the completion of the M&A deal as a proxy for the
expected post-merger tax rate differential that determines the allocation within the
merged firm. When determining the tax differential, we take into account interna-
tional differences in statutory tax rates as well as the treatment of foreign profits
for tax purposes in the acquirer country. Table 3.1 describes the computation of the
absolute tax rate differential for the various double tax relief methods. The latter
may either be based on unilateral approaches, bilateral tax treaties or multilateral
agreements such as the Parent-subsidiary Directive which requires European Union
(EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) members to exempt profits of substan-
tial holdings in other member states from domestic taxation. Furthermore, we check
whether final withholding taxes apply upon repatriation of foreign profits. Again,
the level of these taxes depends on domestic legislation as well as the existence of
bilateral or multilateral agreements.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Identification
The objective of this paper is to analyze how tax differentials between the acquirer
and the target firm affect the impact of the merger on the total factor productivity
of the combined firm. For this purpose we estimate a reduced form of equation
(3.11) by relating the merger-induced change in productivity to the absolute tax
differential. Our empirical model takes the following form:
Γˆjlk = lnAPostj − lnAPrej = α0 + α1∆τjlk + β1Xj + β2Zjlk +ψ + j. (3.15)
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the relationship between the productivity
change and the tax rate differential is probably non-linear such that using the simple
difference of TFP before and after the merger is not appropriate. Instead, we use the
difference in the logarithms of TFP before and after the merger. This transformation
mitigates the problem of outliers and turns out to be the most appropriate among
a range of specifications (see Appendix B.2).
APrej and APostj are the average estimated TFPs of the combined firm that emerges
from deal j in the observable years before and after the completion of the M&A deal,
respectively. Below, we explain in more detail how TFP is estimated. A major ad-
vantage of analyzing the TFP of the combined firm rather than focusing on the
effect in the acquirer or target firm is that we avoid tax-driven measurement errors
in the input variables. These may occur if firms engage in fictitious relocation of
economic activity after the merger. For example, a firm may use transfer pricing
to assign labor expenses to the high-tax location in the merged firm. This would
raise labor input there without affecting the output in this location and thus would
seemingly induce a decline in productivity of the high-tax affiliate while total fac-
tor productivity would appear to increase in the low-tax affiliate. However, since
there was no actual reallocation of resources, this change in productivity would be
misleading. More precisely, even though the perceived productivity change would
certainly be a result of the tax differential between the two locations, it would not
constitute the real productivity effect that we are interested in but would rather be
a result of tax-optimizing financial accounting. Analyzing the TFP of the combined
firm avoids this problem because artificial relocations of productive factors net out
when consolidating acquirer and target firm.
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The tax differential is defined as ∆τjlk = |τl − τk| where τk is the top statutory tax
rate on corporate profits realized in the acquirer location and τl is the effective tax
rate one year after the completion of deal j from the perspective of the acquirer on
profits realized by the target firm. The coefficient of interest is α1 which measures
the effect of one percentage point of absolute difference in target and acquirer tax
rates on the productivity change resulting from the M&A deal. According to our
theoretical model we expect α1 to be negative.
We also check whether a certain type of tax differential drives our result by dis-
aggregating ∆τjlk into positive and negative differentials, ∆τ+jlk and ∆τ−jlk with
∆τ+jlk =

|τl − τk| if τl > τk
0 else
∆τ−jlk =

|τl − τk| if τl < τk
0 else.
In our estimation, we control for various deal-, firm- and location-specific variables
that might affect the productivity change and post-merger performance more gen-
erally in line with the previous literature.11 Xj is a vector of deal characteristics.
Since most of the variation in ∆τlk stems from cross-border deals which themselves
might have a particular effect on firm productivity, we include a dummy that indi-
cates whether a deal involves two firms located in different countries. Furthermore,
we include dummies that are equal to one when the takeover resulted from a hostile
bid, when target shareholders where paid in stocks rather than cash, when the deal
included a capital increase and when the acquirer firm already had a toehold in the
target firm before the acquisition was announced.
Zjlk is a vector of characteristics of the target as well as the acquirer firm and their
respective locations. On the firm level, these include the relative size of both firms
measured by the acquirer to target ratio of total assets, leverage, which is defined as
the ratio of current liabilities to current assets, firm age and an indicator for listed
acquirers. We also account for relevant factors on the country level by controlling
for wage differentials between target and acquirer location which are proxied by the
logarithmic ratio of acquirer to target GDP per capita, as well as, the logarithm
of GDP and GDP per capita growth. Since domestic taxes might also have direct
11See for example Harris & Robinson (2002), Herman & Lowenstein (1988), Fu et al. (2013), Fee
& Thomas (2004), Stiebale (2016).
56
3.3 Empirical Strategy
effects on firm productivity, we include the statutory corporate tax rate of the target
in our regression.12 Furthermore, we include the logarithm of the distance between
the capitals of the acquirer and target country and a dummy that indicates if the
merging firms are both located inside the European Union.
Each estimation contains a set of fixed effectsψ which comprise target and acquirer
country-fixed effects, target and acquirer industry-fixed effects (2-digit US SIC code)
and year-fixed effects. The variable of interest ∆τjlk mainly varies across target and
acquirer country pairs such that we cluster standard errors on the country pair
level.13
Our theoretical model predicts that the effect of the tax differential is less pro-
nounced when firms are able to easily allocate profits to the location with the more
favorable tax rate. We test this notion in our empirical framework by interacting
∆τjlk with an indicator for the looseness of transfer pricing regulations in the tar-
get and acquirer location for a deal, LOOSEjlk. This variable thus exploits both
variation across country pairs and within country pairs as transfer pricing legis-
lation changes over time. It is equal to one whenever in both the target and the
acquirer country the applicable transfer pricing regulations do not include a docu-
mentation requirement by law. We focus on the documentation requirement since
the existence of transfer pricing regulations alone does not impose a sufficient con-
straint on corporate profit shifting if firms are not obliged to properly explain the
assigned transfer prices to the tax authorities. Furthermore, previous studies suggest
that documentation requirements indeed constrain international profit shifting (e.g.
Beer & Loeprick, 2015; Beuselinck et al., 2015).14 Our empirical model is defined as
follows:
Γˆjlk = α0+α1∆τjlk+α2∆τjlk×LOOSEjlk+α3LOOSEjlk+β1Xj+β2Zjlk+ψ+j.
(3.16)
As above, we expect α1 to be negative while α2 should be positive and capture the
12We note that this may be correlated with the absolute tax rate differential and also run regres-
sions without the statutory tax rate in the target location as control variable to check whether
collinearity drives our findings. In these estimations we obtain very similar results.
13To verify the robustness of our results, we have also conducted a regression analysis with a two-
way clustering of standard errors as suggested by Cameron et al. (2012) and again obtained
significant coefficient estimates.
14A comprehensive overview of the legislation regarding transfer pricing documentation in a large
number of countries is provided by Zinn et al. (2014).
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mitigating effect of loose transfer pricing rules on the impact of the tax differential.
More precisely, α1 ≥ α2 with α1 = α2 indicating that the effect of the tax differential
on the productivity change may be completely eliminated if transfer pricing rules
are sufficiently loose.
Transfer pricing regulation in the two locations of the merging firms may not
be equally important for the productivity change. For example, it may be more
relevant for the acquirer location if most of the transfer pricing adjustments are
taken in the headquarter. Furthermore, the strictness of transfer pricing regulations
may be more important in the location with the higher effective tax rate from which
profit is shifted away. We investigate this asymmetry by interacting the absolute
tax rate differential ∆τjlk with a set of dummies LOOSEAcqjlk and LOOSE
Tgt
jlk that
indicate whether the transfer pricing regulations do not require documentation in
the acquirer or target country, respectively, and another set of dummies LOOSEHighjlk
and LOOSELowjlk , which indicate the same for the location with the higher and the
lower effective tax rate, respectively. When computing the latter set of dummies,
we set LOOSEHighjlk = LOOSE
Acq
jlk and LOOSELowjlk = LOOSE
Tgt
jlk whenever the tax
rate differential is zero.
Having explored the relationship between tax differentials and productivity changes
on the deal level, we conduct a further inquiry to investigate the mechanisms un-
derlying our result. Our theoretical model makes no assertion to what extent tax
differentials affect productivity gains in the acquirer or the target firm. Assuming a
merger between similar firms, the effect is expected to be symmetric. However, in
practice, this may not necessarily be the case: Acquirer firms are often much larger
(e.g. Moeller et al., 2004) and also more productive (e.g. Schoar, 2002). It is thus
likely that the inefficient relocation described above, which results in lower over-
all productivity gains, occurs more often with respect to the target, that is, merged
firms do not efficiently relocate to the more productive acquirer if the target location
has a lower tax rate. Furthermore, the management of the merged firm often orig-
inates from the acquiring company and therefore may be less reactive towards tax
differentials that induce a (inefficient) relocation away from the acquirer location.
From a methodological perspective, an explanation for such a finding may be that
the acquiring entity is so much larger than the target that a productivity change
induced by the M&A deal and the following relocation of resources between the two
is hard to observe in the data of the acquiring firm.
We are thus interested in whether the productivity effects of the tax differential
are more pronounced in the target or the acquirer firm. Bearing in mind the po-
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tential measurement errors described above, we estimate a regression model that
relates acquirer and target firm TFP to the absolute tax differential. To capture the
evolution of total factor productivity more precisely, we use a panel regression for
this purpose. The respective empirical model is specified as follows:
ln (Aj,t) = α0POSTj,t+α1∆τjlk×POSTj,t+β1Xj × POSTj,t+β2Zjlk,t+ψ+j,t
(3.17)
where Ajt is the estimated total factor productivity in year t of a firm related to
merger j, that is either the combined, the target or the acquirer firm. POSTj,t
switches to one in the year after the merger is completed. α0 thus captures the
general impact of the merger on the total factor productivity while α1 again is the
heterogeneity in this effect that is attributed to the tax differential.Xj and Zlk,t are
the same vectors of deal, target and acquirer specific variables as defined above. The
effect of the time invariant variables is fully captured by firm fixed effects and we
thus interact Xj with a vector of indicators for the post-merger period. Finally, ψ
comprises firm- and year-industry-fixed effects. The latter capture industry-specific
time trends of productivity.
We also check whether we can observe the expected pattern of allocation of pro-
ductive factors after the merger. This is done by replacing the dependent variable
in equation (3.17) with the logarithms of the employment and tangible fixed assets
in the target and the acquirer firm. In this estimation, the effect of the absolute
tax differential may not be symmetric. We check this by disaggregating ∆τjlk into
positive and negative differentials, ∆τ+jlk and ∆τ−jlk as described above. Alternatively,
one could use the simple tax differential instead of the absolute one. However, the
underlying assumption for such an estimation is that tax rate differentials have a
symmetric effect on the productivity change which is not necessarily the case as
explained above. Using ∆τ+jlk and ∆τ−jlk imposes a less restrictive framework.
In a final analysis, we verify our results using an event study design. This method-
ology was originally developed for the finance and accounting literature by Fama
et al. (1969) but has since been adjusted and is now widely applied in economic
studies (Corrado, 2011).15 In general, an event study tracks the behavior of ob-
served individuals around an event which is defined as the M&A deal completion for
15More recent applications of event studies in economics include Almond et al. (2011), Chetty
et al. (2014) and Hoynes et al. (2016).
59
Chapter 3 International Taxation and Productivity Effects of M&As
our purposes. It has two important benefits. First, it allows us to explore the timing
of distortions in the post-merger adjustment process more systematically. This pro-
vides further insights with regard to the underlying mechanism and also informs us
about the persistence of these distortions. Second, this method allows us to check
whether pre-merger trends in TFP and factor input cause spurious findings. Ruling
out such trends would strengthen the causal inference from our regression results.
For the event study, we adjust the specification of Sandler & Sandler (2014) for
our purposes such that the empirical model looks as follows:
ln yj,t =α−3
M−t∑
n=3
Dj,t−n ×∆τjlk +
3∑
n=−2
αnDj,t−n ×∆τjlk + α4
t−N∑
n=4
Dj,t−n ×∆τjlk
+ γ−3
M−t∑
n=3
Dj,t−n +
3∑
i=−2
γnDj,t−n + γ4
t−N∑
i=4
Dj,t−n
+ β1Xj × POSTj,t + β2Zjlk,t +ψ + j,t. (3.18)
The dependent variable yj,t is TFP, labor or capital input of the acquiring, target
or the combined firm as described above for the panel regression. It is regressed
on a range of dummies Dj,t−n which indicate whether the deal in which entity j is
involved has been completed in period t − n. Within the first and last data year,
M and N , we define our event window to 3 years before until 4 years after the
merger completion.16 The end points of this window are open brackets, that is, they
indicate whether the merger has been completed 4 or more years before (for the
upper window limit) and 3 or more years after a given period (for the lower window
limit). This mitigates collinearity with the year-fixed effects. The regressor for the
period before the merger completion is omitted and normalized to zero such that
remaining coefficients have to be interpreted relative to the pre-merger year. Our
event study specification is augmented by the same set of fixed effects and control
variables as the panel regression model.
While the coefficients of the individual dummies γn capture the direct effect of
the merger on the outcome variables, we are interested in the distortive impact of
tax differentials on this effect. We thus interact the dummies with the absolute tax
rate differential ∆τjlk and add this set of interactions to the regression model to
obtain our coefficients of interest αi. The latter measure how a tax differential of
one percentage point changes the impact of the merger on the outcome variable n
16We experimented with alternative window definitions and obtained similar results.
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years after (if n < 0) or before (if n > 0) the merger completion relative to the year
before the M&A is executed. If tax differentials only affect the adjustment process
after the two firms have merged, one should not find an effect for pre-merger years,
that is, we should obtain αn = 0 ∀n < 0.
3.3.2 Productivity Estimation
An important prerequisite for analyzing the effect of within-firm tax differentials on
productivity changes after M&As is a precise estimate of total factor productivity
in the involved firms. A common approach is to estimate the parameters of a Cobb-
Douglas production function by regressing firm output on the main input factors
labor and capital, compute the predicted values and back out total factor produc-
tivity as the residual. However, the latter contains both the total factor productivity
of the entity and a potential productivity shock which is not observed by the re-
searcher but known to the firm. Since the latter also affects the input choices of the
firm, a simultaneity problem arises. Previous studies have addressed this issue by
either using investments (Olley & Pakes, 1996) or intermediate inputs (Levinsohn &
Petrin, 2003; Wooldridge, 2009) as proxies for the firm expectation regarding future
productivity changes.
In this paper, we estimate total factor productivity using firm level data on inputs
and outputs from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS and ORBIS databases. In doing
so, we closely follow Fons-Rosen et al. (2013) who also use ORBIS and apply the
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) procedure. Output is measured as firm value added
while inputs are labor, which is the total cost of employees, and capital, which is
defined as the total assets of the firm. Following Levinsohn & Petrin (2003), firm
expectations about future productivity shocks are proxied by intermediate inputs
which are measured as the cost of materials.
This approach yields consistent estimates of total factor productivity but is also
very demanding in terms of required data. Missing firm level data are imputed as
described by Gal (2013) in order to ensure a sufficient sample size. Before con-
ducting the productivity estimation, we also check the balance sheet data obtained
from Bureau van Dijk for consistency errors. The relevant steps for constructing the
productivity estimation sample are described in detail in Appendix B.1.
We conduct our productivity estimation using the universe of available firms in
ORBIS and AMADEUS that reside in either an OECD or an EU member country
and contain sufficient observations with reliable information on the relevant vari-
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ables. This sample of 1,366,343 firms with annual data between 2000 and 2013 also
contains the acquirer and target firms of interest. We estimate total factor produc-
tivity using the Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) method within each 2-digit US SIC code
industry. The firm- and year-specific total factor productivities for the firms involved
in an M&A during the observation period are then used in the main analysis.
3.4 Data
We collect M&A deals from the Zephyr database. An important feature of Zephyr
is that target and acquirer firms are each assigned a unique Bureau van Dijk ID
which allows us to match balance sheet data from ORBIS and AMADEUS to the
deal-level data and compute total factor productivity before and after the merger. A
major advantage of these databases is that they provide internationally comparable
data for individual firms in various locations and can thus be used to investigate the
behavior of companies in an international context (e.g. Cravino & Levchenko, 2017).
Only deals with firms for which we obtain sufficient data to estimate total factor
productivity for the year before and the year after the deal completion are used in
the estimation. We also exclude financial and insurance firms17 and privatizations
of state-owned enterprises.
We restrict our sample to M&A deals which constitute a full acquisition or a
merger to make sure that after the completion of the deal, the management of the
combined firm has full control over the target and acquirer assets and thus possesses
the means to reallocate the resources. The resulting sample consists of 9,649 firm-
year observations for combined firms which are involved in 896 M&A deals. For 885
deals we observe TFP before and after the merger for both the acquirer and the
target firm. These deals form the estimation sample for our main analysis. Their
distribution across acquirer and target countries is summarized in Table 3.2. 18%
of them are cross-border deals and thus provide the source of variation in the tax
rate differential. Table 3.3 displays summary statistics for the other deal-specific
variables. Most of the deals are paid in cash with only 1.2% of stock-for-stock deals
in our sample. Only 10.1% of acquirers are listed on the stock market. In our sample,
the absolute tax differential ranges up to 20.8% with an average of 1.0%. Given that a
substantial number of M&As in our sample are domestic deals with no tax difference,
this points to significant tax differentials among cross-border deals. Indeed, for this
17These are defined as firms with US SIC codes 60-67.
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Table 3.2: M&A Deal Sample
Acquirer
country
Code Target Country
BE BG CZ DE EE ES FI FR GB HR HU IT NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK Total
Austria AT . . . . . . 1 1 . 1 1 . . . . . . . . . 4
Belgium BE 36 . 1 1 . 2 . 1 . . . 1 . . . . 1 . . . 43
Bulgaria BG . 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Czechia CZ . . 21 . . . . . . . 1 1 . . . . . . . 1 24
Germany DE 4 . 2 19 . 3 1 4 3 . 1 . . . 2 . 3 2 . . 44
Estonia EE . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Spain ES . . 2 1 . 192 . 3 2 . . 6 . . . 5 . . . . 211
Finland FI . . . 1 2 . 106 . . . . . . 1 1 . . 6 . . 117
France FR 7 . . . . 4 . 77 2 . . 5 1 . . . . 2 . . 98
UK GB . . . . . 4 . 4 38 . . . . . . . . 1 . . 47
Croatia HR . . . . . . . . . 15 . . . . . . . . 3 . 18
Hungary HU . . . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . . 5
Italy IT 3 . 1 1 . 8 1 4 2 2 . 76 . . . . . 3 1 . 102
Norway NO . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . . 2 . . 11
Poland PL . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . 6
Portugal PT . . . 1 . 5 . . . 1 . . . . . 11 . . . . 18
Romania RO . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Sweden SE 1 . . 1 . 1 7 . 1 . . . . 3 1 . . 93 . . 108
Slovenia SI . . . . . 1 . . . 2 . 1 . . . . . . 8 . 12
Slovakia SK . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6
Total 51 8 28 26 4 220 116 95 48 21 8 90 1 13 9 16 4 109 12 6 885
sub-group, the average tax differential is 4.3%. 41% of deals in our sample comprise
an acquirer and target location in both of which transfer pricing documentation is
not required at the completion of the deal. This figure is also high among cross-border
deals with a share of 35.2% involving locations with loose transfer pricing regulations
and neither differs much between target and acquirer locations nor between high and
low tax locations.
The deal sample is then combined with balance sheet data from the financial
databases of Bureau van Dijk as well as the estimated TFP. Table 3.4 provides
summary statistics for these variables. On average, acquirer firms are slightly more
productive than target firms before the merger. This relation reverses after the M&A
is completed, possibly pointing at some within-firm reorganization after the merger.
As is commonly observed, acquirer and target firms differ substantially in size. In
our sample, acquirers are on average about 18 times larger than the target firm in
terms of total assets. They are also older and more leveraged. A positive average of
the wage difference suggests that acquirers generally invest in countries with a lower
level of labor compensation than in their home location.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics: Deals
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Cross-border 885 0.180 0.384 0 1
∆τ 885 1.043 2.260 0 20.75
∆τ+ 885 0.626 1.586892 0 18.43
∆τ− 885 0.417 1.764 0 20.75
LOOSE 885 0.410 0.492 0 1
LOOSEAcq 885 0.437 0.496 0 1
LOOSETgt 885 0.429 0.495 0 1
LOOSEHigh 885 0.446 0.497 0 1
LOOSELow 885 0.421 0.494 0 1
Hostile 885 0.001 0.034 0 1
Stock-for-Stock 885 0.012 0.111 0 1
Capital Increase 885 0.014 0.116 0 1
Horizontal 885 0.409 0.492 0 1
Toe 885 0.045 0.208 0 1
Acquirer Listed 885 0.101 0.301 0 1
EU Member 885 0.932 0.252 0 1
Log Distance 885 5.553 0.679 3.980 7.862
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Tax Differentials and Changes in Total Factor Productivity
Before turning to the results of our econometric analysis, we first investigate the sam-
ple graphically. Figure 3.1 plots the evolution of TFP of the combined firm before
and after the merger. For each particular period it presents the average logarithm
of TFP in our sample of merged firms. We differentiate between mergers with an
absolute tax differential of zero (the blue, solid line) and deals with a positive abso-
lute tax differential between the acquirer and target location (red, dash-dotted line).
Combinations of firms with no difference in taxation between the two locations are
generally more productive. However, this difference becomes more pronounced after
the M&A deal is completed as TFP increases for firms with zero tax differentials
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics: Firms
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Log TFP (combined firm) 7,379 0.652 0.951 -4.906 5.777
Log TFP (Acq.) 8,815 0.642 1.004 -6.369 7.120
Log TFP (Acq., before the merger) 4,691 0.653 0.943 -5.005 6.375
Log TFP (Tgt.) 9,672 0.586 0.976 -5.024 6.375
Log TFP (Tgt., before the merger) 4,512 0.640 0.962 -6.369 7.120
Relative Size 7,388 17.686 54.001 0.007 995.950
Leverage (Acq.) 9,262 1.762 56.786 0 4933.701
Leverage (Tgt.) 9,621 1.006 3.939 0 224.5
Log Age (Acq.) 9,493 2.972 0.870 0 5.298
Log Age (Tgt.) 9,841 2.774 0.854 0 4.942
CIT (Acq.) 14,681 0.302 0.056 0.1 0.52
CIT (Tgt.) 14,681 0.299 0.056 0.1 0.52
GDP p.c. Growth (Acq.) 11,844 0.014 0.043 -0.190 0.220
GDP p.c. Growth (Tgt.) 11,844 0.015 0.044 -0.190 0.220
Log GDP (Acq.) 13,716 27.258 1.156 23.020 28.803
Log GDP (Tgt.) 13,716 27.180 1.171 23.020 28.803
Wage Difference 13,716 0.027 0.252 -2.295 2.331
while it declines for firms with positive tax differential. Consistent with our theoret-
ical model, this indicates that M&A deals with positive tax differentials have lower
productivity gains than those without distortive differences in target and acquirer
taxation. Of course Figure 3.1 may also capture the impact on TFP of other deal
characteristics that are correlated with the induced tax differential. For example,
cross-border deals are more prevalent when the tax differential is positive but prob-
ably also generate lower productivity gains because integrating two firms that are
located in different countries may be very costly.18
18Note, however, that a tax differential of zero does not necessarily imply that the deal is domestic.
Some countries have identical tax rates for some time (e.g. Norway and Sweden) while others
applied the credit regime with respect to foreign dividends (e.g. the United Kingdom) which,
assuming zero withholding taxes, also leads to a zero tax differential in the case of cross-border
acquisitions of targets with lower tax rates relative to the acquirer location.
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of TFP before and after the M&A
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In our regression analysis, we control for these confounding effects. Table 3.5
presents the main findings. Column (1) displays results for a parsimonious regression
with a set of fixed effects as described above but no control variables. The resulting
coefficient is significantly negative, suggesting that an increase in the absolute tax
differential reduces the productivity gain after the merger.
We augment the regression by including control variables in columns (2) and (3).
Only coefficients for the firm- and deal-level variables are displayed while results for
the location specific characteristics are relegated to Appendix B.3. The estimation
results suggest that hostile M&As (i.e. deals that go ahead without the approval of
the target firm’s management) generate significantly lower productivity gains. This
may reflect that the acquiring firm often faces substantial resistance by executives
of the target firm when integrating it after the merger. Furthermore, deals which
are financed via a capital increase also yield lower productivity gains which may be
related to the observation that these deals often involve a large number of partic-
ipants on the acquirer side. Such a consortium may find it more difficult to make
decisions regarding the firm reorganization after the M&A completion.
In column (3), we account for industry-level variation. M&A often coincide with
shifts in specific industries (see Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). These may, for example,
be caused by substantial deregulation within certain industries or an increase in
competition that leads to a consolidation in particular production sectors. Any of
these events may both be related to changes in productivity and increased foreign
acquisition activity within the specific industry, the latter being generally associated
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Table 3.5: Benchmark
OLS regression. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) is the difference in the logarithm of average productivity
before and after the merger. In columns (3) and (6) the dependent variable is the difference in the logarithm of average productivity
before and after the merger relative to the industry mean (SIC 2 digit code). Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) contain regression results
with country-level controls for which estimated coefficients are reported in Table B.1 in Appendix B. All regressions include target
and acquirer country fixed effects, target and acquirer industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster robust standard errors
(clustered at the acquirer-target country-pair level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance
level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆τ -0.030*** -0.045** -0.038***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.014)
∆τ− -0.047** -0.051* -0.055**
(0.019) (0.026) (0.026)
∆τ+ -0.018 -0.040 -0.022
(0.011) (0.024) (0.017)
Cross-border 0.028 0.021 0.029 0.025
(0.146) (0.132) (0.146) (0.131)
Hostile -0.930** -0.171 -0.931** -0.178
(0.397) (0.324) (0.394) (0.319)
Stock-for-Stock 0.249 0.239 0.253 0.251
(0.172) (0.196) (0.172) (0.196)
Capital Increase -0.311*** -0.355*** -0.313*** -0.362***
(0.098) (0.085) (0.098) (0.086)
Horizontal -0.041 -0.022 -0.040 -0.019
(0.034) (0.026) (0.034) (0.026)
Toe 0.044 0.118 0.042 0.111
(0.093) (0.095) (0.092) (0.094)
Relative Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage (Acq.) 0.026 0.000 0.026 -0.000
(0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039)
Acquirer Listed -0.081* -0.058 -0.080 -0.054
(0.048) (0.045) (0.048) (0.045)
Log Age (Acq.) -0.012 -0.003 -0.012 -0.003
(0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.021)
Intercept -0.605* 19.329 0.960 -0.669* 19.104 0.365
(0.337) (29.693) (25.995) (0.344) (29.610) (25.783)
Country-level controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 885 785 782 885 785 782
R2 0.244 0.288 0.285 0.245 0.288 0.286
with higher tax rate differentials. For instance, a slow-down in productivity growth
of an industry in a particular country makes firms in this industry potential takeover
targets for foreign, more competitive firms. This implies larger tax rate differentials
for acquisitions in this industry but also lower productivity gains if the foreign
acquisition cannot completely reverse the downward trend in productivity growth.
Ignoring within-industry developments may thus induce a spurious correlation
between merger-induced TFP changes and tax rate differentials that is unrelated to
the mechanism suggested in our theoretical model above. We account for this effect
by conducting an additional estimation in which we scale the dependent variable by
the industry average. In particular, we use the difference in the logarithm of average
productivity before and after the merger relative to the industry mean (SIC 2 digit
code). Results are presented in column (3) of Table 3.5 which otherwise repeats
the specifications of column (2). The effect of the tax differential on the change
in TFP is still significantly negative. These findings suggest that our results are
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robust to accounting for industry trends in productivity and are thus not driven by
industry-specific shifts.
In all of the augmented regressions, the coefficient for the absolute tax differential
remains significantly negative. Using regression (2) with the full set of controls and
a straight-forward interpretation of the observed effect as a conservative benchmark,
we find that an increase in the absolute tax differential between acquirer and target
location by 1 percentage point drives down the merger-induced productivity gain by
about 4.5%.
We complement our analysis in columns (4) to (6) by allowing for different coef-
ficients for positive and negative tax differentials. Again, column (4) presents the
results for regressing the tax differentials on the variables of interest and a set of
fixed effects. The coefficient for negative tax differentials (i.e. tax differences where
the effective tax rate of the target location is below that of the acquirer location) is
significantly negative while the coefficient for positive tax differences is insignificant.
This suggests that deals with targets in low-tax jurisdictions drive our main result.
When adding control variables in column (5) or controlling for industry-specific
trends in column (6), we again obtain the result that deals involving low-tax targets
have a particularly negative impact on the post-merger productivity change.
One explanation for this finding is that the potential for productivity improve-
ment is probably higher in the target firm. Thus, negative tax differences, that
induce the management to continue the operation of some less productive units in
the target have a more negative impact on overall productivity than positive tax
differences. The latter would only reduce the post-merger productivity gain by a
substantial amount if there is a sufficient number of units in the acquirer location
whose productivity is inferior to that of the corresponding units in the target firm.
If generally most of the adjustment takes place in the target firm, one may also refer
to asymmetric adjustment costs in factor demand (Hamermesh & Pfann, 1996) as a
complementary explanation. Jaramillo et al. (1993) show that the cost for lowering
labor demand is much higher than for increasing it and the persistent nature of cap-
ital investment implies that downward adjustment is also more expensive for this
factor (Pindyck, 1988). The excessive reduction in resources in the target firm that
would be induced by positive tax differentials is thus likely to be more costly than
the relative increase of resources resulting from negative tax differences, especially
if this means that resources remain where they are and no net adjustment takes
place. In this setting, negative tax differences are more likely to have an impact on
management decisions and thus affect productivity changes more strongly.
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Table 3.6: Transfer Pricing Regulation
OLS regression. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) is the difference in the logarithm of average productivity
before and after the merger. In column (3) the dependent variable is the difference in the logarithm of average productivity before and
after the merger relative to the industry mean (SIC 2 digit code). Columns (2)-(5) contain regression results with control variables
for which estimated coefficients are reported in Table B.2 in Appendix B. All regressions include target and acquirer country fixed
effects, target and acquirer industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the acquirer-target
country-pair level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆τ -0.041*** -0.062*** -0.048*** -0.072*** -0.071**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.016) (0.027) (0.028)
∆τ × LOOSE 0.042* 0.058** 0.035*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
LOOSE -0.010 -0.052 0.021
(0.060) (0.082) (0.071)
∆τ × LOOSEAcq 0.059***
(0.021)
∆τ × LOOSETgt -0.005
(0.021)
LOOSEAcq -0.196
(0.157)
LOOSETgt 0.176
(0.177)
∆τ × LOOSEHigh 0.048**
(0.024)
∆τ × LOOSELow 0.006
(0.024)
LOOSEHigh -0.085
(0.125)
LOOSELow 0.061
(0.139)
Intercept -0.669* 28.887 6.007 23.562 25.153
(0.349) (31.473) (26.900) (31.612) (31.327)
Country-level controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 885 785 782 785 785
R2 0.249 0.296 0.290 0.296 0.295
In the next set of regressions, which is presented in Table 3.6, we analyze how
transfer pricing regulation affects our results. In the regression in column (1) of Table
3.6 we add the interaction of the tax rate differential and LOOSE, our indicator for
the strictness of transfer pricing regulation, to the benchmark specification displayed
in columns (1) to (3) in Table 3.5. As before, the coefficient of the absolute tax
differential ∆τ is significantly negative. The coefficient of the interaction between
∆τ and an indicator for loose transfer pricing regulations is significantly positive.
This suggests that the impact of the tax differential on the productivity change is
mitigated if transfer pricing regulation is not very strict and firms are able to reduce
the effective tax rate difference between the locations by engaging in profit shifting
activities. Furthermore, our results suggest that if the tax law in the acquirer and
the target country either does not contain transfer pricing regulations or does not
require firms to provide a written documentation of their transfer pricing system, this
may neutralize the effect of the tax differential. In particular, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that α1 +α2 = 0 in our sample.19 This finding is robust to adding control
19Conducting a simple Wald test, we obtain F -Statistics of 0.00, 0.13 and 0.62 for the regressions
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variables and controlling for industry trends in columns (2) and (3), respectively.
Does transfer pricing legislation matter more in the target or in the acquirer
location? We answer this question by disaggregating LOOSE into two indicators
for the strictness of transfer pricing regulation in the acquirer and the target country,
LOOSEAcq and LOOSETgt. Results presented in column (4) suggest that legislation
in the acquirer location is much more important than in the target location. Given
our findings above, this is not surprising. Our estimation results in Table 3.5 indicate
that the results are mainly driven by negative tax differences, that is, when profits
of the target are taxed at a lower rate than profits of the acquirer. In this case
firms would like to shift profits away from the acquirer location to the target firm.
This is what stricter transfer pricing legislation in the former would be implemented
to inhibit. On the contrary, raising transfer pricing documentation requirements in
the low-tax target location might increase overall transparency but is probably not
designed to prevent profit shifting to this location (Bucovetsky & Haufler, 2008) and
is therefore less relevant.
An alternative disaggregation would be to differentiate between the strictness of
transfer pricing legislation in the location with the higher and the lower effective
tax rate, LOOSEHigh and LOOSELow. Results for this approach are presented in
column (5) of Table 3.6. Consistent with the idea described above that legislation to
curb profit shifting via transfer pricing is more important in the high-tax location,
we find that the estimated coefficient for LOOSEHigh is much bigger than the one
for LOOSELow. The latter is not significantly different from zero.
3.5.2 Allocation of Productive Factors
We now extend our analysis to explore the mechanisms that underlie our main
result. Inefficient reallocation after M&As can take various forms. The management
can either allocate too many or too few resources to either the acquirer or the target
depending on the sign of the tax difference between the locations of the two firms.
Our theoretical model is not conditional on such biases which has the advantage
of very general results but also precludes us from forming any expectations about
how the effect evolves in practice. Instead, we rely on empirical evidence to identify
particular channels.
For this purpose, we turn to a panel analysis in order to follow the evolution of
important determinants of total factor productivity over time. This allows us to
in columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 3.6, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Panel Regression: Total Factor Productivity
OLS regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total factor productivity of the combined firm in columns (1)-(2), of
the target firm in columns (3)-(4) and the acquirer firm in columns (5)-(6). All regressions include country-level controls for which
estimated coefficients are reported in Table B.3 in Appendix B. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are
provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm and industry-year fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance
level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1)
Combined
(2)
Combined
(3)
Target
(4)
Target
(5)
Acquirer
(6)
Acquirer
Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
POST -0.805*** -0.809*** -0.851*** -0.847*** -0.667** -0.664**
(0.217) (0.212) (0.315) (0.312) (0.281) (0.275)
POST ×∆τ -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.020*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
POST ×∆τ− -0.035*** -0.046** -0.017
(0.012) (0.020) (0.011)
POST ×∆τ+ -0.034** -0.036* -0.025
(0.016) (0.020) (0.017)
POST×Cross-border -0.040 -0.045 -0.017 -0.050 -0.061 -0.057
(0.086) (0.086) (0.122) (0.121) (0.103) (0.104)
POST×Hostile -0.294 -0.301 -0.292 -0.311 -0.223** -0.228**
(0.188) (0.187) (0.338) (0.343) (0.098) (0.098)
POST×Stock-for-Stock -0.097 -0.095 -0.706*** -0.707*** 0.252 0.243
(0.159) (0.160) (0.196) (0.199) (0.179) (0.182)
POST×Capital Increase 0.010 0.010 0.638*** 0.653*** -0.371*** -0.369***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.169) (0.170) (0.108) (0.109)
POST×Horizontal 0.025 0.023 -0.053 -0.062 0.041 0.040
(0.033) (0.033) (0.054) (0.054) (0.036) (0.036)
POST×Toehold 0.142* 0.140* 0.087 0.080 0.108 0.109
(0.078) (0.079) (0.119) (0.118) (0.081) (0.081)
POST×Acquirer Listed -0.036 -0.037 -0.190* -0.192* 0.055 0.052
(0.059) (0.060) (0.099) (0.101) (0.064) (0.065)
Relative Size -0.001** -0.001** 0.001 0.001 -0.001* -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage (Acq.) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage (Tgt.) 0.001 0.002 -0.016 -0.016 0.007 0.007
(0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.034) (0.011) (0.011)
Log Age (Acq.) 0.005 0.006 0.047 0.043 0.030 0.032
(0.054) (0.054) (0.079) (0.078) (0.063) (0.062)
Log Age (Tgt.) 0.032 0.028 0.094 0.089 -0.039 -0.041
(0.042) (0.042) (0.069) (0.069) (0.044) (0.044)
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,075 5,102 5,072 5,099 5,072 5,099
R2 0.239 0.236 0.191 0.187 0.295 0.293
control for co-moving variables and general time trends. In columns (1) and (2) of
Table 3.7 we repeat our main analysis in a panel regression framework to demon-
strate that this approach also captures the negative effect of the tax differential on
TFP. The coefficient of the interaction between the absolute tax difference and the
post-merger dummy is significantly negative. This is the case both for positive and
for negative tax differences although we note that negative tax differences appear to
be somewhat more important with a slightly larger magnitude for the corresponding
coefficient.
Next, we turn to the target firm, that is, instead of the TFP of the combined
firm we relate the tax differential to the estimated TFP of the target firm only.
Our results in column (3) suggest, that the productivity gain on the target level
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is substantially lower when the absolute tax differential is positive.20 In particular,
we find that a one percentage point increase in the absolute tax difference lowers
the merged-induced change in target productivity by 4.2%. We also explore whether
this result is rather driven by negative or positive tax differentials, that is, whether
lower productivity gains are a result of the target being located in a low-tax or high-
tax country with respect to the acquirer location. The results for the corresponding
estimation are presented in column (4). The coefficient for the interaction of the
post-merger dummy with the absolute magnitude of the negative tax differential,
∆τ−, is negative and highly significant. In contrast, the coefficient for the related
interaction with the positive tax differential, ∆τ+, is only marginally significant and
much smaller in magnitude. This finding suggests that the negative effect of tax
differentials on the post-merger productivity change in the target in our sample is
mainly driven by deals where profits received from the target are taxed at a lower
rate than those generated in the acquirer country.
We then conduct a similar analysis for the acquiring firm in columns (5) and (6).
Our results indicate that tax differentials have a much smaller impact on acquirer
productivity. With a coefficient of -0.02 the estimated effect is less than half the
magnitude found for target firms and only marginally significant. When relating the
TFP of the acquirer to negative and positive tax differentials separately, we do not
obtain precise results. The respective coefficients are negative but insignificant.
These findings point to the target firm as the entity within the merged firm where
tax differentials are most harmful for productivity gains. Although the estimated
impact of the tax differential is a novel effect with regard to M&A outcomes, it
is not surprising that the main impact relates to the target firm as this is the
place where probably most of the reorganization occurs after the merger. How the
tax differential affects this process should also be visible in the data. In our next
estimation we therefore trace the evolution of the input factors labor and capital
before and after the M&A completion and analyze how their use is affected by tax
differentials.
We begin this analysis with employment and present our findings in Table 3.8. The
first two columns show results with respect to the target firm. A negative, albeit
insignificant coefficient for the post-merger dummy in column (1) suggests that firms
reduce employment in the target firm after the merger. However, this reduction is
20The results presented here are estimated including the full set of controls. We also estimated the
corresponding models without firm-, country- and deal-level controls and obtained very similar
results.
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mitigated when there is a positive absolute tax differential. The estimation suggests
that the post-merger employment cut is reduced by 2% per percentage point of
absolute tax difference. As we focus on the target firm in this estimation, it is
again useful to separate the absolute tax differential into positive and negative tax
differences. We do this in column (2). Consistent with our theoretical explanations
above, target employment is mainly affected by negative rather than positive tax
differences.
Table 3.8: Panel Regression: Employment
OLS regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the total number of employees of the target firm in columns (1)-(2) and
the acquirer firm in columns (3)-(4). All regression results contain country-level controls for which estimated coefficients are reported
in Table B.4 in Appendix B. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions
include firm and industry-year fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1)
Target Firm
(2)
Target Firm
(3)
Acquirer
Firm
(4)
Acquirer
Firm
POST -0.402 -0.166 -0.126 -0.127
(0.288) (0.278) (0.206) (0.204)
POST ×∆ 0.021* -0.019*
(0.012) (0.010)
POST ×∆τ− 0.033*** -0.019*
(0.011) (0.010)
POST ×∆τ+ 0.005 -0.019
(0.018) (0.014)
POST×Cross-border -0.083 -0.006 0.024 0.032
(0.102) (0.098) (0.079) (0.078)
POST×Hostile -0.473*** -0.242 -0.449** -0.443**
(0.101) (0.167) (0.210) (0.210)
POST×Stock-for-Stock -0.435** -0.519*** 0.949*** 0.948***
(0.186) (0.187) (0.190) (0.192)
POST×Capital Increase 0.037 0.014 -1.004*** -1.007***
(0.131) (0.127) (0.112) (0.113)
POST×Horizontal -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.051) (0.049) (0.040) (0.040)
POST×Toehold 0.172 0.185 -0.103 -0.101
(0.118) (0.117) (0.112) (0.112)
POST×Acquirer Listed 0.138* 0.155** 0.094 0.098
(0.075) (0.071) (0.081) (0.083)
Leverage (Acq.) 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage (Tgt.) -0.065*** -0.059*** 0.017 0.015
(0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014)
Log Age (Acq.) 0.000 0.040 0.265*** 0.263***
(0.071) (0.048) (0.067) (0.067)
Log Age (Tgt.) 0.250*** 0.242*** 0.034 0.039
(0.082) (0.061) (0.050) (0.050)
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,096 5,123 5,096 5,123
R2 0.209 0.185 0.317 0.314
The opposite effect is observed with regard to the acquiring firm for which we
present results in columns (3) and (4). Higher absolute tax differentials enhance
the post-merger employment cut in the acquirer by 1.9% points for each percentage
point in tax difference. Again, separating the tax differential in positive and negative
differences suggests that this result is driven by M&As where a firm in a high-tax
country takes over a firm located in a low-tax country.
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We repeat this analysis for the other input factor capital which is measured as the
logarithm of tangible fixed assets. Results are shown in Table 3.9 where the first two
columns refer to the target firm. Similar to the effect on labor input, the estimation
suggests that an increase in the absolute tax differential has a positive effect on the
use of capital in the target after the merger. Furthermore, the significantly positive
coefficient of the interaction between the post-merger dummy and ∆τ− in column
(2) indicates that this is mainly driven by negative tax differences. An increase
in the magnitude of the negative tax difference between target and acquirer raises
merger-induced change in capital employed in the target by 4.6% per percentage
point. In contrast, we do not find a significant effect of positive tax differences on
the post-merger level of capital in the target which mirrors the asymmetry observed
for labor input. Firms only adjust the post-merger use of input factors in the target
to tax rate differentials if the target is located in a country with an effective tax rate
below that of the acquirer location. If the acquirer resides in a country with a more
favorable tax regime, no reaction occurs.
Turning to capital employment in the acquirer firm we cannot identify a significant
effect of the absolute tax differential. The corresponding coefficient in column (3) is
negative but relatively small and not significant. We also do not find a significant
impact if we differentiate between positive and negative differences. Thus, acquirer
firms in our sample do not adjust their post-merger investment policies to tax dif-
ferences. On the one hand, this may reflect that firms find it easier to adjust labor
input than to decrease or increase capital. On the other hand, acquirer firms are
usually much bigger than target firms, especially in terms of assets, and may adjust
their capital stock because of various factors unrelated to taxation. Such noise in
the data would prevent us from precisely measuring the effect of the tax difference
on changes in the capital employment of the acquirer following the M&A.
The main channel through which tax differentials affect the realization of produc-
tivity changes in M&As thus appears to be that they reduce the scale of adjustment
in the target firm when the tax burden for profits is lower there. Previous empirical
studies have already shown that target firms often undergo a period of substantial
restructuring after the completion of an M&A (e.g. Maksimovic et al., 2011; Li,
2013). However, our results suggest that differences in taxation are relevant with
regard to the magnitude and the speed of such adjustments. For instance, our re-
sults suggest that firms reallocate less activity away from targets that are located in
low-tax locations. This distortion hampers the realization of productivity gains in
these firms and thus has a negative impact on the overall productivity gain in the
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merged enterprise.
Table 3.9: Panel Regression: Capital
OLS regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of tangible fixed assets of the target firm in columns (1)-(2) and the acquirer
firm in columns (3)-(4). All regression results contain country-level controls for which estimated coefficients are reported in Table B.4
in Appendix B. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm
and industry-year fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Assets
(1)
Target
(2)
Target
(3)
Acquirer
(4)
Acquirer
POST -0.065 -0.083 -0.009 -0.049
(0.440) (0.436) (0.348) (0.344)
POST ×∆τ 0.031* -0.005
(0.017) (0.018)
POST ×∆τ− 0.040** -0.014
(0.018) (0.021)
POST ×∆τ+ 0.023 0.011
(0.026) (0.021)
POST×Cross-border 0.118 0.113 -0.135 -0.137
(0.193) (0.188) (0.153) (0.150)
POST×Hostile -0.274 -0.275 -0.227 -0.220
(0.290) (0.290) (0.139) (0.140)
POST×Stock-for-Stock -0.169 -0.190 2.061*** 2.093***
(0.351) (0.356) (0.313) (0.315)
POST×Capital Increase 0.040 0.039 -2.315*** -2.333***
(0.244) (0.245) (0.185) (0.184)
POST×Horizontal 0.089 0.090 -0.081 -0.077
(0.092) (0.092) (0.068) (0.067)
POST×Toehold -0.033 -0.029 0.139 0.142
(0.174) (0.173) (0.183) (0.183)
POST×Acquirer Listed 0.198 0.195 0.224 0.235
(0.178) (0.180) (0.143) (0.143)
Leverage (Acq.) 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.037
(0.000) (0.000) (0.055) (0.055)
Leverage (Tgt.) 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.038** 0.037**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.018) (0.018)
Log Age (Acq.) -0.220* -0.209 0.250** 0.249**
(0.132) (0.131) (0.109) (0.108)
Log Age (Tgt.) 0.205 0.204 0.181* 0.187*
(0.139) (0.139) (0.104) (0.103)
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,075 5,102 5,084 5,111
R2 0.199 0.198 0.307 0.307
We complement our analysis using the event study design described above. Results
are displayed in Figure 3.2 which plots the coefficients of the interactions between
the event dummies and the tax rate differential against the number of years relative
to the merger completion. In panel (a), the dependent variable is the TFP of the
combined firm. After an M&A is completed, TFP declines relative to one year prior
to the merger. This decrease is persistent over time and even increases in later
periods. Panels (b) and (c) present results for acquirer and target firms separately.
For the latter, we observe a significant decrease in TFP two and three years after
the merger. This suggests that the effect of tax rate differentials on merger-induced
productivity continues at least over the medium run. In contrast, there is no effect
of tax rate differentials on TFP of the acquirer neither before nor after the merger.
Turning to the effect of the tax differential on employment, we observe in panels
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Figure 3.2: Event Study
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Standard errors are clustered on firm level. 95% confidence intervals are reported. Estimations
include firm-fixed and industry-year-fixed effects.
(d) and (e) that it has opposite directions for the target and the acquirer. Relative
to the year before the merger, employment significantly increases in the target from
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2 years after the M&A completion onward. The effect increases over time. For the
acquirer, the effect is negative, albeit of much smaller magnitude. It only persists in
the short-run but is zero in year 4 after the merger. The impact of tax differences on
capital is less clear-cut. There is a marginally significant positive effect on target
capital two years after the M&A is executed but this quickly reverses. For the
acquirer, we find no significant change in capital in any post-merger year. These
results point to employment as the factor whose adjustment is affected most strongly
by tax differences between target and acquirer firm. At least for the acquirer, these
responses are not quickly reversed but continue over a substantial period of time.
For capital, the effect is less pronounced which probably reflects that adjustment
cost is higher for this factor as indicated, for example, by Hall (2004).
In none of the event study analyses we observe a significant response of the out-
come variable prior to the merger.21 This rules out that pre-merger trends in the
outcome variable drive our results and strongly points to the M&A completion as
the event that triggers the effect of the tax differential which strengthens the causal
interpretation of our results.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how the productivity change after corporate M&As is
affected by differences in profit taxation between the target and the acquirer location.
In our theoretical model, tax differentials between the locations of firms involved in
an M&A distort the post-merger reallocation of productive activity. If tax differences
are large enough, firms assign some activity to units that are less productive but
more profitable due to a lower tax burden. With respect to overall productivity in
the combined firm, this choice is inefficient and reduces the productivity gain after
the M&A.
We then employ firm-level data to test this notion empirically. First, we derive
firm-level estimates of TFP using the Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) method. We then
compute the merger-induced change in TFP in the combined firm and relate it to the
absolute value of the difference between the effective tax rate on profits received from
the target in the form of inter-corporate dividends and the tax rate applied to profits
generated by the acquirer. Our results suggest that an increase in the absolute tax
differential by one percentage point reduces the merger-induced productivity gains
21The graphical observation is confirmed using a Wald test for the joint insignificance of the
interaction of the pre-merger dummies with the absolute tax rate differential.
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by 4.5%. Consistent with our expectation that tax differentials are less distortive if
firms are able to reattribute part of their profit from high-tax to low-tax locations,
we find that the impact of the tax differential is mitigated when transfer pricing
regulations are less strict such that firms can more easily engage in profit shifting.
In a complementary analysis, we explore the mechanisms that drive the impact of
tax differences on overall firm productivity. Our findings indicate that the effect
is asymmetric. It is mainly driven by M&A deals where firms located in high-tax
countries acquire a firm in a low-tax country and fail to efficiently adjust the input
factors of production in the target to fully realize the productivity gain. In contrast,
tax differentials that would induce a relocation of activity to the acquirer location
have no significant impact on overall firm productivity. This probably reflects the
observation that post-merger adjustment relative to firm size is usually much larger
in the target entity.
An important limitation of our analysis, which is inherent to many empirical
studies of corporate M&A, is that we only observe completed deals. Both potential
productivity gains and the tax differential affect the expected benefit from an M&A
deal in terms of future profits. These factors may thus influence whether or not a
deal is completed. In particular, we may be less likely to observe M&As with low
productivity gains and small tax differentials because these deals lack two important
sources of future benefits. Due to the large number of domestic deals, this is, however,
not observed in practice. Alternatively, productivity gains and tax rates may interact
in their potential to increase post-merger returns. However, they do so only with
respect to the level of tax rates in the individual locations. An increase in production
is more valuable if the resulting profit is taxed at a lower rate. However, there is
no obvious interaction in this regard between productivity gains and the tax rate
difference. Thus, even though our estimations are exposed to biases similar to those
of other M&A studies, this is unlikely to drive our empirical results. In particular,
the results of an event study analysis reject the presence of pre-merger trends which
strengthens the causal inference from our estimations.
The findings of this paper have several important implications. First, they point
to a potential advantage of tax regimes that are neutral with respect to the location
of investment. These are mainly regimes with high domestic corporate tax rates that
avoid international double taxation through a credit on foreign tax payments such
as the United States. In contrast, systems that exempt foreign profits from domestic
taxation usually imply effective international tax differences. Devereux et al. (2015)
suggest higher tax administration costs as a potential motive for switching from a
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credit to an exemption regime despite the distortive impact of the latter. In the
light of our findings, these benefits should, however, be carefully weighted against
negative effects on the efficiency of international factor allocation.
Second, tax differentials turn out to be an additional impediment to cross-border
knowledge flows that has so far been largely ignored. Given that a large fraction of
conventional trade barriers has been eliminated in comprehensive bilateral and mul-
tilateral agreements, substantial differences in tax policy across countries are likely
to emerge as an important obstacle to the international transmission of technology.
Finally, while the analysis of firm reactions to international tax competition has
so far mostly focused on its relevance for financial accounting (see Hines Jr, 1999),
our results highlight that differences in taxation are also harmful in real terms by
reducing productivity growth. We show that firms make real adjustments not only
with respect to the level of domestic tax rates but also with regard to the interna-
tional tax system. Furthermore, in contrast to financial effects such as profit shifting
for which tax competition between developed countries and so-called tax havens is
an important driver, the real effect that we identify in this paper mainly refers to
tax differentials between developed economies. These are more likely to be linked
by real cross-border investments and are thus more exposed to the negative impact
of distortive tax rate differences.
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4 Thinking Outside the Box: The
Cross-border Effect of Tax Cuts on
R&D
4.1 Introduction
Research and development (R&D) activity is an important determinant of economic
growth and technological progress. Not surprisingly, governments regularly use fiscal
policy to attract R&D investment and top inventors (Akcigit et al., 2016; Moretti
& Wilson, 2017). With integrated economies, the implementation of such policies is
likely to exert effects on other locations. The direction of these cross-border effects
is of high relevance in a world where jurisdictions use tax policy to compete for
internationally mobile capital and talent. If nexus is required to benefit from tax
cuts such that income must be collocated with the underlying real activity, a lower
average tax rate in one location draws away operations from other locations. Hence,
the cross-border effect of a tax cut is negative (Barrios et al., 2012). However, this is
not necessarily true if income and real activity can be separated via profit shifting.
For instance, it is possible to assign the generation and ownership of output from
R&D to different locations via patent transfers. In this case an entity can attribute
profits to a low-tax affiliate but leave the actual operations in the high-tax location.
As profit shifting strategies become more sophisticated, the cross-border impact
of tax policy is thus getting more complex. Despite the intuitive relevance of this
issue, not much is known about the international effect of unilateral tax reductions
on innovative activity in the context of profit shifting. In this paper, we close this
gap by estimating the cross-border effect of tax cuts on R&D output. We explicitly
account for the possibility of profit shifting.
Our focus on R&D activity allows us to base our analysis on two important fea-
tures. First, the source of income and the underlying real activity are easily separated
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for R&D because the ownership rights of intellectual property are usually assigned
via tradable patents. Thus, profit shifting is a particularly relevant phenomenon
which allows us to study the cross-border effect of tax cuts in its full complexity.
Second, there have been a large number of tax cuts specifically for corporate income
from intangible assets at different points in time in different locations. These tax
regimes are often termed “patent boxes” because they are exclusively targeted at
returns to intellectual property. Patent box regimes exempt a large share of profits
related to intangible assets (mainly patents)1 from taxation and, thus, reduce the
effective tax rate on these profits. Furthermore, patent boxes differ substantially in
their design, in particular with regard to the extent of real activity (i.e. nexus) which
is required to become eligible for the lower tax rate. This makes them an interesting
policy feature for our analysis. Since the R&D activity of individual firms outside
of a jurisdiction is unlikely to affect this jurisdiction’s fiscal policy, these reforms
can be exploited as an exogenous variation for the identification of the cross-border
impact of tax cuts on R&D output.2
We analyze the cross-border effect of tax cuts on corporate R&D activity using a
difference-in-differences design which exploits firm-level variation in the exposure to
foreign patent box regimes within a multinational group. The cross-border effect is
identified by estimating the response of a firm in one location to the exogenous patent
box implementation in another location where one of its foreign affiliates resides.3
Following previous studies (e.g. Blundell et al., 1995; Stiebale, 2016), we measure
R&D output by granted patent applications. We address the potential endogeneity of
firm structure in an instrumental variable research design following the approach by
Gumpert et al. (2016). Furthermore, we provide additional evidence for R&D inputs
using confidential data on R&D expenditure for German firms. For the analysis,
ownership information for more than 26,000 firms is linked to administrative data on
patent applications. Cross-border links are established via multinational companies
which have been identified as important transmitters of macroeconomic and policy
shocks (Cravino & Levchenko, 2017). Using micro-level data also allows us to avoid
problems of spatial effects that arise when using aggregated data (Montmartin &
Herrera, 2015).
Importantly, in our analysis we differentiate between patent box reforms with and
without nexus requirement. Patent boxes without nexus requirement also tax patents
1Some patent boxes also allow for the inclusion of trademarks or other intellectual property.
2We verify this by testing for common trends in our empirical analysis.
3See Figure C.3 in Appendix C for a graphical illustration of this concept.
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at the favorable rate that have been generated elsewhere. This is usually done by
including existing and acquired patents in the patent box which provides firms with
the following profit shifting opportunity: They conduct R&D in the location of their
choice and then transfer the resulting patent to a patent box location without nexus
requirement in order to benefit from the lower tax rate there.4 This lowers the user
cost of capital for R&D activity in the group as a whole through a mechanism that is
very similar to the one described in Hong & Smart (2010) for tax havens. In fact, this
similarity is not surprising. Countries that implement patent boxes without nexus
requirement effectively become tax havens for a particularly important asset. Below,
we thus refer to these regimes as patent havens. Because patent havens provide an
output-related tax incentive beyond the location where they are implemented, we
expect them to generate a positive cross-border effect on R&D activity.
Nexus patent boxes only apply the reduced tax rate if at least part of the research
activity has been carried out in the respective country (i.e. there is some nexus in
this country). These regimes make it hard to separate R&D profits from underlying
operations. Thus, we do not expect this incentive to raise R&D activity beyond
the jurisdiction where it is implemented. The cross-border effect would be negative,
if the tax cut leads to the relocation of R&D activity. One could, however, still
observe some positive repercussions on domestic investment from increases in R&D
activity in the foreign affiliate. A similar effect has been identified for FDI of U.S.
multinationals by Desai et al. (2009). This is likely to mitigate or compensate a
negative cross-border effect of nexus patent boxes.
Our estimation results suggest that the implementation of a foreign patent haven
(no nexus requirement) raises R&D activity in the form of patent output by about
15% on average. We capture the treatment intensity by interacting the implemen-
tation indicator with the change in the tax rate difference between firm and affiliate
location and find that the patent haven implementation leads to an increase of
patent output by 1.1% per percentage point of change in the tax rate differential.
The cross-border effect of tax cuts on R&D output is thus about one third of the
effect estimated by Karkinsky & Riedel (2012) for domestic tax changes. Similar
results are obtained when using confidential data on R&D expenditures of German
firms. For patent boxes with nexus requirement, we find a cross-border effect that is
close to zero and possibly negative. Furthermore, we find that nexus patent boxes
4The extent to which such a profit shifting strategy is feasible depends on the design of both the
patent box regime and the tax system in the high-tax country. We discuss institutional issues
in more detail below.
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reduce the average patent quality in related firms abroad. The cross-border effect of
nexus boxes thus occurs with respect to the intensive rather than with respect to the
extensive margin of corporate R&D location decisions. This result can be explained
by the spatial sorting of patents according to their profitability: Nexus patent boxes
probably lead to the relocation of the most profitable patents.
These findings are robust to controlling for domestic tax-related input incentives
such as super-deductions and credits. They also pertain when we adjust the patent
count for heterogeneity in the patent quality. We further ensure robustness by repli-
cating our results using different estimation methods such as propensity score match-
ing as well as an event study design and by conducting a number of sample checks
with regard to the structure and activity of the corporate group.
Our analysis expands the large literature on tax policy and R&D activity. We
explore the cross-border impact of tax cuts as a novel effect of tax policy on R&D
and highlight the importance of nexus conditions in these policies. Previous studies
have established a link between taxation and investment in R&D (Mamuneas &
Nadiri, 1996; Bloom et al., 2002; Wilson, 2009), the location choice of intangible
assets (Dischinger & Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014)
and the quality of patents (Ernst et al., 2014) within the borders of a particular
location. The literature on international effects of tax policy on R&D is scarce and
relies on macro data. For example, Wilson (2009) uses aggregate data on R&D
spending from US states to show that a large part of the increasing effect of tax
credits on R&D inputs is due to a reallocation of research activity between states.
In contrast, we study the cross-border effect of output-related tax incentives in the
form of tax cuts for intellectual property. This allows us to directly account for
the differences in nexus requirements that drive the cross-border impact of these
reforms.
More generally, we contribute to the literature on the cross-border impact of taxa-
tion on economic activity which is centered around multinational firms (e.g. Dharma-
pala, 2008; Slemrod & Wilson, 2009; Hong & Smart, 2010; Desai et al., 2006). Our
results provide important insights into the role of tax policy in determining the
geographical distribution of economic activity. We show that tax incentives in one
location only attract real activity from another location if they are combined with an
effective nexus requirement. In contrast, if tax benefits are available without nexus,
tax cuts raise economic activity across borders. Such differences in the cross-border
effect of tax policy are especially relevant for high-growth industries. For instance,
the sustainability of nexus rules is particularly questionable in the case of highly val-
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ued R&D activity which is associated with extremely mobile intellectual property
and top scientists. Moreover, the fast-growing digital economy challenges conven-
tional concepts of the economic nexus of a taxable activity. Our results suggest that
tax policy is less likely to determine the location choice of real activity for these
growing sectors. However, it remains relevant for the allocation of mobile income
and tax revenue.
In addition, we enrich the growing literature on patent box regimes. In this field,
more normative analyses (e.g. Evers et al., 2015) have recently been complemented
by empirical studies (e.g. Bradley et al., 2015; Koethenbuerger et al., 2016; Al-
stadsæter et al., 2018). Even though most governments claim to implement patent
boxes mainly to facilitate domestic R&D activity, the emergence of these regimes
has raised concerns. Not surprisingly, the cross-border effect that we investigate in
this paper is at the heart of several of these issues. For instance, it is not certain that
patent boxes actually boost new R&D projects and, thus, increase the overall level
of corporate innovation. In response to the implementation of a more favorable tax
regime in one location, firms could merely relocate existing research projects. Such a
beggar-thy-neighbor effect is well-known for tax credits (Wilson, 2009). In addition,
the economic role of patent boxes is heavily debated. In the best case, these regimes
eliminate a market failure by increasing the net return of R&D to a level that better
reflects its positive externalities on knowledge generation within the economy. In the
worst case, patent boxes distort the location decisions of R&D investments. To the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically analyze the cross-border
effect of patent boxes on R&D activity. Our results suggest that the institutional de-
sign of patent boxes is decisive for the direction and magnitude of their international
impact.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 develops a stylized
theoretical framework for our analysis. We explain the empirical strategy in Section
4.3 and describe the data collection in Section 4.4. Results are presented in Section
4.5 while Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Cross-border Effect of Tax Cuts
In this section we develop a stylized theoretical framework to characterize the re-
sponse of a firm’s R&D activity to a tax cut in one of its foreign affiliate locations
(e.g. the implementation of a patent box). From this framework we derive testable
hypotheses for our empirical analysis. We consider a multinational enterprise (MNE)
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i that is located in country h and has an affiliate in country p. We are interested
in the cross-border effect of a tax cut for patent income. Thus, our focus is on the
number of successfully realized research projects (measured as patents) in h rather
than the overall research activity in the MNE. The firm makes three decisions: (i)
it chooses whether or not to realize projects (patents) from a given set of potential
undertakings indicated by s = 1, ..., ni, (ii) it decides on the location of R&D activ-
ity and (iii) it chooses the location of patent ownership. The two location decisions
do not necessarily coincide and depend on the characteristics of h and p such as
R&D related fixed costs and tax rates for patent income. All three choices jointly
determine the number of realized research projects in h denoted by Pi.
Let us define the return to a research project s by
rs = (1− t) pis − c (4.1)
where (1− t) pis is the net profit (i.e. revenue less deductible cost after taxes) and c
is some non-deductible fixed cost. The effective tax rate t and the fixed cost c may
differ between location h and p and are thus functions of the ownership and activity
location choices of the firm. For simplicity, we normalize tax rates to be equal ini-
tially, th = tp. The tax cut in p lowers tp such that th > tp. The fixed cost c comprises
items that are hard to price and usually not considered as deductible expenses such
as the cost of risk-taking in R&D investments in a particular location, the cost of
becoming acquainted with local patenting institutions or the cost to identify suitable
researchers in different regions. To simplify the derivation, we assume that firm i
incurs higher fixed costs if it relocates its research activity to country p (i.e. cp > ch).
Besides the specific characteristics of the fixed costs described above, this reflects po-
tential relocation costs which include the establishment of new organizational R&D
structures in p and the effort for convincing researchers to move.
The firm either co-locates or geographically separates R&D activity and ownership.
There are various ways to achieve the latter, including the direct transfer of patent
rights, contract R&D and cost sharing agreements between the two affiliates (Griffith
et al., 2014). Effectively, all of these arrangements result in part of the profit from
the research project being taxed in a location different from the one where the
R&D activity was carried out and, thus, have qualitatively similar consequences.
The organizational form of the geographical location of patent rights is, however,
an important feature for the empirical identification of the cross-border effect of tax
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cuts. We discuss this in more detail below.
Depending on the location choices of the firm, the profit of a research project s is
given by
rh,hs = (1− th) pis − ch if R&D activity and ownership in h,
rh,ps = (1− th + α∆t)pis − ch if R&D activity in h and ownership in p,
rp,ps = (1− tp) pis − cp if R&D activity and ownership in p
where ∆t = th − tp ≥ 0. Locating R&D activity in p and ownership in h is not
optimal because cp > ch. α denotes the profit share of a research project conducted
in h that is taxed at tp as a consequence of the relocation of the ownership right
to p. The parameter α captures the extent to which a reduction in the tax burden
is inhibited both by regulations in location h (e.g. CFC rules or exit taxes) and in
location p. Regulations in location h are likely to be orthogonal to the patent box
implementation while regulations in location p are directly linked to the setup of
the exploited patent box. For example, α is small if the patent box in p excludes
R&D profits for projects conducted outside of p (nexus patent box). In contrast, α
is close to 1 if the patent box regime in p includes existing and acquired patents
(patent haven).
To compute the number of realized research projects, we assume the following
sequence of decisions: The firm first decides on whether or not to realize a partic-
ular project s and then simultaneously determines where to optimally locate R&D
activity and legal ownership. Solving this problem backwards, we begin with the
location decision. If ∆t > 0, legal ownership is assigned to p because there are no
fixed costs for separating ownership and R&D activity5 and hence rh,hs < rh,ps , rp,ps .
To simplify notation, we assume that the ownership rights are also assigned to p if
∆t = 0. The ownership location does not affect the return of a project if tax rates
are equal. R&D activity is located according to the cut-off profit
p˜i = cp − ch(1− α) ∆t
5To make the framework more realistic, one could introduce some fixed costs to separating own-
ership and activity which would result in the ownership of some research projects being located
in h even if th > tp. This would make our model slightly more complicated without adding
further insights with regard to the main effect of interest.
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Activity for all projects with pis < p˜i is located to h because in this case rh,ps ≥ rp,ps ,
while R&D activity for the remaining projects (for which rh,ps < rp,ps ) is located to p.
Next, we turn to the decision of whether or not a research project is realized. Only
research projects with a positive return are completed. This implies that any project
s with
pis > p˜i
∗ = ch1− th + α∆t
is realized. We sort the gross profits of all available projects along the interval (
¯
pii, p¯ii)
and define the corresponding cumulative distribution function F . Let us assume for
illustrative purposes that p˜i∗ < p˜i.6 The overall number of finished projects is then
given by ni (1− F (p˜i∗)) with ni (1− F (p˜i)) projects realized in p and the number of
realized R&D projects of firm i in location h given by
Pi = ni (F (p˜i)− F (p˜i∗)) . (4.2)
Note that F (p˜i) → 1 as ∆t → 0, that is, Pi converges to the overall number of
realized projects as the tax differential shrinks.
How is Pi affected by a tax cut in p? Such a reform lowers tp and, thus, increases
the tax differential ∆t. The change in the number of realized R&D projects in h as
a result of an increase in the tax differential of d∆t is given by
dPi = ni
(
− (1− α) f (p˜i) (cp − ch)
((1− α) ∆t)2 + α
f (p˜i∗) ch
(1− th + α∆t)2
)
d∆t. (4.3)
The sign of the effect depends on how much the separation of ownership and real
activity for tax purposes is inhibited by regulations. For example, if the patent box
requires full nexus in location p, that is α = 0, dPi is negative. In this case, cross-
border relocation of ownership (and, thus, profits) from h to p is not an option and
the tax reduction in p does not affect the cost of capital in h. Rather, activity for
sufficiently profitable projects is located to p, reducing the overall number of realized
projects in h.7 In contrast, a patent haven (no nexus requirement) has a positive
6Various orders of the threshold profits are possible but yield the less interesting case where all
research activity is located to p irrespective of the change in the tax rate differential.
7Note that this does not necessarily imply that overall research activity of the multinational
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effect on research output in h. Abstracting from inhibiting factors in the transferor
location, we have α = 1 in this case and, thus, dPi > 0. As the firm is able to
relocate the ownership of some projects realized in h to p, the tax cut there also
reduces the user cost of R&D capital in h and increases research output.8
Finally, we observe that the average profit of realized projects in h decreases with
the tax cut in p. A formal analysis of this result is presented in Appendix C.1. For
nexus boxes (small α), the intuition for this result is that only R&D activity for
the most profitable projects is relocated to p. This is consistent with an analysis by
Haufler & Stähler (2013) who show in a tax competition model, that more profitable
projects sort into low-tax jurisdictions. Empirical evidence by Becker et al. (2012)
suggests that this effect contributes significantly to the overall tax base location
effect of corporate taxes. In principal, the negative effect on average R&D quality
can also occur when a patent haven is established in p because this allows R&D
projects with lower profitability to be realized in h. In practice, this effect can,
however, be compensated or even overturned by an increase in R&D profitability
due to an agglomeration effect that is likely to be observed if patent havens generate
a positive cross-border effect on R&D quantity.
Thus, the theoretical framework suggests two types of cross-border effects that
are tested in the empirical analysis. First, the cross-border effect of a tax cut for
patent income on the quantity of R&D output is positive if profit shifting is possible
and absent or negative if profit shifting is limited. Second, we expect a negative
cross-border effect of tax cuts on the quality of R&D output, especially if firms can
only benefit from the tax cut if they establish sufficient nexus in the relevant patent
box country.
4.3 Empirical Identification
4.3.1 Patent Output
The goal of this paper is to assess the cross-border impact of tax cuts on R&D
activity. Following previous studies (e.g. Blundell et al., 1995; Stiebale, 2016), R&D
activity of a firm is measured by its annual registered output of granted patents.9
company decreases. If the tax benefits in p are large enough, the total number of patents would
even increase. This occurs, however, only because the increase in research activity in p more
than compensates for the decrease in h. Research activity in h always decreases.
8A graphical illustration of this formal analysis can be found in Appendix C.2.
9Granted applications are commonly used in the literature (e.g. Aghion et al., 2013; Seru, 2014;
Stiebale, 2016; Bena & Li, 2014) because they better capture actual research activity rather
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We model the number of granted patent applications Pijct in year t of firm i which is
member of multinational group j and is located in country c as a function of foreign
tax cuts on patent income and several control variables.
We begin our analysis using an event study design.10 The general idea of the event
study is to regress the number of patents on individual dummies indicating periods
before and after the implementation of a foreign patent box. This approach is helpful
in two ways. First, it allows us to verify the validity of our research design, which
compares the response of firms with and without affiliates in particular countries to
exogenous tax cuts in these locations, by establishing common pre-trends of R&D
activity for the treatment and control firms. Second, since in an event study we
observe the cross-border effect of foreign patent box implementations for individual
periods, we are able to explore the dynamics of this effect. The setup of the event
study closely follows Fuest et al. (2018) and is described in detail in Appendix C.5.
In order to estimate the average cross-border effect of a tax cut, we use a difference-
in-differences strategy in a Poisson fixed effects model11 (see Hausman et al., 1984;
Wooldridge, 1999; Cameron & Trivedi, 2015) of the following form:
E (Pijct) = exp
(
x′ijctβ
)
with x′ijctβ = α ·BOXHavenjt +η ·BOXNexusjt +βXit+γZjt+δCct+φt+φi
(4.4)
BOXHavenjt and BOXNexusjt are binary variables that are equal to 1 if a patent box
of a particular type is implemented in the country of residence of at least one of
the foreign affiliates of firm i and zero otherwise. Xit, Zjt and Cct are firm-, group-
and location-specific characteristics. φt and φi capture time- and firm-specific ef-
fects. In the estimation, we differentiate between nexus patent boxes (some nexus
requirement, indicated by BOXNexusjt ) and patent havens (no nexus requirement,
indicated by BOXHavenjt ). Patent havens are defined as patent boxes that include
both acquired and existing patents and, thus, allow firms to realize tax benefits
than strategic patent filing.
10See Hoynes et al. (2011), Kline (2012) and Chetty et al. (2014) for recent applications of event
studies in public economics. Furthermore, Alpert et al. (forthcoming) use an event study design
in a count model that closely resembles our approach.
11This model is equivalent to the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator proposed by
Silva & Tenreyro (2006). As demonstrated by Wooldridge (1999), it is the most robust choice
among nonlinear count models. To verify whether over-dispersion drives our result, we have
also estimated a negative binomial regression and obtained very similar results.
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through the post-generation cross-border transfer of patent rights (see Table 4.2).
In contrast, the nexus patent boxes apply the favorable rate mainly to profits from
R&D activity conducted in the respective location.
To identify the cross-border effect of tax cuts on a particular firm, we exploit the
exogenous implementation of a patent box regime in the location of a foreign affiliate
of this firm. The identification relies on the assumption that, prior to the implemen-
tation of a patent box, firms with affiliates in the implementing countries are not
systematically different with respect to the evolution of their R&D activity from
those that do not have affiliates in these locations. We test this assumption using
the event study design. A further potential source of endogeneity is the structure of
the multinational group. On the one hand, MNEs that comprise firms which expect
an increase in their research activity have an incentive to set up a new affiliate in a
patent box location. On the other hand, firms may establish affiliates in patent box
locations once they accumulated a significant stock of patents and R&D activity
subsequently slows down. There are two ways in which we account for these issues
and ensure that our results are not driven by firms endogenously establishing affili-
ates in patent box locations: We employ an instrumental variables strategy and we
conduct an additional sample check where we consider only firms with no changes
in their group structure.
The instrumental variable approach follows a strategy proposed by Gumpert et al.
(2016) to account for the potential endogeneity of firm location. In this estimation,
we fix the organizational structure of each firm at the beginning of our sample
period and then redefine the variables that indicate the occurrence of foreign tax
cuts (e.g. BOXHavenjt , BOXNexusjt ) according to this fixed structure. We use these
hypothetical realizations as instruments for the actual variables. The instruments
only capture foreign tax cuts on patent income that result from the exogenous
implementation of patent boxes and are unrelated to the location choice of the firm
during our sample period. Such an instrumental variable strategy is valid if the initial
structure of the firm is not affected by the subsequent response of innovation output
to foreign tax cuts. This is a plausible assumption given that both the tax changes
implemented through the patent box regimes and the success of R&D activity are
highly unpredictable. In an additional robustness check, we exclude all groups that
changed their structure with respect to a patent box location and reestimate our
benchmark specification. In this setting, the foreign tax cuts are again the ones
exclusively caused by the exogenous implementation of patent box regimes.
The macroeconomic and institutional control variables include the log of GDP per
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capita, GDP growth, general research activity measured by R&D expenditures as
a percentage of GDP and the corporate income tax rate. One concern with regard
to our analysis is that those countries without a patent box have instead turned to
input-related tax incentives in order to remain competitive R&D locations. If these
alternative incentives are the main drivers of the observed rise in domestic patenting
activity, this would still hint to a cross-border effect of patent boxes. Instead of a
direct impact on the user cost of capital, the effect would then be a result of policy
interactions in a fiscal competition game. To avoid capturing such spurious effects,
we include the user cost of capital for R&D in our estimation which is a composite
measure that includes input-related tax incentives such as tax credits and super-
deductions for R&D activity.12 We also control for several items that have been
suggested to affect R&D activity on the firm level such as the number of affiliates,
the age of a firm as well as the firm size measured in total assets, the working capital
and the capital intensity of a firm (see Stiebale, 2016). Finally, we include firm- and
time-fixed effects to capture cross-sectional differences in the level of R&D output,
as well as general time trends.
We restrict our analysis to firms located in countries without a patent box imple-
mentation during our sample period. As the focus of this study is the cross-border
effect of tax cuts through patent box regimes, patent box locations must be excluded
to avoid distorting effects of the implementation of domestic regimes that may or
may not coincide with the implementation of patent boxes abroad. However, we
verified that our results also hold when we include these locations.
The number of patents is primarily measured as the count of annual granted
patents per firm. To capture the intensity of domestic R&D activity, we also con-
duct our analysis using the quality-weighted number of new patents. Frequently
cited patents registered at multiple patent offices and classified to contribute to
many patenting classes are potentially more valuable (see Harhoff et al., 1999). We
construct patent quality using the composite quality indicator proposed by Lanjouw
& Schankerman (2004) which is commonly employed in this strand of literature (see,
e.g., Hall et al., 2007 and Ernst et al., 2014). The composite quality indicator is de-
rived through a multiple-indicator model relying on the number of forward citations,
the patent family size and the number of patent classifications resulting in a relative
measure for patent quality. The procedure to derive it is described in Appendix C.3.
12See Appendix C.4 for a detailed derivation.
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4.3.2 Patent Quality
We also estimate the cross-border effect of a patent box implementation on the
average quality of new patents to test our theoretical predictions with regard to
the cross-border effect of patent boxes on the quality of R&D output. The latter is
computed by dividing the quality-weighted patent count by the number of patents,
qijct =
P qual.ijct
Pijct
. To account for general quality shifts within the same industry as well
as level differences across industries and countries, we then scale this measure by its
2-digit SIC industry, country- and year-specific mean q¯sct and obtain q˜ijct = qijctq¯sct . We
relate the logarithm of this relative measure to foreign patent box implementations
in the following fixed effects regression:
log (q˜ijct) = ι+ α ·BOXHavenjt + η ·BOXNexusjt
+βXit + γZjt + δCct + φt + φi + it (4.5)
The specification of variables is the same as for equation (4.4).
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Patent Data
The analysis is based on a rich panel dataset built by combining multiple data
sources on administrative patent data, firm information and patent box character-
istics. Patent data is taken from the PATSTAT database operated by the European
Patent Office (EPO). PATSTAT is a comprehensive data source covering patent
data for over 80 countries in a harmonized way (Jacob, 2013). For the econometric
analysis we count the number of granted patents per firm for each year.13
In our analysis we focus on domestically developed patents. In principal, the coun-
try of residence of the firm applying for a patent does not necessarily constitute the
place of development of the patent. As is common in the literature, we identify
whether or not a patent was developed at the location of the firm using address in-
formation of the inventors (Guellec & de la Potterie, 2001). A patent is classified as
domestic if the majority of its inventors reside in the same country as the applicant
firm.14 We remove outliers by trimming the sample at the 99 percentile of annual
13Since it can take multiple years between application and approval of a patent, we account for
this time lag between generating an innovation and acceptance of the patent application using
the date of first patenting application instead of the patent publication date.
14For those patents with no inventor information provided by PATSTAT, it is assumed that the
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Table 4.1: New Patents, 2000-2012
Number of firms in
sample
Number of granted
patent applications
Avg. new dom.
patents per
firm-year
Share of firms with affiliate in patent
box location
Patent Haven Nexus Patent
Box
AT 1,086 6,162 0.50 0.25 0.26
BG 72 175 0.23 0.11 0.08
CH 1,337 8,604 0.55 0.40 0.39
CZ 808 2559 0.27 0.12 0.11
DE 11,849 67,250 0.48 0.19 0.22
DK 561 2,135 0.36 0.25 0.30
EE 46 97 0.21 0.03 0.06
FI 591 3,457 0.51 0.29 0.32
GB 4,035 17,541 0.38 0.29 0.34
GR 15 55 0.29 0.27 0.13
HR 21 32 0.13 0.14 0.14
IS 9 17 0.16 0.06 0.18
IT 3,288 13,101 0.34 0.11 0.12
LT 21 46 0.17 0.13 0.15
LV 44 87 0.20 0.06 0.06
NO 552 1,828 0.32 0.18 0.23
PL 489 1,743 0.31 0.16 0.18
PT 135 300 0.19 0.27 0.36
RO 157 403 0.22 0.06 0.06
SE 997 5,086 0.44 0.35 0.36
SI 172 621 0.31 0.09 0.09
TR 401 1,173 0.25 0.02 0.05
Total 26,686 132,472 0.43 0.21 0.24
domestic patent output.
Table 4.1 displays descriptive statistics of the firm locations we include in our
sample.15 Research activity is particularly strong in Switzerland, Austria, Finland
and Germany with average annual domestically developed patents per firm of be-
tween 0.55 and 0.48. Fewer patent applications are observed in smaller locations like
Croatia and Lithuania.
patent was developed domestically. As a robustness check, it is also assumed that all patents
without inventor information provided are non-domestic ones. The results still hold implying
that these patents are not systematically different from those with inventor information.
15An overview of the sample selection process is displayed in Table C.2 in Appendix C.
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As pointed out above, an institutional feature that is crucial to identify the cross-
border effect of a tax cut on R&D output is the way MNEs separate patent ownership
and R&D activity. Previous studies that estimate the elasticity of legal ownership
of a patent in a particular jurisdiction with respect to the applicable tax rate have
argued that, if the separation of R&D activity and ownership occurs, this is done
mainly through contract R&D and cost sharing arrangements whereby the patent
applicant would also be the final owner (Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al.,
2014). In contrast, actual transfers of patents via intra-company sales are less at-
tractive because of their adverse tax effects. This assumption appears sensible given
that these studies cover periods when many countries applied CFC rules that should
substantially diminish potential tax benefits of cross-border patent transfers.16 Un-
der these circumstances, contract R&D or cost sharing are probably more attractive
modes of cross-border ownership allocations.
However, in its seminal 2006 Cadbury-Schweppes ruling the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) has effectively limited the applicability of CFC rules and the majority
of countries has amended their regimes (Bräutigam et al., 2017). Further ECJ rulings
have mitigated the threat of exit taxes on the capital gains realized in these cross-
border transfers.17 In fact, a recent anonymized survey conducted by Heckemeyer
et al. (2015) reveals that MNEs consider the selling of patents to foreign affiliates a
feasible way to transfer ownership rights across borders.18 A possible reason for this
observation is that it is particularly difficult for tax authorities to examine the true
value of recently granted patents with no revenues attached which makes it easy to
set transfer prices in such a way that MNEs can realize tax benefits from cross-border
transfers. At the same time, direct patent transfers avoid communication costs and
uncertainty arising from cost sharing or contract R&D arrangements. Furthermore,
many input-related incentives for R&D (e.g. direct subsidies, tax credits) usually do
not apply to contract arrangements.
In line with Dischinger & Riedel (2011), we conclude that the post-generation
transfer of intangible assets such as patents is a viable mode of ownership relocation
16Griffith et al. (2014) study patent applications from 1985 to 2005, Karkinsky & Riedel (2012) ob-
serve annual patent applications of European firms from 1995 to 2003. According to Bräutigam
et al. (2017), Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Norway,
Portugal and Sweden had CFC rules with respect to other European countries in 2003.
17E.g. National Grid Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond C-371/10 ( NGI )
and C-657/13 Verder LabTec GmbH & Co. KG v Finanzamt Hilden
18The survey also finds that cost sharing agreements are much less important, which probably
reflects that they are primarily a phenomenon in MNEs with US parents due to institutional
reasons (Dischinger & Riedel, 2011).
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for tax purposes. Recent findings suggest that such transfers are a relevant phe-
nomenon. For instance, Gaessler et al. (2017) estimate that the implementation of
patent boxes in the recipient country that include acquired and existing patents (i.e.
no nexus requirement) significantly increases the number of annual bilateral patent
transfers. It follows that it is feasible to identify the cross-border effect of patent
boxes using patent application data. We further ascertain that the initial applicant
is likely to be the entity that was actively involved in the research project by using
information on inventor residence to isolate patents for which the underlying R&D
activity has been conducted elsewhere. If anything, the measurement error induced
by R&D contract arrangements would exert a downward bias on our estimates of
the cross-border effect. While the patent box implementation in one affiliate actu-
ally raises R&D output in another non-patent box affiliate of an MNE, this would in
some cases not be observed in the patent application data since the final applicant
would be the patent box affiliate as the internal buyer of R&D services. Our estimate
would then have to be interpreted as a lower bound of the true effect.
4.4.2 Tax Cuts for Income from Intellectual Property
Before testing the empirical relevance of our analytical results, it is useful to describe
the patent boxes that exist in practice. Evers et al. (2015) and Alstadsæter et al.
(2018) provide a comprehensive overview of the various regimes that have been es-
tablished since 2000. In Table 4.2, we summarize key elements of existing patent box
regimes in our sample. In general, firms enjoy substantial reductions in effective tax
payments when opting for these regimes but significant differences remain. Patent
boxes differ in the treatment of expenses as well as in the types of intangible assets
they are applied to beyond patents (e.g. trademarks, brands). The magnitude of the
tax exemption varies significantly across locations. For instance, while the tax rate
on profits from patents is reduced by 35 percentage points in Cyprus, firms enjoy
only a 50% exemption in Portugal which implies a decrease in the statutory tax rate
of 11.25 percentage points.
For the cross-border effect of a patent box, it is relevant whether or not the regime
has a nexus requirement. In the sense of our analytical framework, a nexus require-
ment is a regulation that restricts the lower tax rate to income from patents for
which the underlying R&D activity has also been carried out in the respective coun-
try. This is done by either excluding previously existing or acquired patents from the
benefits of the lower patent box tax rate (Spain, Portugal) or by requiring acquired
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Table 4.2: Patent Box Regimes in European countries
Country Year of
implementation
Corporate
income tax rate
(2015)
Patent box tax rate
(2015)
Acquired
Patents
Existing
Patents
France 2000 34.0 16.8 Yes Yes
Hungary 2003 19.0 9.5 Yes Yes
Netherlands 2007 25.0 5.0 No No
Spain 2008 30.0 12.0 No Yes
Belgium 2008 34.0 6.8 No No
Luxembourg 2008 29.2 5.8 No No
Malta 2010 35.0 0.0 Yes Yes
Cyprus 2012 10.0 2.5 Yes Yes
United Kingdom 2013 20.0 12.0 No Yes
Portugal 2014 22.5 11.3 No No
Italy 2015 31.4 22.0 No No
Turkey 2015 20.0 10.0 No No
Ireland 2016 12.5 6.3 No No
Source: IBFD; Alstadsæter et al. (2018); Evers et al. (2015). Note: Ireland initially introduced a patent box regime
in 1973 but abolished it in 2010. It was reintroduced in 2016.
patents to either have been further developed to a substantial degree at the patent
box location (Belgium, Ireland19, Netherlands, United Kingdom) or to have been
purchased from a non-related entity (Luxembourg). Effectively, all of these patent
boxes require that a substantial part of the research activity must be conducted in
the respective country for the lower patent box rate to apply. As a consequence,
profit shifting opportunities are limited and these regimes are thus unlikely to gen-
erate a positive cross-border effect on R&D activity.
Several patent box regimes include acquired and existing patents (France, Hun-
gary, Malta, Cyprus) without effective restrictions.20 Since this allows firms to con-
duct the actual development of the patent elsewhere and then transfer the resulting
19In 2008, Ireland extended the scope of its patent box to patent income resulting from R&D
conducted in a EEA member state. However, the reform also imposed an upper limit of EUR 5
million for the income to which the exemption is applied. This prohibits the setup of effective
profit shifting structures through holding entities.
20In France, the only limitation is that acquired patents must be held for at least 2 years by the
acquiring company for the resulting profits to be taxed under the patent box regime.
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patent right to the patent box location, these regimes correspond to the patent
havens in the theoretical analysis.
4.4.3 Ownership and Firm Data
We obtain PATSTAT patent data through Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. This
allows us to link patents of the applying firms to the comprehensive ownership
information contained in Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database via common iden-
tifiers. The firm level databases by Bureau van Dijk are unique in two important
ways. First, they provide information on the organizational structure of multina-
tional firms around the globe. Second, they contain firm-level balance sheet data in
an internationally comparable format. Both features are crucial for the analysis of
the cross-border effect within MNEs and have also been exploited to identify other
types of international transmissions (e.g. Cravino & Levchenko, 2017).
Using the ownership information, we are able to identify the ultimate owner for
each firm in the sample. We construct multinational groups by assigning firms with
a common ultimate owner to the same group. This approach is complemented using
data on firm establishment and acquisitions in order to record changes in the owner-
ship structure over time. More precisely, we check whether the firm existed through-
out the whole observation period and combine the ownership information with data
on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database to cap-
ture ownership changes. In line with previous studies (e.g. Stiebale, 2016), we restrict
our sample to industries where patenting is actually relevant. We include firms ac-
tive in the manufacturing sector as well as several knowledge-intensive service sectors
such as information technology, telecommunications, transport, or business-related
services.21 Table 4.1 provides information on the geographical distribution of firm
observations over the 22 locations that remain after excluding patent box locations.
We also obtain balance sheet items as well as firm age from Amadeus. Working
capital is computed by scaling the difference between current assets and current
liabilities with total assets, while capital intensity is defined as the ratio of tangible
fixed assets and sales.22
Macroeconomic control variables are obtained from the World Bank’s World De-
velopment Indicators (WDI) and the OECD. Tax policy indicators are collected
21This excludes financial services. We identify relevant sectors via 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes and
include firms with codes 10-32, 51-53, 58-63, 69-74 and 77-82.
22Missing entries for the necessary variables are replaced by annual industry (2-digit US SIC code)
means.
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from the IBFD tax database. When computing the user cost of capital, we follow
Bloom et al. (2002) and incorporate the input incentives, the applicable tax rate
and the fixed depreciation rate into a measure for the user cost of a domestic R&D
investment. In order to isolate the effect of tax policy on R&D activity, we calculate
the user cost with a fixed interest rate of 5%.23
Firm-level ownership and balance sheet information is available from 2000 onward.
We analyze data until 2012 because for more recent years the patent data is not
reliable. The process of granting patents usually takes several years, such that for
more recent periods we do not yet observe the full amount of R&D output.24
4.4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.3 provides summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis.
As mentioned above, for the cross-border effect of patent boxes to be identified,
we require firms with affiliates in patent box locations (treated) and those that
do not have affiliates in these countries (non-treated) to be comparable. We thus
complement the descriptive statistics with various characteristics of the two types
of firms. In Table 4.4 we display the distribution across industries (NACE Rev.
2 divisions) of the two groups (Panel A) and state the within-group averages for
key variables (Panel B). Treated and non-treated firms have a similar distribution
across industries, with the majority of patenting firms in the manufacturing and
services sectors. They differ with respect to location-specific variables such as the
user cost of R&D capital, the statutory corporate income tax rate and GDP per
capita. However, these differences are very small in magnitude. This implies that
firms with affiliates in patent box countries are not clustered in certain locations
and, therefore, our results are not driven by such a clustering. The two groups
differ more substantially with respect to size (measured in total assets), age and
the number of affiliates within their corporate group. Firms with foreign affiliates in
patent box locations are larger, older and more often part of large multinationals.
This difference in levels is not surprising since a large part of the non-treated firms
operates domestically. We control for this by including the respective variables in
our regression model. Furthermore, we further ensure the robustness of our results
using a matching analysis.
23See Appendix C.4 for a detailed description of the calculation of user cost of capital.
24In a robustness check, we extended the sample to 2015 (see Table C.3). The results remain highly
significant with coefficients of similar size.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics
Number of
Observations
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
New patent appl. 310,852 0.426 1.114 0 10
New patent appl. (qual. adj.) 310,852 0.242 0.693 0 9.570
BOXHaven 310,852 0.198 0.399 0 1
BOXNexus 310,852 0.144 0.351 0 1
∆t (Haven) 310,852 0.134 1.398 -13.1 31.20
∆t (Nexus) 310,852 0.776 3.401 -8.850 40.25
Number of affiliates 310,852 20.028 66.850 1 2,566
Log Age 303,054 2.705 1.042 0.000 6.592
Log Total Assets 310,817 9.388 2.464 -8.151 19.842
Working Capital 310,817 -6.740 1,921.617 -769,074 344,886
Log Capital Intensity 300,446 -2.690 2.189 -24.089 10.901
Corporate income tax rate 310,852 31.856 6.925 10 52
User cost of R&D capital 310,852 0.344 0.024 0.115 0.364
Real Interest Rate 301,420 0.056 0.020 -0.014 0.265
R&D expenditures (% of GDP) 308,611 2.140 0.721 0.323 3.914
Log GDP p.c. 310,852 10.427 0.421 7.920 11.143
GDP Growth 310,852 1.455 2.655 -14.814 11.902
4.5 Results
4.5.1 R&D Quantity
In a first step, we present results from an event study design. Figure 4.1 plots the
results of the event-study analysis for the implementation of patent havens and nexus
boxes separately.25 The effect is normalized to zero in the year before the patent box
implementation and the coefficients have to be interpreted as the cross-border effect
of a patent box on patent output relative to the year prior to the reform. Here, we
present the benchmark results using a Poisson count model and report very similar
results for a linear model in the Appendix. For foreign tax cuts that allow for profit
shifting (patent havens), we observe a positive cross-border effect on patent income.
It is strongest in year two after the reform with a significant increase of about
21.2% relative to the pre-reform. In contrast, the impact of tax cuts that require
real activity in the relevant location for a firm to become eligible to the lower tax
rate (nexus patent box) is initially negative. However, this trend reverses in later
25Although both effects are estimated jointly.
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Table 4.4: Treated vs. Non-treated Firms
Panel A: Distribution Across Industries (Share of firms in industry)
Manufacturing Transportation and
Storage
Information &
Communication
Professional,
Scientific &
Technical
Activities
Administrative &
Support Service
Activities
Treated 0.7255 0.0042 0.0403 0.2023 0.0277
Non-treated 0.7622 0.0052 0.0486 0.1498 0.0342
Panel B: Means of Key Variables
User Cost of
R&D Capital
CIT Log GDP per
Capita
Total Assets
(th. USD)
Age No. of Affiliates
Treated 0.337 31.523 10.447 160,967.3 24.333 36.160
Non-treated 0.352 32.212 10.406 120,298.9 22.949 2.740
Difference 0.015
(0.000)
0.689
(0.025)
-0.040
(0.002)
-40,668.4
(1403.082)
-1.384
(0.096)
-33.421
(0.232)
This table reports summary statistics for treated and non-treated firms. Treated firms are all firms that have an affiliate in a patent
box country during the sample period. Non-treated firms are all other firms. The third line in Panel B reports the difference in means
for the indicated variables, standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
periods and is close to zero in period five.
Interestingly, neither the cross-border effect of nexus patent boxes nor the one
of a patent haven implementation materializes immediately. Rather, the response
is significantly pronounced only about two years after the foreign tax cut became
effective. This is consistent with the observation that it takes some time for R&D
activity to result in patent applications. Furthermore, we note that pre-trends are
flat which implies that our difference-in-differences design is a valid approach.26
Thus, our econometric approach identifies the cross-border effect of patent boxes
correctly if it exists.
Having established the validity of our research design, we turn to the benchmark
difference-in-differences setup to estimate the average cross-border effect of tax cuts
on R&D activity. Table 4.5 contains the main estimation results. Heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters are presented in parentheses.27
26More precisely, we cannot reject the hypothesis of common trends, that is, all coefficients of the
pre-implementation periods are jointly equal to zero (χ2-test statistic 2.99 for patent havens,
1.10 for nexus boxes).
27We also ran the regression with standard errors clustered in the group level and found the results
to be robust to this adjustment. However, clustering on a level that nests the firm-fixed effects
is computationally demanding and the model did not converge when we included the full set
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Figure 4.1: Event-study Design
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
(a) Patent Havens
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
(b) Nexus Boxes
This figure plots the event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands. The model specification is
explained in Appendix C.5. The plotted coefficients correspond to αn,n ∈ [−4, 5]. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. The event variables are indicators for the implementation of a patent haven or a nexus patent box in
a foreign affiliate location of the firm.
In column (1), the cross-border effect of patent havens is captured by a dummy
BOXHaven that indicates a relevant patent box implementation in the residence
country of a foreign affiliate of a firm. We estimate a positive cross-border effect for
patent havens. The foreign tax cut for patent income leads to a significant increase
of domestic patenting activity by 14 log points. This translates into a rise of annual
patent output by approximately 15%.
We are also interested in the cross-border effect of nexus patent boxes on R&D
activity. In columns (2) of Table 4.5 we present results of an estimation that relates
the patent count to a dummy BOXNexus that switches to one when the residence
country of one of the foreign affiliates of the firm implements a patent box with
nexus requirement. The coefficient of interest is insignificant and very small. Thus,
we cannot identify a significantly positive cross-border effect for nexus patent boxes.
This is consistent with the notion that tax cuts for patent income only reduce the
user cost of R&D capital in other countries if they do not inhibit profit shifting
(e.g. by requiring nexus). We note from the results of the event study design, that
of controls.
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Chapter 4 Thinking Outside the Box
the cross-border impact of nexus patent boxes is initially negative. This probably
reflects that, consistent with the theoretical prediction, some research projects are
relocated away from the observed firm to the corresponding patent box location to
satisfy the nexus requirement and benefit from the tax cut. However, we also observe
a reversal of this trend in later periods leading to an insignificant cross-border effect
of nexus patent boxes in the long-run. We attribute this to positive repercussions on
domestic investment from increased activity in the foreign affiliate. This is consistent
with previous studies that have found positive effects of FDI on domestic activity
(e.g. Desai et al., 2009).
In column (3) we include both implementation dummiesBOXHaven andBOXNexus
into one regression. Again, we estimate a significantly positive coefficient forBOXHaven
which is similar to the previous results while the coefficient for BOXNexus is insignif-
icant and small in magnitude.
Firm-level patent output is also driven by other macroeconomic factors and poli-
cies. R&D expenditures as a share of GDP increases patent output of firms. On the
contrary, an increase in the financing cost measured by the real interest rate or a
higher statutory corporate income tax rate is expected to induce a decline in innova-
tive activity. Consistent with related studies (e.g. Bloom et al., 2002; Wilson, 2009),
our estimates suggest that an increase in the user cost of R&D capital leads to a
decline in corporate R&D investment. The fact that the coefficient for the patent
box dummy is significant despite the inclusion of the user cost of R&D capital indi-
cates that our estimates are not the result of the fiscal competition game described
above.28 The significantly positive coefficients of total assets and the firm age in-
dicate that, consistent with previous findings, larger and also older firms conduct
more R&D.
In columns (4) to (6) of Table 4.5 we account for treatment intensity, that is, we
allow patent boxes with different magnitudes of tax exemption for patent income
to have a different cross-border impact. Instead of an implementation dummy, we
use the change in the tax rate difference between the location of the firm and the
patent box country that is induced by the patent box implementation. More specif-
ically, we take the change in the difference between the corporate income tax rate
in the residence country of the firm and the applicable tax rate for patent profits in
the relevant affiliate country upon implementation of the patent box and interact
28We also ran regressions restricting the set of control variables to macro-economic factors first and
then excluding all control variables (keeping year-fixed and firm-fixed effects in both cases). The
resulting coefficient estimates were qualitatively similar albeit somewhat larger in magnitude.
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it with our implementation dummies, BOXHaven and BOXNexus. We then repeat
regressions (1) to (3) using our more sophisticated indicator. Again, the estimated
coefficient of interest is significantly positive for the patent haven indicator. Our
results suggest that a patent haven that increases the tax rate differential by 1
percentage point raises the number of patents by 1.1%. This cross-border effect of
taxation on patent output is thus about one third of the effect estimated by Karkin-
sky & Riedel (2012) for domestic tax changes.29 The coefficient for the nexus box
indicator is insignificant and small.
In the next step, we account for the fact that patents vary strongly with regard
to their quality, usefulness and applicability (see Hall et al., 2010) and repeat our
analysis using the quality-weighted patent count as dependent variable. Columns (7)
and (8) of Table 4.5 present the results from replicating regressions (3) and (6) with
this alternative dependent variable. Throughout the specifications, the coefficients
of the patent haven implementation dummy as well as the one for the more so-
phisticated measure of the corresponding patent-box-induced tax difference remain
significantly positive. We note that the coefficients for the nexus box indicator is
slightly negative and marginally significant when interacted with the reduction in
the tax rate differential. This suggests a negative cross-border effect of nexus patent
boxes on R&D quality. We analyze this phenomenon in more detail below.
In addition, we check whether the direction of our estimated effect is driven by
the model choice and use a linear fixed-effects model in columns (9) and (10). In
this specification, the dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transforma-
tion30 of the patent count. This transformation is often employed to account for
the non-linearity of the relationship while not generating missing observations for
firm-years without patent applications (e.g. Burbidge et al., 1988). Again, the esti-
mated coefficient for the patent haven indicator is significantly positive. Consistent
with the notion that patent boxes with nexus requirement lead to relocations of
R&D activity, we estimate a negative coefficient for the nexus patent box indicator.
However, for our benchmark results we prefer to rely on the Poisson model as it
correctly adjusts for the count nature of the patent data.
Finally, we employ an instrumental variable strategy to verify that our results are
29Karkinsky & Riedel (2012) estimate a semi-elasticity between 3.5% and 3.8%. A comparison
to Griffith et al. (2014) is more difficult because they allow the own-region semi-elasticity of
patent applications with respect to the tax rate to vary by location. The estimated own tax
semi-elasticity ranges from 0.52% in Germany to 3.9% in Luxembourg.
30The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the patent count takes the following form:
ln
(
Pijct +
√
P 2ijct + 1
)
.
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Table 4.6: Patent Quality
Estimation of an OLS fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the logarithm of average patent quality per year and firm for
domestic patents. The full sample is used in the regressions presented in columns (1)-(3), while the sample is restricted to firms which
have patent applications before and after the implementation of a foreign patent box in regressions presented in columns (4)-(6).
Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed
effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Patent Quality
Full Sample Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BOXHaven 0.036 0.025 0.034 0.025
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
BOXNexus -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
R&D exp. 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.090*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.090***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
Log GDP p.c. -0.132 -0.133 -0.131 -0.123 -0.129 -0.131
(0.091) (0.091) (0.099) (0.092) (0.099) (0.099)
CIT 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP Growth 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
User Cost of R&D -1.240*** -1.179*** -0.408 -1.242*** -0.401 -0.408
(0.278) (0.279) (0.344) (0.281) (0.340) (0.344)
Real Interest Rate -0.494* -0.482* -0.281 -0.512* -0.284 -0.281
(0.265) (0.265) (0.293) (0.269) (0.288) (0.293)
Log no. of affiliates -0.030** -0.019 -0.025* -0.028** -0.023* -0.025*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Log Age -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.010 -0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Log Total Assets -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Working Capital 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Capital Intensity 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 62,323 62,323 47,151 61,131 47,786 47,151
No. of firms 23,840 23,840 16,160 23,294 16,369 16,160
R2 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
not driven by firms endogenously establishing affiliates in patent box locations. In
this specification, the actual realizations of foreign tax cuts are instrumented by the
hypothetical realization that we obtain when fixing the firm structure in 2000. To
ensure exogeneity of the instrument we begin our estimation in 2001. Results are
presented in columns (11) and (12). The size of the F-test statistic for the exclusion
of the instruments in the first-stage regression is large which indicates that our
instrumental variable strategy is a valid approach. Again, we find a positive cross-
border effect of tax cuts if profit shifting is possible while tax cuts that require nexus
exhibit negative cross-border effects. Comparing the coefficients obtained from the
instrumental variable specification to the results of the linear model in columns
(9) and (10), we observe that the estimated cross-border effect is slightly larger
for patent havens and very similar for nexus patent boxes. This points to a slight
underestimation in our benchmark model due to endogenous location choices of the
treated firms. Our benchmark results can thus be interpreted as lower bounds of the
actual effect.
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4.5.2 R&D Quality
In Table 4.6, we present estimates of the cross-border effect of a patent box im-
plementation on the average quality of patents. Column (1) contains the regression
result relying on a dummy indicating that one of the affiliate countries of a firm
turned into a patent haven as well as the set of control variables and fixed effects
described above. We find no significant cross-border effects of this type of patent
box on average R&D quality. In contrast, we find significantly negative cross-border
effects for nexus patent boxes in column (2). Having an affiliate in a country with
a nexus patent box significantly reduces the average quality of domestic patents.
We estimate similar coefficients when including both dummies in the regression pre-
sented in column (3). Taking into account our results for the cross-border effects
on the number of patents (i.e. R&D quantity), this implies that cross-border effects
of nexus boxes occur with respect to the intensive rather than with respect to the
extensive margin of corporate R&D location decisions.
We are only able to compute the average quality of patents for firm-year obser-
vations where the firm successfully applied for a patent. In order to not distort
our estimation by potentially confounding effects of the R&D quantity decision of a
firm, we restrict the sample to firms that apply for patents before and after a foreign
patent box was implemented. Regression results are presented in columns (3) to (6)
where we obtain similar results as in the benchmark analysis.
While it is possible in theory, that both patent havens and nexus patent boxes
generate negative cross-border effects on patent quality, these effects are in practice
only observed for nexus boxes. If a sufficiently large number of high-quality R&D
projects is available, a decrease in the user cost of R&D does not necessarily lead to a
significant decrease in R&D quality. One reason for this is that the increase in R&D
quantity that results from the positive cross-border effect of patent havens is likely
to lead to agglomeration effects which increase R&D quality rather than decreasing
it. This compensates negative cross-border effects on the quality of R&D projects
chosen for realization. In contrast, nexus patent boxes directly affect R&D related
decisions of the firm on the intensive margin by providing an incentive to relocate
profitable R&D projects. This observation is consistent with previous findings by
Ernst et al. (2014).
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4.5.3 Further Robustness Checks
The validity of our results is reassured when exposing them to various robustness
checks. We discuss the three most important tests here and relegate the correspond-
ing results to the Appendix. First, one concern is that the firms in our sample are
not sufficiently comparable since we include both domestic and multinational firms.
We verify that this is not the case by re-estimating our benchmark results with a
sample restricted to MNEs. Results are presented in Table C.4. Reassuringly, the
coefficient estimates are similar to those in our benchmark regression.
Second, the structure of an MNE may be affected by the implementation of patent
box regimes which may induce an endogeneity bias to our results. For instance, if
firms can foresee increases in patent output and are more likely to establish an
affiliate in a patent box location if they expect such an increase, our coefficient
estimate for the foreign patent box indicators in the benchmark regression would be
upward biased due to reverse causality. We check empirically whether this is an issue
in our data by reestimating the benchmark regressions using a restricted sample.
In this specification we exclude all multinational groups that had an ownership
change with respect to a patent box location after the relevant regime had been
implemented there. For this specification, the foreign patent box implementation is
exogenous as long as the level of patent output in particular firms does not affect
the implementation of such a reform in another country. If there was an upward
bias, we would expect to estimate a smaller coefficient for the patent box indicators
than we do in the benchmark estimation presented in Table 4.5. However, this is
not the case. The coefficient estimate, which is presented in Table C.6, is larger
rather than smaller when we use the restricted sample. From this we infer that
our estimation does not suffer from an endogeneity bias that would drive estimates
upwards. If anything, our estimates are biased downwards. In principal, a downward
bias in the benchmark sample is possible, e.g. firms may first pile up their patent
stock and then acquire a firm in a patent box location to shift the property rights
and benefit from the lower tax rate but at the same time do not further accelerate
R&D activity. The results in Table C.6 are also likely to reflect that by excluding
firms with ownership structure changes, we exclude many large MNEs from the
sample. Since these firms often have additional opportunities to shift profits and
lower their effective tax burden (e.g. through tax havens), they react much less to
foreign patent box implementations. Thus, we obtain a smaller coefficient in the
benchmark estimate that includes these firms.
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Third, the differences in average assets, age and group size between treated and
untreated firms (see Table 4.4) could be indicators for endogenous sorting causing
a self-selection bias (Wooldridge, 2010). For example, a member of a large group is
more likely to be assigned to the treatment group because of having more foreign
affiliates and, thus, having a higher probability that one of these foreign affiliates
obtains access to a patent box. However, if affiliates of large groups exhibit a differ-
ent evolution of patent output during the sample period, comparability of treatment
and control group is limited. To verify the preclusion of such a selection bias, we
reestimate our benchmark model using propensity score matching to account for
structural differences between treatment and control group. More precisely, we em-
ploy nearest neighbor matching on initial firm characteristics in 2000, the first year
of our sample period, to find for each firm of the treatment group its most simi-
lar counterpart in the control group. The nearest neighbor for a firm is found by
estimating a Probit model for being in the treatment group. This is conducted by
regressing a dummy for having access to a foreign patent box at some time dur-
ing our sample period on our usual firm- and group-specific characteristics. Based
on this Probit regression result, a propensity score is calculated for each firm. The
propensity score statistic enables comparisons in terms of similarity of firms. Single
nearest neighbor matching is then conducted by assigning each firm of the treatment
group to the firm in the control group with the most similar propensity score. Our
benchmark regression results in Table 4.5 are then reestimated on the sub-sample of
treatment group firms and firms of the control group which are most similar to the
treatment group. The estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in
various specifications as reported in Table C.8 is similar to our benchmark regression
results. Therefore, we rule out endogenous sorting of firms into the treatment group.
Further untabulated robustness checks include re-estimations of the benchmark
model including industry-specific and location-specific time trends as well as separate
time trends for MNEs and domestic firms. We obtain virtually the same results in
all specifications.
4.5.4 Additional Analysis
In this section, we consider several extensions to our benchmark analysis. First, we
examine heterogeneity across industry sectors to further verify the plausibility of our
results. Second, we compute the elasticity of R&D output to various measures of the
effective tax burden within company groups. This exercise highlights more general
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aspects of our results. Finally, we complement our analysis of patent output using
additional information on R&D expenditures of German firms to check whether the
impact of the foreign, output-related tax incentives we study is also reflected in
domestic R&D spending.
Industry Heterogeneity
Previous studies have shown that the responsiveness of corporate R&D activity to
domestic tax incentives varies across industry sectors (Griffith et al., 2014). This
is likely to be the case for cross-border effects of taxation as well. Moreover, firms
in different industries probably react differently to foreign patent boxes with and
without nexus requirement. To explore these heterogeneities, we focus specifically
on two sectors with different types of R&D activity: the Information and Commu-
nications Technology (ICT) sector and the manufacturing sector. The ICT sector is
characterized by low relocation costs, in particular for software development which,
for instance, does not require specific hardware. In contrast, R&D activity in the
manufacturing sector, which includes large pharmaceutical and chemical companies,
is usually concentrated in one place and not easily relocated to another country be-
cause of the immobility of invested R&D capital. Researchers in this sector are often
highly specialized and not easily replaceable at a new location while laboratories are
hard to move across long distances.
In Table C.5 in the Appendix, we analyze how firms in these two sectors respond
to foreign tax incentives. Columns (1) to (4) report the results for the sub-sample of
ICT firms. We find a significantly negative cross-border effect of nexus patent boxes
on patent output. This is consistent with the notion that these tax regimes gener-
ally incentivize firms to relocate R&D activity away from locations with relatively
higher taxation of patent income. ICT firms are more responsive to this incentive
than the overall sample because the relocation cost for R&D in this sector is lower.
We do not find a significant cross-border response to the implementation of patent
havens. While the ICT sector experiences strong growth in patenting (e.g. Fink
et al., 2016), these patents are also more likely to be held together in one location
as this strengthens the position of the owner in patent litigation that frequently
occurs in this sector.31 This inhibits the relocation of patents for profit shifting and,
thus, also mitigates the response to foreign tax cuts on patent income without nexus
31These cases regularly result in so-called “patent wars” with large costs. For instance, in a recent
case Samsung was ordered to pay US$ 120 million to Apple for patent infringements in October
2016. This case had been open since 2012.
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requirements (i.e. patent havens).
Results for manufacturing firms are reported in columns (5) to (8) of Table C.5. We
find no significant response to foreign nexus patent boxes which is consistent with
the observation that the cost to relocate R&D activity is relatively high in this sector
and firms are thus less reactive to foreign tax cuts that incentivize the relocation of
R&D. However, innovation in the manufacturing sector usually occurs in the form
of well-specified technologies and is easily patented. The ownership rights can then
be transferred to other locations to benefit from tax cuts that do not require nexus
(i.e. patent havens). This explains the significantly positive coefficient for foreign
patent haven indicators.
The Effective Tax Burden of R&D
We now turn to implications of our findings for the measurement of the tax burden
on corporate R&D investment in the presence of cross-border effects of tax cuts.
An important issue raised by the literature on tax havens and investment of MNEs
(e.g. Hong & Smart, 2010) is that the domestic tax rate of a jurisdiction is not very
informative with respect to the tax environment faced by such firms for investing
in this jurisdiction. Since internationally operating firms are able to shift part of
their profit from one location to another, their effective tax burden in one location
is likely to depend on the applicable tax rates in the whole group. With sufficiently
low costs of profit shifting (e.g. when locating intellectual property rights to patent
havens), it is the location with the lowest tax rate in the group that determines the
effective tax burden of its members.
We test this notion by replacing the main variable of interest BOX in equation
(4.4) by several measures for the effective tax rate for profits faced by a firm. We
are interested in how R&D activity reacts to each of these measures. They include
the statutory corporate income tax rate and the minimum tax rate on patent profits
within the whole group. For the latter, we again distinguish between nexus patent
boxes and patent havens. Effectively, we extend our analysis beyond the particular
incidence of a foreign patent box implementation and exploit the full variance of tax
rates on patent profits in a multinational group to identify cross-border effects on
patent output.
Following Hong & Smart (2010) and Slemrod & Wilson (2009), the statutory
tax rate should be most relevant for firms without foreign affiliates. If we take
into account tax rate reductions of patent boxes without nexus requirement (patent
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havens), the minimum tax rate within a group should be more informative for the
whole sample. Table 4.7 displays the results of this exercise. In column (1), the vari-
Table 4.7: R&D Activity and Corporate Taxation
Estimation of a Poisson fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the number of new domestic patents per year and firm. Cluster
robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed effects and
the firm-, location- and group-specific controls of the benchmark model (results are reported in Table C.7). Stars behind coefficients
indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
No. of New Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Domestic
Firms
Full Sample Full Sample
CIT -0.000 -0.007**
(0.002) (0.003)
Minimum Tax Rate (Patent Havens) -0.003**
(0.002)
Minimum Tax Rate (Nexus Boxes) -0.001
(0.001)
N 276,048 179,162 276,048 276,048
No. of firms 24,346 16,202 24,346 24,346
Pseudo LL -154,184 -81,597 -154,180 -154,183
able of interest is the statutory corporate income tax rate. The respective coefficient
is negative but small and insignificant. This implies that the statutory tax rate is not
very informative with respect to the tax environment of a firm in our sample that
also includes large MNEs. In column (2), we restrict the sample to firms without
foreign affiliates. The coefficient for the statutory corporate income tax rate is now
larger and significantly negative. Our results suggest that for domestically operating
firms a one percentage point decrease in the corporate income tax rate would raise
R&D activity by about 0.7%. Next, we use the minimum tax rate on patent profits
within the group of affiliates of a firm as a measure of the tax burden in column (3).
In doing so, we take into account tax reductions resulting from the implementation
of patent havens. In contrast to the regression in column (1), the coefficient for this
adjusted tax rate measure is significantly negative and implies that an effective tax
rate decrease by one percentage point leads to an increase of patent output by 0.3%.
Thus, our results indicate that the effective tax burden of a firm with respect to
R&D investment is better described by also taking into account tax rate changes in
the whole group. The statutory corporate income tax rate is, however, informative
for firms that operate in one country only. Consistent with our expectation that
cross-border effects only result from the implementation of patent haven regimes
that allow for profit shifting, we do not find a significant effect of the minimum
group tax rate when we account for tax cuts induced by foreign nexus patent boxes.
The corresponding coefficient in column (4) is negative but insignificant.
112
4.5 Results
R&D Expenditures
Our analysis focuses on R&D output measured by patent applications because this
captures the firm response that directly corresponds to the output-related tax incen-
tive we study. In the following extension, we investigate how this response transmits
to R&D inputs. The level of innovation in a firm is not necessarily proportional to
its R&D expenditure (Hausman et al., 1984). However, if the change in corporate
patent output that we measure in our benchmark analysis reflects an increase in
innovative activity, we are likely to observe a similar cross-border effect of tax cuts
on R&D expenditure.
Table 4.8: R&D Expenditures
Estimation of a fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the logarithm of R&D expenditure in the indicated area per year and
firm. In columns (1) and (4), we use the total R&D expenditure of a firm while we focus expenditure for personnel in columns (2)
and (5) and on equipment expenditure in columns (3) and (6). Columns (1) to (3) use the full sample. We restrict the sample to
MNEs in columns (4) to (6). Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions
include firm- and year-fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Data source R&D
expenditures: SV Wissenschaftsstatistik GmbH, RDC, R&D Surveys 2001-2011, own calculations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R&D Expenditures (all firms) R&D Expenditures (MNE only)
Total Personnel Equipment Total Personnel Equipment
BOXHaven 0.184* 0.173** 0.144 0.213** 0.186* 0.245*
(0.096) (0.086) (0.158) (0.107) (0.104) (0.149)
BOXNexus 0.031 -0.001 0.082 0.020 0.021 0.064
(0.036) (0.043) (0.055) (0.040) (0.052) (0.064)
No. of affiliates 0.043 0.078* 0.054 0.086 0.163 0.103
(0.038) (0.041) (0.056) (0.099) (0.102) (0.134)
Log Age 0.0304 0.057 -0.020 -0.010 0.051 -0.023
(0.047) (0.055) (0.078) (0.061) (0.075) (0.105)
Log Total Assets 0.024*** 0.027** 0.015 0.029* 0.036 0.025
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.031) (0.034)
Working Capital 0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.009 0.049
(0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.043) (0.065) (0.067)
Log Capital Intensity 0.015 0.027* 0.037** 0.025* 0.076* 0.095**
(0.008) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.045) (0.045)
N 13,006 13,006 13,006 6,156 6,156 6,156
No. of firms 3,762 3,762 3,762 1,712 1,712 1,712
R2 0.034 0.035 0.008 0.042 0.040 0.017
Unfortunately, detailed information on R&D inputs is scarce. Firms are usually not
required to report them and are generally reluctant to publish related data because
of the strategic information contained in these figures. In the following analysis we
use confidential survey data for German firms.32 The data is collected on a biannual
basis and feeds into the Eurostat database on corporate R&D. In this confidential
database, total annual R&D expenditures together with R&D expenditure for R&D
personnel and R&D equipment of German firms are reported. The identifier used by
the Stifterverband is identical to the one in the Bureau van Dijk databases such that
we can directly link our ownership and tax policy information as well as the relevant
balance sheet items to the R&D expenditure data. In total, we obtain R&D expen-
32We use the R&D survey of the Wissenschaftsstatistik of the Stifterverband.
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diture information from 2001 to 2011 on a biannual basis for 3,762 German firms
of our main sample (13,006 firm-year observations). Aligning the R&D expenditure
information with the benchmark estimation sample ensures consistency across data
sets. Furthermore, we focus on firms that file patent applications throughout the
sample period such that the R&D expenditure we observe is closely linked to the
firm’s innovative output which the foreign tax cuts relate to. Descriptive statistics
for the R&D expenditures are reported in Table C.9 in the Appendix.
We estimate a linear model that follows the specification defined in equation (4.4)
but replace the patent count with the logarithm of firm-level R&D expenditure.33
Results are presented in Table 4.8. In column (1), we use total R&D expenditures as
the dependent variable. We obtain a significantly positive coefficient for the patent
haven indicator which suggests a positive cross-border effect on R&D inputs of a tax
cut that allows for profit shifting. This is consistent with our benchmark findings
for R&D output. According to our estimates, the patent haven implementation in
a foreign affiliate of a German firm increases its overall R&D expenditure by about
18.4%. We find no cross-border effect for nexus patent boxes and attribute this
result to the fact that in order to benefit from this type of foreign tax cut the firm
is required to relocate R&D activity. This is costly in practice and, thus, rarely
observed. In a next step, we disaggregate R&D expenditure into expenditure for
personnel and expenditure for equipment and report results separately in columns
(2) and (3). We estimate a significantly positive response of personnel expenditure.
In our sample of German firms, it increases by 17.3% once a foreign patent haven is
implemented. We also estimate a positive response for equipment expenditure which
is, however, not significant. In columns (4) to (6), we repeat a robustness check from
the benchmark analysis, by excluding all domestic firms from the estimation sample.
In these regressions, we thus compare MNEs with and without affiliates in patent
box locations. Our results with regard to the cross-border effect of tax cuts which
allow for profit shifting are robust to this restriction. If anything, the estimated
effect is larger.
33Since the analysis is restricted to firms residing in Germany, we capture macro-economic shifts by
including year-fixed effects as in the benchmark specification and drop macro-economic control
variables due to collinearity.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we combine information on firm ownership, administrative patent data
and output-related R&D tax incentives to identify the cross-border effect of tax cuts
within multinational groups. Our results indicate that, within MNEs, the patent box
implementation in one location also affects R&D output at other locations of the
group. It increases the research activity there by 1.1% per percentage point of change
in the cross-border tax rate differential. Consistent with our theoretical analysis, we
find this effect only for patent boxes without nexus requirement (patent havens).
In contrast, patent boxes with nexus requirement effectively preclude tax benefits
from the transfer of intangibles and, thus, do not lower the effective tax burden on
R&D investment across borders. However, for these nexus patent boxes we estimate
a negative cross-border effect on patent quality. This implies that the cross-border
effect of nexus boxes occurs with respect to the intensive rather than with respect
to the extensive margin of corporate R&D location decisions.
These results have several important implications. First, they provide empirical
evidence with regard to previous theoretical analyses (e.g. Desai et al., 2006; Hong &
Smart, 2010), who argue that the presence of low-tax countries reduces the user cost
of capital for investment in high-tax countries. It is questionable whether tax havens
are beneficial from an overall welfare perspective (see Slemrod & Wilson, 2009),
but our analysis shows that the proposed mechanism is a relevant phenomenon for
investments in intangible assets which are particularly mobile with regard to the
location of related profits.
Second, these findings inform the ongoing debate on patent boxes and tax cuts on
mobile types of income in general. Some countries have argued that patent boxes
are not effective in fostering domestic research activity but merely constitute an
instrument for harmful tax competition. Indeed, existing empirical studies have not
yet robustly identified a direct effect of patent boxes on domestic innovation. The
risk that these tax regimes merely provide an opportunity for profit shifting by
transferring patents is arguably high and, thus, a negative cross-border effect on
tax revenue is likely. However, our results show that the possibility of profit shifting
implies that the real activity underlying these profits is not necessarily relocated
as well. In contrast, it may even increase because tax benefits are realized across
borders. In the context of intellectual property, this means that R&D remains in
the location with the relatively higher tax burden. As a consequence, this location
continues to benefit from R&D industry spillovers and other effects that have been
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cited as positive externalities of research activity (e.g. Jones & Williams, 1998).
More generally, the insight that foreign tax cuts do not necessarily draw away real
activity applies to all sectors where profit generation and the underlying activity
can be easily separated. For instance, profits in the fast growing digital economy are
often difficult to tax.34 At the same time, a large part of the real activity of this
sector is clustered in high-tax locations such as the United States. Profit shifting
allows these firms to effectively separate profits and real activity. As more firms
develop sophisticated profit shifting strategies, the relevance of profit shifting for
the cross-border impact on corporate activity is likely to become more relevant over
time. However, we caution against interpreting our findings as a positive cross-border
effect of tax cuts on welfare. A first-best solution would always be to design a tax
system in which the location of both the ownership and creation of an asset are
independent of corporate taxation.
We note that our empirical analysis does not address all aspects of the preceding
theoretical consideration. In particular, there are two consecutive firm responses to
the creation of a foreign patent haven. Companies first raise R&D output and then
locate the resulting patent rights to the patent box location. In our empirical estima-
tion we have verified the first step, which is relevant for the cross-border implications
of patent boxes on real R&D activity, and have left the analysis of the second step for
future research. More generally, we are interested in the impact of patent boxes on
corporate innovation rather than on the resulting profit allocation. As it is the case
for many corporate investment decisions, the former effect depends on the expected
tax rate on future profits. Thus, the change of prospective taxation induced by the
patent box, which we capture in our empirical specification, is decisive. Even though
we do not identify the second step, we note that recent findings by Ciaramella (2017)
and Gaessler et al. (2017) on patent relocation and the implementation of patent
boxes strongly point to the relevance of this effect. Furthermore, we note that empir-
ical findings of previous studies suggest that profit shifting via the transfer of patent
rights is a very relevant phenomenon (see Dischinger & Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky &
Riedel, 2012). In fact, a recent empirical analysis by Koethenbuerger et al. (2016)
on the effect of patent boxes on cross-border profit shifting suggests that the in-
troduction of these regimes leads to a substantial transfer of profits to the affiliates
that are located in the implementing countries.35 Consistent with our analysis, this
34For example, see the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 1 of the OECD.
35On the reverse effect, Chen et al. (2016) show that patent boxes reduce outward profit shifting
in the countries where they are implemented.
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effect is confined to patent boxes without sufficient nexus requirements.
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5 Fiscal Competition and Public
Debt
5.1 Introduction
The recent economic and financial crisis has led to substantial increases in govern-
ment debt levels in many countries, which has raised concerns about the sustainabil-
ity of government finances in general and fears about default in some countries (IMF,
2015). In the short-run, governments may need to increase taxes or cut spending
to counter high indebtedness. At the same time, fiscal policy also needs to stabilize
output and must not become pro-cyclical. While academic research has extensively
covered the effect of fiscal policy on economic stabilization and solvency (see De-
Long & Summers, 2012; Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2012), the implications of high
indebtedness for tax policy and strategic tax setting in internationally integrated
capital markets have found much less attention.
In this paper, we propose a novel channel through which changes in initial debt
levels, like the major pile up of debt during the recent economic and financial crisis,
affect the policy and economic outcome. In particular, we show in a two-country
model that in case of a binding constraint on public borrowing in one country, a
rise in this country’s initial debt level induces it to spend less on investment in
public infrastructure and to set a lower business tax, while in the other country the
opposite occurs. Thus, public policy diverges. On net, the borrowing constrained
country who experiences a debt shock becomes an unambiguously less attractive
location for firms.
The result is driven by a government’s limited ability to shift resources across
time: A higher level of legacy debt reduces ceteris paribus a government’s spend-
ing on public goods in the present. If taking on new public debt is not constrained
by possible default, the optimal policy response is to increase public borrowing to
smooth consumption across periods without affecting investment in public infras-
tructure. However, when default on new debt is an issue, the government’s second
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best response is to partially reduce public infrastructure spending relative to the no
default case. This affects the region’s attractiveness for firms in the long-run due
to the durable goods nature of public infrastructure. In addition, the government
responds with a cut in its business tax to partially make up for the loss in compet-
itiveness. Conceptually, our analysis is in the spirit of Cai & Treisman (2005) who
argue that asymmetries in certain jurisdictional characteristics may have a substan-
tial effect on how these jurisdictions behave in fiscal competition and how they react
to an increase in tax base mobility. In this regard, initial debt levels may constitute
an important but so far largely neglected factor.
Our mechanism assumes a direct link between the choice of government borrowing
and adjustment of public investment in infrastructure. One might think that the
government could respond to the problem of constrained borrowing by adjusting
alternative instruments, in particular taxes. We show that this intuition is not correct
because the alternative revenue source is optimally chosen even before the debt
shock occurs. This finding is in line with Trabandt & Uhlig (2013) who report that
shortly after the start of the economic and financial crisis in 2010 many industrialized
countries were near the peaks of the Laffer curve regarding their labor income tax.1
In addition, Servén (2007) shows evidence for fiscal rules that limit government
borrowing or debt to reduce spending on public infrastructure, a finding that is in
line with a political economy explanation: Politicians reduce spending on durable
goods like public infrastructure that has strong long-term consequences in order to
please voters.
Two further results show when the link between initial debt and fiscal competition
is further strengthened and when it is overturned. The main mechanism is reinforced
when firm location choices become more flexible. An increase in capital mobility (by
loosening firm attachment) does not only drive down tax rates on firms, a direct
effect that is well known in the literature, but also tends to reinforce the impact of
initial debt on fiscal competition. The latter represents a novel indirect effect. Higher
initial debt levels are therefore more problematic when international capital markets
are more integrated. The mechanism can be reversed, however, if higher initial debt
is correlated with or even caused by higher initial public infrastructure. In that
case, the affected region gains an advantage in fiscal competition early on when
debt increases, which makes its government less rather than more constrained in its
subsequent borrowing. The opposite holds when higher initial debt is correlated with
1Furthermore, quantitative results by Mendoza et al. (2014) suggest that capital tax increases
would not have been sufficient to restore solvency in Europe after the financial crisis.
120
5.1 Introduction
more government consumption spending and thus less public infrastructure. Our
finding thus complements the literature on the composition of public expenditure
(e.g. Keen & Marchand, 1997).
In an empirical analysis using data from about 11,000 municipalities in Germany
over the period of 1998 until 2013 we show evidence in line with the base model’s
theoretical predictions. We make use of an event study design and capture the
change in initial debt by a well above average increase in the net repayment burden
of a municipality. In line with the theoretical model, the municipality lowers its
contemporaneous spending on public infrastructure by nearly 27%, which recovers
within 5 years. In addition, the municipality decreases its local business tax by a
small, but significant amount. The opposite behavior is found in localities who do
not have a neighbor with a debt repayment shock and who increase slightly their
tax rates.
Our analysis contributes to the debate on fiscal decentralization (Besley & Coate,
2003; Oates, 2005; Janeba & Wilson, 2011; Agrawal, 2012; Asatryan et al., 2015).
Many countries consider or have recently devolved powers from higher to lower levels
of government, including the right to tax mobile tax bases like capital (Dziobek et al.,
2011). In Germany, for instance, federal states (Länder) may be granted the right
to supplement the federal income tax with a state specific surcharge. Critics often
fear that devolving taxation power leads to “unfair” fiscal competition and may
aggravate existing spatial economic inequalities if regions differ economically and
fiscally. We provide a rigorous framework to analyze this concern and show that it is
justified if the default constraint on government borrowing is binding, for example
due to a large initial debt levels.
It is perhaps surprising that despite the large body of research on inter-jurisdictional
competition in taxes (see Keen & Konrad, 2013) and public infrastructure invest-
ment (e.g. Noiset, 1995; Bucovetsky, 2005), the theoretical literature in this field
has mostly ignored public debt levels as a factor in inter-jurisdictional competition
for business investment. One possible reason is that, in the absence of government
default, there is no obvious reason why governments cannot separately optimize
public borrowing and fiscal incentives for private investment, thus precluding any
interaction between the initial debt level and business taxes. This notion also un-
derlies the results of more comprehensive general equilibrium models such as in
Mendoza & Tesar (2005).2 However, in the light of public defaults and a surge in
2Mendoza & Tesar (2005) show in a setting without borrowing constraints that legacy debt
provides an incentive for large economies to use capital taxes to manipulate interest rates but
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policy measures, such as fiscal rules designed to limit deficits and government debt,
unconstrained public borrowing is an unrealistic assumption for some jurisdictions.3
We note two exceptions. Arcalean (2017) analyzes the effects of financial liberal-
ization on capital and labor taxes as well as budget deficits in a multi-country world
linked by capital mobility. In contrast to our analysis, he focuses on endogenous bud-
get deficits that are affected by financial liberalization because permanently lower
tax rates on capital due to more intensive tax competition lead to higher capital
accumulation. This in turn makes it attractive for the median voter, who is a worker
by assumption, to bring forward the higher benefits of capital taxation through gov-
ernment debt. The mechanism works at the early stages of financial liberalization
when capital taxes are relatively high.
Jensen & Toma (1991) show in a two-period, two-jurisdiction model that a higher
level of first-period debt leads to an increase in taxation in the following period
and a lower level of public good provision in that jurisdiction. In the other juris-
diction, either a higher or a lower tax rate is set depending on whether tax rates
are strategic complements or substitutes.4 The present paper differs from this set-
ting in three important aspects: First, we allow for a default on government debt
which endogenously limits the maximum level of public debt. Second, we introduce
public infrastructure investment, which is shown to play a key role. Finally, we as-
sume a linear within-period utility function, which allows us to abstract from the
intra-period transmission mechanism identified by Jensen & Toma (1991).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we describe the model frame-
work. We then proceed to the equilibrium analysis in Section 5.3, which contains
the main results for the situation with symmetric initial public infrastructure but
possible differences in the public borrowing constraint. In Section 5.4, we consider
a number of extensions, including an asymmetry that is due to differences in ini-
tial public infrastructure. In Section 5.5 we present our empirical analysis based on
German municipal data. Section 5.6 provides the conclusion.
does not directly affect tax competition.
3By “unconstrained” we mean that the government can borrow as much as it wants at the current
interest rate assuming no default.
4An interesting empirical application for this model in the case of interactions in borrowing deci-
sions can be found in Borck et al. (2015). Krogstrup (2002) also analyzes the role of government
debt in an otherwise standard ZMW (Zodrow & Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986) model of
tax competition. Higher interest payments on exogenous public debt lead to lower spending on
public goods and higher taxes, similar to Jensen & Toma (1991).
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5.2 The Model
We start with a brief overview of the model. The world consists of two jurisdictions,
i = 1, 2, linked through the mobility of a tax base. The tax base is the outcome
of the location decisions of a continuum of firms and generates private benefits and
tax revenues that are used by the government for spending on a public consump-
tion good, a public infrastructure good, and debt repayment. Better infrastructure
makes a jurisdiction more attractive, while taxes work in the opposite direction. The
economy lasts for two periods. Both jurisdictions start with an initial (legacy) debt
level bi0 and issue new debt in the first period in an international credit market at
a given interest rate r. We pay particular attention to a government’s willingness to
repay its debt in period 2, which endogenously limits the maximum available credit
in period 1.
The government is assumed to maximize a linear combination of the number of
firms in its jurisdiction and the level of the public consumption good. There are
two inter-temporal decisions for a government to be made in period 1: the level of
borrowing and the spending on public infrastructure. The latter is modeled as a
long-term decision to capture the durable good nature of infrastructure projects.
Public investment is costly in period 1, but carries benefits only in period 2.
Fiscal competition has two dimensions: tax rate competition in periods 1 and 2,
where governments set a tax on each firm in their jurisdiction, and competition in
infrastructure spending. We consider a fiscal policy game between the two govern-
ments without commitment, that is, governments choose fiscal policy in each period
non-cooperatively and cannot commit in period 1 to fiscal policy choices in period
2.
5.2.1 Firms
We begin the description of the model with the location of the tax base, which
follows a simple Hotelling (1929) approach.5 There is a continuum of firms with the
total number of firms normalized to 1. Each firm chooses a jurisdiction to locate in
and can switch its location between periods at no cost. Firms are heterogeneous in
terms of their exogenous bias towards one of the two jurisdictions, which is captured
by the firm-specific parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. α comprises firm-specific characteristics
5Our model shares some features with classical models of tax competition as, for example, Zodrow
& Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986) and Kanbur & Keen (1993). Our approach is analytically
simpler to handle, which is crucial in the presence of many government instruments and possible
default on government debt.
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that make it more attractive to locate in one or the other region such as existing
production facilities or requirements for natural resources. Omitting the time index
for the moment, a firm of type α receives a net benefit ϕi (α) in jurisdiction i given
by
ϕi (α) =

ψ + αν + ρqi − τi for i = 1
ψ + (1− α) ν + ρqi − τi for i = 2.
(5.1)
The terms ψ + αν and ψ + (1− α) ν represent the exogenous returns. The general
return ψ is assumed to be sufficiently positive so that overall return ϕi is non-
negative and the firm always prefers locating in one of the two jurisdictions rather
than not operating at all. The second component of the private return is the firm-
specific return in each jurisdiction weighted by ν > 0. The parameter ν allows us to
capture the strength of the exogenous component relative to the policy-induced one.
Variation in ν changes the degree of fiscal competition, which we analyze below. The
overall return to investment in a jurisdiction i further increases when the jurisdiction
has a stock of public infrastructure in place at level qi ≥ 0. The effectiveness of public
infrastructure is captured by the parameter ρ ≥ 0 and is not firm-specific.6 Finally,
the uniform tax τi reduces the return. We assume that the tax is not firm-specific,
perhaps because the government cannot determine a firm’s type or cannot choose a
more sophisticated tax function for administrative reasons.
Let α ∈ [0, 1] be uniformly distributed on the unit interval. There exists a marginal
firm of type α˜ that is indifferent between the two locations for the given policy
parameters, that is ϕ1 (α˜) = ϕ2 (α˜). Under the assumption that the marginal firm
is interior, α˜ ∈ (0, 1),7 the number of firms in each jurisdiction is then given by
N1 = 1− α˜ and N2 = α˜ or, more generally,
Ni (τi, τ−i, qi, q−i) =
1
2 +
ρ∆qi −∆τi
2ν , (5.2)
where ∆qi = qi − q−i and ∆τi = τi − τ−i. The number of firms in a jurisdiction is a
linear function of the tax and public infrastructure differentials. Firms split evenly
6We could let the firm-specific component and the effectiveness of public infrastructure interact.
This would lead to a less tractable framework without providing additional insights.
7Similarly to Hindriks et al. (2008), we make this assumption to avoid the less interesting case of
a concentration of all firms in one of the two jurisdictions.
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between the two jurisdictions when both policies are symmetric across jurisdictions,
that is ∆qi = ∆τi = 0. The sensitivity of a firm’s location choice with respect to tax
rates and infrastructure spending depends on the parameter ν. Higher values of ν
represent less sensitivity.
5.2.2 Governments
Government i takes several decisions in each period. In both periods, it sets a uniform
tax τit and provides a public consumption good git, which can be produced by
transforming one unit of the private good into one unit of the public good. In the
first period, the government pays back initial debt bi0 (no default by assumption),
and decides on public infrastructure investment mit as well as the level of newly
issued debt bi1. If the government honors the debt contract, bi1 is repaid in period 2.
We denote the government’s default decision with the binary variable κi = {0, 1},
where 0 stands for no default and 1 for default.
Public investment raises the existing stock of public infrastructure qit. In each
period, a share δ ∈ [0, 1] of qit depreciates so that the law of motion for qit is
denoted by
qit = (1− δ) qit−1 +mit−1. (5.3)
In period 1 jurisdictions are endowed with an exogenous level of public infrastructure
qi0 = q¯i.8 The cost for public infrastructure investment is denoted by c(mi), which is
an increasing, strictly convex function: c′ (mi) > 0, c′′ (mi) > 0. To simplify notation,
we suppress the time subscript in mi, since it is effectively only chosen in period 1.
The period-specific budget constraints for the government in i = 1, 2 can be stated
as follows:
gi1 = τi1Ni1 − c(mi)− (1 + r) bi0 + bi1 (5.4)
gi2 = τi2Ni2 − (1− κi) (1 + r) bi1. (5.5)
In these expressions, the set of available revenue-generating instruments is limited
to the business tax. In practice, governments may use a wide range of taxes, including
levies on consumption and labor. In the base version we consider only the taxation
8A jurisdiction’s level of public infrastructure may be correlated with its initial level of government
debt. We consider this aspect in Section 5.4.2.
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of firms. In Appendix D.5 we demonstrate that the main insights of the base model
are qualitatively not affected by introducing a second tax instrument.
Government borrowing takes place on the international credit market at the con-
stant interest rate r. We assume for the time being that government debt is repaid.
In our subsequent analysis we pay attention to the possibility of default in period
2.9
Each government is assumed to maximize the discounted benefit arising from
attracting firms and government spending on a public consumption good according
to the following specification:
U i = h1 (ui1) + βh2(ui2) = h1 (Ni1 + γgi1) + βh2 (Ni2 + γgi2) . (5.6)
We think of (5.6) as the utility function of a representative citizen who benefits
from attracting firms because this generates private benefits such as income and
employment. Here, we simply use the number of firms in jurisdiction i, Ni, as an
indicator of this benefit. In addition, attracting firms increases the tax base and
generates higher tax revenues.10 The marginal benefit of the public good, γ > 1,
implicitly determines the relative weight attached to the private benefit and public
consumption. The linear structure of the within-period utility function is in line
with earlier literature (e.g. Brueckner, 1998) in order to solve for Nash tax rates
explicitly. This assumption makes the model different from Jensen & Toma (1991)
who assume a strictly concave function for the benefit of the public good (within the
function h2). As mentioned earlier, our approach is more tractable in the context
of multiple government instruments and possible default on debt, and allows us to
demonstrate the novel mechanism at work. β is the discount factor which we set
equal to 11+r . The inter-temporal structure of the utility function assumes that the
functions h1 and h2 are concave, and at least one of them is strictly concave. We
assume this for h1, such that h′1 > 0, h′2 > 0, h′′1 < 0, h′′2 ≤ 0.
So far, we assumed that public debt is repaid in both periods, such that creditors
have no reason to restrict lending to the government. We now consider default on
debt in period 2 through a willingness-to-pay constraint. A government honors the
9We ignore the possibility of bailouts, which have been relevant in the financial crisis in some
cases, but go beyond the scope of this paper.
10Our utility function is qualitatively similar to standard models of tax competition. In Section
5.4.4 we argue that a micro-founded model in the spirit of Hindriks et al. (2008) generates also
very similar results.
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debt contract when the net benefit of defaulting is smaller than the net benefit of
paying back the debt. While the former is related to the size of the existing debt level,
the latter involves a loss of access to the international credit market and possibly
other disturbances. The two-period time horizon allows us, similar to Acharya &
Rajan (2013), to take a shortcut for modeling such disturbances. Default in period
2 causes a utility loss of size z in that period, representing the discounted value
from being unable to borrow in the future among other possible disadvantages. The
period 2 utility in jurisdiction i is given by
ui2 = Ni2 + γgi2 − κiz.
Two comments are in order. First, we do not model the default decision on gov-
ernment debt regarding initial (legacy) debt bi0 in period 1. Legacy debt levels may
accumulate due to unforeseen shocks as in the recent European financial and eco-
nomic crisis, or may play a role when switching to a more decentralized tax system
(as is considered in the reform debate on fiscal federalism in Germany).11
In a second comment we like to highlight a particular modeling choice. In our
model, the fixed interest rate and the binary government default decision are sepa-
rated. Alternatively, one could assume that the interest rate on debt depends posi-
tively on the size of debt bi1 due to default risk. In that case the government would
face an increasing marginal cost of borrowing. By contrast, in our model default
prohibits any borrowing beyond a certain level. This approach has certain advan-
tages in terms of tractability and captures explicitly that the rising cost of borrowing
originate from the possibility of default. We return to the role of this assumption in
Section 5.4.4.
5.2.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium definition has two components. The economic equilibrium is straight-
forward, as this refers only to the location decision of firms. There is no linkage across
periods because relocation costs for firms are zero. An economic equilibrium in pe-
riod t = 1, 2 is fully characterized in Section 5.2.1 as a profit-maximizing location
11Our assumption of repayment of legacy debt is reasonable if its size is small enough so that
default in period 1 is not attractive. Even if a government default was attractive in period 1,
it would not occur in equilibrium, since creditors would not have given any loans in the first
place. We checked that there exists a set of sufficiently small initial debt levels that does not
lead to default in period 1 but still influences the subsequent choice of fiscal instruments.
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choice of each firm for given levels of taxes and infrastructure in that period.
The second component comprises the policy game between governments. We as-
sume the following timing of events. In period 1, governments simultaneously decide
on how much to invest (i.e. set mi), set new debt bi1, choose the tax rate τi1 and the
public good gi1, assuming that they pay back the legacy debt bi0. Then firms decide
where to invest. In period 2, governments simultaneously choose tax rate τi2, as well
as the public good gi2, and decide on the default of existing debt bi1. Subsequently,
firms again make their location choices. Governments observe previous decisions and
no commitment is possible. We consider a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium and
solve the model by backward induction.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Period 2
We begin with analyzing the government decision making in period 2. At that stage,
a government decides on its tax rate, the public consumption good level and default,
taking as given the policy choices of period 1, that is, the debt levels bi1 and the
public infrastructure qi2 in both jurisdictions i = 1, 2. A period 2 Nash equilibrium
is a vector of tax rates, public good levels and default decisions such that each
government maximizes its period 2 sub-utility, taking the other government’s fiscal
policy decisions in that period as given, and anticipating correctly the subsequent
locational equilibrium.
Government imaximizes period 2 utility as given by equation (5.6). We analyze the
tax and default decisions sequentially, making sure that in the end a global maximum
is reached. We start with the choice of the tax rate, which affects the number of
firms Ni2, given by (5.2) adding time subscripts. The first-order conditions are given
by
U iτi2 :=
∂U i
∂τi2
= h′2
∂ (Ni2 (1 + γτi2))
∂τi2
= 0, i = 1, 2 (5.7)
For the period 2 decision the outer utility function h2 can be ignored as long as h′2 >
0, which we assume. Solving the system of two equations (one for each jurisdiction)
with two unknowns, we obtain τ12 and τ22.12
12The second-order condition is fulfilled because Ni2 is a linear function of tax rates and depends
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Next, we analyze the default decision in period 2, holding tax rates in both juris-
dictions constant for the moment. For this purpose, we need to compare the utilities
under default and under no default, which defines a willingness-to-pay threshold bwtp
at which the government is indifferent:
ui2 (κi = 1) = ui2 (κi = 0)⇔Ni2 + γNi2τi2 − z = Ni2 + γ
(
Ni2τi2 − bwtp (1 + r)
)
⇔bwtp = z
γ (1 + r) .
If bi1 > bwtp, a jurisdiction does not repay its debt as the benefits from default
outweigh the related costs, and vice versa.13
The additive structure of the within period 2 utility allows us to separate the tax
and default decisions. The government could choose a different tax rate in case of
default than when honoring debt contracts. There is no incentive to do so, however,
as tax rate choices are best responses that do not depend on default, as long as the
level of public good provision is strictly positive, that is, tax revenue exceeds the
repayment burden resulting from debt in period 1. The latter holds as long as the
willingness-to-pay threshold is sufficiently strict, which is fulfilled for a sufficiently
small z.14
Taken together, the first-order conditions (5.7) and the willingness-to-pay condi-
tion define the government’s optimal decision in period 2. Inserting these candi-
date tax rates into (5.2), we find the marginal firm to be of type α˜ = 12 − ρ∆qi26ν ,
from which we can derive the number of firms Ni2 = 12 +
ρ∆qi2
6ν . Note that ∆qi2 =
∆qi2 (mi,m−i) = ∆q¯i (1− δ) + ∆mi is a linear function of the inter-jurisdictional
differences in existing public infrastructure ∆q¯i = q¯i− q¯−i and additional investment
in public infrastructure ∆mi = mi −m−i. We summarize the results for period 2 in
the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Let γν > 1. For given public infrastructure investment levels (m1,m2)
and borrowing in period 1 (b11, b21), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the
period 2 fiscal policy game with
negatively on the own tax rate.
13bwtp is identical across jurisdictions because they face the same z. This assumption simplifies
the derivation but is not crucial for our results. In fact, heterogeneous utility losses in case of
default are one of the reasons why the Willingness-to-pay Condition that we derive below may
be binding in one jurisdiction and not the other. We describe this situation as Case II below.
14When inserting bwtp as the maximum debt level for bi1 into (5.5), it becomes obvious that
g∗i0 > 0⇐⇒ zγ < τ∗i2N∗i2.
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τ˜i2 (mi,m−i) = ν +
ρ∆qi2
3 −
1
γ
,
κ˜i (bi1) =

0 if bi1 ≤ bwtp
1 if bi1 > bwtp
g˜i2 (mi,m−i, bi1) = τ˜i2N˜i2 − (1− κ˜i)(1 + r)bi1,
and the number of firms in i = 1, 2 given by N˜i2 (mi,m−i) = 12 +
ρ∆qi2
6ν .
Proposition 1 carries several implications. First, the equilibrium tax rate of juris-
diction i increases with the value of the gross location benefit ν, the own investment
in infrastructure mi, and the marginal benefit of the public good γ, while the tax
rate decreases with infrastructure spending by the other government m−i. Better
infrastructure provides more benefits to firms that are partially taxed. The tax rate
is positive if ν and γ are sufficiently large (γν > 1). Moreover, any divergence in
tax rates stems solely from differences in public infrastructure, ∆qi2. Second, the
average tax rate across jurisdictions τ¯2 = τ
∗
12+τ∗22
2 = ν− 1γ is independent of public in-
frastructure levels, as the terms involving public infrastructure offset each other, but
decreases when the general location benefit ν declines, making firms more sensitive
to policy differences.
5.3.2 Period 1
We first abstract from any confounding asymmetries and let initial levels of public
infrastructure be the same (q¯1 = q¯2). We relax this assumption below. Beginning
with the second stage of period 1, firms choose their location in the same way as
in period 2 because location decisions are reversible between periods at no cost. In
the first stage of period 1 fiscal policy is determined. Recall that default on debt
from period 0 is not considered. However, new borrowing in period 1 is constrained
by default in period 2. Proposition 1 shows that a government defaults when its
debt level exceeds bwtp. Therefore, no lender gives loans above this threshold. We
thus have an upper limit on borrowing in the form of a willingness-to-pay condition
which is defined as follows.
Condition 1 (Willingness-to-pay Condition). bi1 ≤ bwtp= zγ(1+r) .
The advantage of Condition 1 is its simplicity, as it does not depend on public
investment and legacy debt levels.
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We denote by bdesi1 the desired level of borrowing in period 1 if the default problem
in period 2 is ignored. If utility is strictly concave in bi1, and assuming an interior
level of the public consumption good, the optimal period 1 debt is given by
b∗i1 = min
{
bdesi1 , b
wtp
}
.
We now consider two separate cases. First, we assume that the willingness-to-pay
condition is not binding in either of the jurisdictions. The assumption is correct if,
for example, the default cost z and thus bwtp are very large, so that b∗i1 = bdesi1 < bwtp.
In this case we can derive and use the first-order conditions for all fiscal variables in
period 1, taking into account the variables’ impact on period 2 equilibrium values.
In a second step, we turn to the case where Condition 1 is binding in jurisdiction
1 only, that is b∗11 = bwtp. The set of first-order conditions of the government in
jurisdiction 1 is reduced by one because it is constrained in its borrowing (or more
precisely, the first-order condition for b11 does not hold with equality).15
Case I: The Willingness-to-pay Condition is not binding in both jurisdictions
After inserting budget constraints, both governments i = 1, 2 solve the following
maximization problem
max
τi1,mi,bi1
U i = h1 (Ni1 + γ (τi1Ni1 − c− (1 + r) bi0 + bi1)) (5.8)
+ βh2
(
N˜i2 + γ
(
τ˜i2N˜i2 − (1 + r) bi1
))
s.t. gi1 ≥ 0, mi ≥ 0.
This maximization problem is similar to the one discussed by the tax-smoothing lit-
erature that also considers inter-temporal aspects of fiscal policy (e.g. Barro, 1979).
As before, we assume a positive level of public good provision gi1 ≥ 0.16 The val-
ues for period 2 (τ˜i2, κ˜i, N˜i2), as given in Proposition 1, are correctly anticipated.
Condition 1 ensures that debt contracts are always honored, as shown in expression
(5.8). The first-order conditions for i = 1, 2 are
15We have checked the consistency of all assumptions and the working of the model using a
numerical example with quasi-linear utility. We let hi1 (ui1) = ln (ui1), hi2 (ui2) = ui2, c (mi) =
m2i , q¯i = q¯j and set parameter values ρ = 1.4, ν = 1.4, γ = 1.3, δ = 1, z = 0.25, r = 0.01 such
that β = 0.99 and bwtp = 0.19. We solve the example using a simple iterative algorithm and
obtain results that are consistent with our general analysis.
16The relevant parameter restriction depends on the functional form of U i. For example, if U i is
quasi-linear, that is h′′2 = 0, one obtains a positive public good level g∗i1 = 12γ > 0 in equilibrium.
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∂U i
∂τi1
= h′i1
∂ (Ni1 (1 + γτi1))
∂τi1
= 0, (5.9)
∂U i
∂mi1
= −h′i1γc′ + βh′i2
∂
(
N˜i2 (1 + γτ˜i2)
)
∂mi
= 0, (5.10)
∂U i
∂bi1
= γh′i1 − βγ(1 + r)h′i2 = h′i1 − h′i2 = 0. (5.11)
In the first-order condition (5.11), we make use of the assumption β = 11+r . We
derive the full set of second-order conditions in Appendix D.1.17 Note that U i is
strictly concave in bi1, as long as at least one of the two functions hi1 or hi2 is
strictly concave.
We solve the system of six first-order conditions (three for each jurisdiction) as
follows: Assuming that public consumption good levels are strictly positive, the
first-order conditions for tax rates (5.9) for both jurisdictions are independent of
infrastructure investment as well as debt levels, and can be solved in a similar way
as above in period 1, yielding
τ ∗i1 = ν −
1
γ
, N∗i1 =
1
2 , i = 1, 2 (5.12)
Since by assumption the public infrastructure differential is zero in period 1, the tax
base is split in half between the two jurisdictions. As in period 2, the more footloose
firms are (i.e. the lower ν is), the lower are equilibrium tax rates. This corresponds
to the standard result that increasing capital mobility drives down equilibrium tax
rates.
Using the condition for period 1 borrowing (5.11), h′i1 = h′i2, we can simplify the
condition for optimal infrastructure investment (5.10) to β ∂(N˜i2(1+γτ˜i2))
∂mi
= γc′ (mi).
We use the period 2 equilibrium values to obtain
c′ (mi) =
βρ
3
(
1 + ρ∆mi3ν
)
, i = 1, 2. (5.13)
A symmetric equilibrium, m1 = m2 = m∗, always exists. It is unique if the cost func-
tion for public infrastructure c is quadratic because then the first-order conditions
17The second-order conditions are always satisfied if the cost function for infrastructure investment
is sufficiently convex.
132
5.3 Results
are linear. Asymmetric equilibria may exist though.18 The combined results from
the first-order conditions for taxes and infrastructure spending can now be used to
determine the optimal borrowing level, as all other variables entering the arguments
of hi1 and hi2 are determined via (5.10) and (5.11).
An interesting property of (5.13) is that it is independent of the initial debt level,
which leads to a neutrality result: The choice of mi is not affected by bi0 if the
willingness-to-pay condition is not binding. We summarize our insights from the
equilibrium under non-binding debt constraints in the Proposition below.
Proposition 2. Let γν > 1. Assume Condition 1 is not binding in both jurisdictions
and initial public infrastructure levels are symmetric q¯1 = q¯2.
a) A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with symmetric infrastructure spending
exists, in which first-period tax rates are τ ∗i1 = ν− 1γ and infrastructure spending
and first period borrowing are implicitly given by c′(m∗) = βρ3 and condition
(5.11).
b) Changes in a jurisdiction’s legacy debt (bi0) affect its period 1 borrowing and
its period 2 public consumption good, but do not affect fiscal competition (tax
rates and public infrastructure). The firms’ location decisions in both periods
are unaffected.
c) Lower ν (i.e. firms are more footloose) implies lower tax rates in both juris-
dictions in both periods.
Underlying the debt neutrality result is the following intuition: When governments
can choose their desired borrowing level, the unconstrained decision on period 1
debt leads to the equalization of marginal utilities across periods. This frees the
infrastructure spending decision from doing this. Infrastructure spending serves to
equalize the marginal benefit of an improved economic outcome in period 2 (number
of firms and public consumption good) and the marginal cost from spending in period
1 that implies forgone public good consumption in that period. The neutrality result
with respect to inter-temporal aspects of fiscal competition may explain why the
existing literature has not much addressed the link between fiscal competition and
public legacy debt.19 However, endogenous constraints on borrowing change this
18For example, a corner solution with one jurisdiction not investing at all exists if c (mi) = m
2
i
2
and 2βρ2 > 9ν > βρ2. The first inequality ensures that one jurisdiction cannot benefit from
infrastructure investment, while the second inequality makes sure that the jurisdiction finds a
positive level of infrastructure m∗i = 3βρν9ν−βρ2 optimal.
19We abstract from inefficiencies in public good provision and thus ignore the intra-period trans-
mission channel highlighted by Jensen & Toma (1991) to focus on the inter-temporal effect of
initial public debt.
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conclusion.
Case II: The Willingness-to-pay Condition is binding in one jurisdiction
We now turn to the case where Condition 1 is binding in jurisdiction 1, but not in
the other jurisdiction. In this scenario, jurisdiction 1 would like to run a higher debt
level than lenders are willing to provide, as the latter correctly anticipate the default
problem in period 2, that is bdes11 > bwtp. In equilibrium, the first-order condition for
period 1 debt, (5.11), does not hold with equality. Instead the optimal borrowing
level equals the maximum feasible level given by bwtp due to the strict concavity of
U1 with respect to b11. First-order condition (5.9) still holds and together for both
jurisdictions the two conditions determine the Nash tax rates in period 1, which are
identical to Case I. As before, we make the appropriate assumption that the level of
the public consumption good is positive and thus an interior solution is obtained.20
In this case, legacy debt does not affect period 1 taxes.
We are left with the two jurisdictions’ first-order conditions for public infrastruc-
ture investment, (5.10). The absence of condition (5.11), however, now implies that
the marginal utilities in periods 1 and 2 are typically not equalized for jurisdic-
tion 1, h′11 6= h′12. In particular, h′11 in (5.10) depends on the level of infrastructure
investment. This is the key difference to Case I.
We are interested in the effect of legacy debt on fiscal competition, that is period
2 taxes and public infrastructure. We cannot solve explicitly for public investment
levels, as the two conditions are nonlinear functions ofm1 andm2. We can undertake
comparative statics, however, by totally differentiating the first-order conditions for
public infrastructure, assuming an interior solution for the public consumption good
and making sure that tax rates for period 1 are determined in isolation from the
other relevant first-order conditions.
The sign of the comparative static effects can be partially determined when we
assume that the Nash equilibrium is stable, as suggested by Dixit (1986). In this
case, the sign of the own second-order derivative regarding infrastructure spending
is negative, ∂2U i
∂m2i
< 0, i = 1, 2, and importantly, the own effects dominate the cross
effects, that is ∂2U i
∂m2i
∂2U−i
∂m2−i
> ∂
2U−i
∂m−i∂mi
∂2U i
∂mi∂m−i
. A detailed derivation of the comparative
static analysis is relegated to Appendix D.2. Making use of the Dixit (1986) stability
assumptions, we obtain
20Using the numerical example described in footnote 15 we verify that such an equilibrium may
indeed be obtained.
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dm1
db10
= −1
φ
∂2U2
∂m22
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
< 0, (5.14)
dm2
db10
= 1
φ
∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
> 0, (5.15)
with φ = ∂2U1
∂m21
∂2U2
∂m22
− ∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
∂2U1
∂m1∂m2
> 0 and ∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
= h′′11 γ
2
β
c′ < 0. The latter in-
equality means that the incentive to invest in infrastructure declines with higher
legacy debt, as the marginal utility of consumption rises when h′′1 < 0. Thus, so-
lution (5.14) contains our second important result: If a jurisdiction is constrained
in its borrowing, an increase in legacy debt leads unambiguously to a decline in its
infrastructure investment. The cross effect of an increase in legacy debt on the infras-
tructure investment in the other jurisdiction is positive. Furthermore, since ∂2U i
∂mi∂bi0
depends on ν, capital mobility clearly affects the size of the effect of legacy debt
on public infrastructure investments. We summarize these results in the following
proposition and discuss them in detail below.
Proposition 3. Let γν > 1. Assume that jurisdiction 1 is constrained in its bor-
rowing decision in period 1 and initial public infrastructure levels are symmetric
q¯1 = q¯2.
a) If the Nash equilibrium in infrastructure spending is stable, an increase in the
legacy debt of jurisdiction 1 (b10) leads to a decline in infrastructure investment
(m1) and also reduces i’s period 2 tax rate (τ12). In jurisdiction 2, it raises the
tax rate (τ22) and infrastructure spending (m2). As a consequence, the number
of firms decreases in jurisdiction 1 and increases in jurisdiction 2.
b) Lower ν (i.e. firms are more footloose) implies lower tax rates in both juris-
dictions in both periods. In addition, if h′′′1 > 0, the effect of legacy debt on the
public investment level and period 2 tax rates is the stronger in magnitude the
larger is ν.
The interaction of public infrastructure investment and tax setting both within
jurisdictions and over time, as well as, between competing governments implies that
an increase in legacy debt in one jurisdiction affects various fiscal policy instruments.
Table 5.1 summarizes these effects for unrestricted (Case I) and restricted (Case II)
public borrowing in period 1.
The main reason for the negative effect of legacy debt b10 on public investment m1
is that borrowing cannot be increased to smooth consumption if the willingness-to-
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Table 5.1: Change in Legacy Debt (b10), Impact on Fiscal Policy
Willingness-to-pay
Condition
Jurisdiction 1 (db10 > 0) Jurisdiction 2 (db20 = 0)
Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
m1 b11 τ12 N12 m2 b21 τ22 N22
Case I (non-binding) - ↑ - - - - - -
Case II (binding in 1) ↓ - ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
pay condition is binding. The burden from higher legacy debt falls ceteris paribus
on period 1 and raises the marginal utility of consumption in period 1, thus making
a transfer of resources from period 2 to period 1 more desirable. Because higher
government debt is impossible, a second best government response is to reduce in-
vestment in public infrastructure in that jurisdiction. This in turn lowers government
spending in period 1 and increases the space for public good consumption. At the
same time, the constrained government makes up for reduced competitiveness in
period 2 by lowering its tax rate in the long run.
The increase in b10 also affects public investment policy in jurisdiction 2. The
decrease in m1 provides an incentive for jurisdiction 2 to increase public investment
because of the strategic advantage arising from this situation.21 As a consequence,
jurisdiction 2 becomes more attractive in period 2.
A policy divergence occurs also in the period 2 tax equilibrium. Starting from a
stable equilibrium, an increase in a jurisdiction’s initial debt leads to a lower tax rate
for this jurisdiction in period 2, while the opposite holds in the other jurisdiction.
The latter can afford a higher tax because the better relative standing in public
infrastructure partially offsets higher taxes. Overall, we conclude that an exogenous
increase in government debt leads to policy divergence across jurisdictions regarding
fiscal competition instruments.
The second part of Proposition 3 refers to the impact of capital mobility. As in the
case with no restriction on public borrowing, higher capital mobility, captured by
a decrease in ν, puts downward pressure on equilibrium tax rates. However, in ad-
dition to this direct effect, an additional indirect effect from capital mobility arises
when public borrowing in period 1 is restricted. Intuitively, higher capital mobil-
ity reduces the government’s revenue from taxing firms in period 1. This makes
21Since jurisdiction 2 is not constrained in its borrowing, the increase in m2 is financed by an
increase in b21, see Appendix D.2.
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the government even more sensitive in period 1 to increases in legacy debt. It be-
comes even less attractive to shift resources to the future by investing in public
infrastructure. Consequently, a government sets an even lower tax rate in period 2.
Analytically, by affecting the level of tax rates in period 1, ν changes ∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
. In
particular, d
dν
(
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
)
= h′′′11 (1 + r) γ3c′ is positive if and only if h′′′11 > 0, which
holds for many strictly concave functions such as natural logarithm and square root.
It is interesting to put our main results in the context of the scarce literature on
tax competition and public debt. As noted in the introduction, Arcalean (2017) is
close to but different from our work. In his model, government debt is always repaid.
Financial liberalization puts pressure on tax rates which in turn leads to more capital
accumulation. The gains from an increase in future tax bases can be brought forward
through higher initial budget deficits. This incentive works because the median voter,
who has labor income only, redistributes through capital taxation to herself intra-
temporally and through debt intertemporally. In our paper, we emphasize the role
of initial (legacy) debt and focus on a different inter-temporal mechanism through
investment in public infrastructure. Our results can also be related to Jensen &
Toma (1991), who show that period 1 debt affects period 2 capital tax rates even in
the absence of default. While the models are different in some other aspects, the non-
linear within-period utility function in Jensen & Toma (1991) drives this difference.
In contrast, our simplifying assumption is useful in order to clearly identify the
role of default which we obtain by comparing the results from Case I and Case II,
respectively.
5.4 Robustness and Extensions
We have made several simplifying assumptions to ease presentation and direct at-
tention to the main insights and underlying mechanisms. In this section we discuss
other settings. For example, we consider the case where both competing jurisdictions
are unable to borrow at their desired level. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of
structural differences in initial infrastructure across competing jurisdictions which
are a frequent phenomenon and may be correlated with the legacy debt level. Finally,
we consider a tax on an immobile tax base. We also discuss more general modeling
choices including the exogenous interest rate. We summarize the main findings and
relegate a more formal derivation to Appendix D.
137
Chapter 5 Fiscal Competition and Public Debt
5.4.1 Constrained Borrowing in Both Jurisdictions
We begin by considering an alternative case where the Willingness-to-pay Condi-
tion is binding in both jurisdictions. In this case, the set of first-order conditions
in period 1 is reduced to (5.9) and (5.10) (see Appendix D.3). The first-order con-
dition with respect to bi1 does not hold with equality for both jurisdictions. Thus,
the maximization problem of each jurisdiction is identical to the constrained juris-
diction in Case II (see derivation in Appendix D.2). It follows that the direction
of the response to a marginal increase in bi0 is also the same: Jurisdiction i lowers
public infrastructure investment in period 1 and also reduces its period 2 tax rate
to mitigate the resulting loss in attractiveness.
The effect of a change in legacy debt in one jurisdiction on the infrastructure
investment in the other jurisdiction is less clear cut and depends on the strategic
interaction of public infrastructure investment. If public investments are strategic
substitutes22 jurisdiction 2 reacts to jurisdiction 1’s decrease in m1 with an increase
in m2. Such an unambiguous result is, for example, obtained if we assume that
the inter-temporal utility function is of the quasi-linear type (h′′2 = 0). In this case
∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
, which is the change in the net benefit of public infrastructure investment in
one jurisdiction if the government in the other jurisdiction invests more (or less), is
negative and dm2db10 > 0.
With regard to tax policy, the increase in initial debt in jurisdiction 1 leads to
a divergence in the period 2 tax equilibrium similar to Case II. The tax rate of
jurisdiction 1 decreases relative to the tax rate in jurisdiction 2. This effect is in-
dependent of the infrastructure spending response in region 2 because in the fiscal
competition game the best response of jurisdiction 2 when deviating from the initial
Nash equilibrium is to adjust fiscal policy instruments in such a way that its attrac-
tiveness increases relative to jurisdiction 1. Thus, even if it lowers m2, it will do so
only to the extent that it still turns out to be more attractive than jurisdiction 1.
As a consequence, jurisdiction 2 can afford a higher tax rate without reducing its
mobile tax base.
22This a standard feature in fiscal competition models (e.g. Hindriks et al., 2008). For a discussion
on the role of public inputs in fiscal competition, see Matsumoto (1998).
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5.4.2 Interaction Between Initial Public Infrastructure and Initial
Public Debt
A potential feed-back mechanism of legacy debt differentials may occur if these are
related to differences in initial infrastructure levels, q¯1 6= q¯2. Public debt that results
from large public infrastructure investments in the past has a different impact on
the subsequent fiscal competition game than one that has mostly been caused by
public consumption.
To understand the mechanism at work, note that an asymmetric level of initial
public infrastructure has two implications. First, ceteris paribus it causes the better
endowed and thus generally more attractive jurisdiction to set higher taxes be-
cause its better infrastructure offsets weaker tax conditions. This effect takes place
in period 1, and also in period 2 if public infrastructure does not fully depreciate
(δ < 1). Second, asymmetric equilibria in the tax competition game feed into the
inter-temporal fiscal variables. A higher level of public infrastructure attracts more
firms, which in turn raises the incentive for additional public infrastructure spending
as long as public investment is a strategic substitute.23 More public infrastructure
investment also raises the level of desired public borrowing in period 1, bdesi1 , both in
order to compensate for an otherwise lower public good provision in that period, and
because the better endowed jurisdiction intertemporally shifts part of the benefits
from a higher level of period 2 tax revenues to period 1. A higher level of exist-
ing public infrastructure thus improves a jurisdiction’s position in the subsequent
fiscal competition game. This relates to the polarization effect described by Cai &
Treisman (2005).
We consider an asymmetry in initial infrastructure (q¯1 6= q¯2) that is caused by
legacy debt differentials. In particular, suppose that the initial level of public infras-
tructure is a function of legacy debt, q¯i = f (bi0). Intuitively, there are two forms in
which such a relation appears reasonable. For example, Poterba (1995) points out
that debt financing of public infrastructure spending can make it easier to obtain
support for government investment projects as they appear less costly to the pub-
lic. Thus, if higher legacy debt levels are an indicator of more public infrastructure
spending in the past, the relationship is positive, that is, f ′ > 0. High legacy debt
levels may, however, also be caused by public consumption spending. In this case,
the level of existing infrastructure may be negatively related to the observed legacy
debt, and therefore f ′ < 0.
23 In our model this is generally the case for quasi-linear inter-temporal utility functions.
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In Appendix D.4, we insert q¯i = f (bi0) into our model and analyze the equilibria
for Cases I and II. In both scenarios, the negative effect of an increase in initial public
debt on infrastructure investment in period 1 is reinforced when there is a negative
relation between legacy debt and initial public infrastructure (f ′ < 0). A positive
relation between bi0 and q¯i (f ′ > 0) leads to more nuanced results. If legacy debt
has no effect on inter-temporal redistribution (Case I), only the polarization effect
of public infrastructure spending is present. This additional mechanism generates a
link between bi0 and mi even in the case of unrestricted public borrowing. Higher bi0
leads to more infrastructure spending in period 1 if higher legacy debt is associated
with more public investment in the past (f ′ > 0).24
Inter-temporal considerations are relevant, if public borrowing is restricted (Case
II). The benchmark result in Proposition 3 remains relevant as the government’s
desire to smooth utility across periods induces it to lower public investment when
the legacy debt burden is higher. At the same time, the polarization effect that
results from the (potentially positive) relation between bi0 and q¯i works in the op-
posite direction if public investment is a strategic substitute. The effect described
in Proposition 3 is thus mitigated. In extreme scenarios, the results may even be
reversed. This is, however, only the case if public infrastructure spending is indeed a
strategic substitute and the polarization effect dominates the coinciding mechanism
of Proposition 3.
5.4.3 A Tax on Domestic Income
In the base model we restrict tax policy to the taxation of capital at source. In
reality, governments have various revenue sources, which may include a tax on a
less mobile base such as labor income. Would the introduction of such a tax affect
the results with regard to the role of legacy debt in our fiscal competition model?
The short answer is basically no. In Appendix D.5, we prove this result in a model
with an additional tax on domestic income: the government can tax a share of the
local benefit of foreign investment, which can be interpreted as a wage tax on labor
income that citizens receive from the firms that locate in their jurisdiction. The tax
is distortive by assuming that the government incurs a convex administrative cost
when collecting revenue from this source.
We repeat our analysis and show that the results with regard to legacy debt
prevail. An additional tax raises government revenue in both periods but does not
24This result is formalized in condition (D.17) in Appendix D.
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affect the nature of inter-temporal redistribution that induces governments to react
to an increase in the initial debt repayment burden with a cut in public investment
spending and a subsequent reduction in the tax rate on the mobile income. The result
is obtained precisely because the additional tax instrument relates to the immobile,
local tax base and thus has no effect for the fiscal competition game that drives our
main results. The tax is optimized separately in any case. We note, however, that
the additional revenue from a labor tax can make it less likely that governments
face binding constraints with regard to their borrowing.
5.4.4 Model Robustness
Two further modeling choices are worth being discussed in more detail. In the base
model the number of firms in a region enters directly into the region’s utility function.
In comparison to a standard micro-founded model, this simplifies notation while
still keeping the main idea: firms generate private benefits in form of wages and
employment. As discussed above, introducing an additional immobile income source
does not alter the results of our analysis, even if it is related to the level of firm
investment. Furthermore, we are able to confirm our results in a micro-founded
model similar to Hindriks et al. (2008).25 More generally, our results hold for any
form of economy for which a jurisdiction’s within-period utility is a concave function
of its own tax rate.
The other important modeling choice refers to the market for government bonds.
Public borrowing is assumed to take place on an international debt market with
an exogenous interest rate. Both assumptions may not hold in reality. For example,
governments may largely borrow domestically. In this case, the repayment burden
in period 1 is a simple transfer between the government and its citizens. We note,
however, that γ > 1 ensures that an increase in the debt repayment burden af-
fects the marginal utility of public infrastructure investment and thus triggers the
mechanism described above. Finally, private borrowing may serve as a substitute for
inter-temporal redistribution by the government. This appears feasible with regard
to the consumption of the private good. Public goods are, however, generally pro-
vided more efficiently by the government26 such that private borrowing is, at best, an
imperfect substitute for public redistribution across periods.27 Thus, inter-temporal
25Results are available from the authors upon request.
26In this regard, the simplifying assumption of a representative citizen in our model constitutes
an exemption which would need to be relaxed to determine the optimal way of public goods
provision.
27An additional requirement for private borrowing to completely compensate for the public bor-
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adjustments via reductions in public infrastructure spending remain relevant. Fur-
thermore, some citizens are likely to borrow at a higher cost, this cannot completely
compensate for the public borrowing restriction.
Another important assumption we made is that the interest rate is exogenous.
Alternatively, one could allow for a positive, possibly convex relation between the
interest rate and the level of public borrowing in the current or the previous period.
The case of a contemporaneous relationship turns out to be a simple extension
to our model in which the marginal increase in the initial public debt burden is
reinforced by its effect on the interest paid.28 The case with a lagged relationship
introduces a cost on the inter-temporal redistribution via public borrowing. If the
relation between past borrowing and the current interest rate is non-linear (e.g.
convex), this precludes the friction-less reallocation of resources between periods
through additional borrowing. As a consequence, more borrowing is not necessarily
the best option for inter-temporal redistribution since the corresponding costs must
be compared to the cost of redistribution between periods via an adjustment in
long-run public infrastructure investment. Our results thus rely on the assumption
that public borrowing is generally used as the best option for inter-temporal utility-
smoothing in the sense of Barro (1979).
5.5 Empirical Evidence
We test the main implications of our theoretical analysis using administrative data
from German municipalities. We do not aim at fully identifying the causal relation-
ships suggested in the model as this would require further information which is hard
to obtain. For example, we do not know whether and to what extent jurisdictions are
constrained in their public borrowing. Still, the empirical analysis is an important
first step towards verifying the mechanism proposed in our theoretical model.
The case of Germany is a good testing ground as the constitution provides mu-
nicipalities with substantial discretion in fiscal policy. Each municipality approves
its own budget, which includes decisions on public borrowing and public investment
expenditure. Furthermore, several tax rates are set at the municipal level such as
the taxation of business profits (“Gewerbesteuer”). Most importantly, fiscal policy
in German municipalities varies substantially both with respect to the tax rates
rowing restriction is that, on average, citizens do not borrow at a cost above the one faced by
the government.
28Formally, ∂2Ui∂mi∂bi0 = h
′′
i1γ
2
(
1 + r + ∂r∂bi0 bi0
)
c′ < h′′i1γ
2 (1 + r) c′ < 0.
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applied and in terms of the debt ratio.
5.5.1 Empirical Specification
To test the main results of our theoretical analysis, we apply an event study design.
Originally developed by Fama et al. (1969) for the analysis of stock market responses,
this methodology is now also widely used in the area of public economics (e.g. Hoynes
& Schanzenbach, 2012; Chetty et al., 2014; Fuest et al., 2018). In our context, we
measure the responses of jurisdictions within a pre-defined time window around a
particular event of interest. In this way, event studies allow for a precise analysis of
the timing of responses which is crucial for our purposes as we test an inter-temporal
model with policy responses that are not necessarily contemporaneous.
We estimate the response of two fiscal policy instruments to shocks in the debt-
repayment burden of individual municipalities. The latter are defined as years in
which the level of net redemption payments of a municipality is extraordinarily
high. Net redemption payments are defined as the difference between the total debt
redemption payment and additional revenue obtained from issuing new debt in the
same period. The value of net redemption payments is set to zero whenever newly
issued credit exceeds redemption payments.29 We then compute the share of net
redemption payments in the net expenditure of a municipality for each individual
year and also the average of this share within a municipality across the observation
period. A shock is defined as a municipal-year observation in which the share is at
least three times as high as its average within the municipality. Therefore a shock
constitutes a substantial increase in the debt repayment burden of a municipality and
corresponds to an increase in the initial debt burden, bi0, in our theoretical model,
which in turn results in a net repayment burden in period 1 of bi1 − (1 + r)bi0.
An alternative specification would be to regress the fiscal policy variables of inter-
est on the lagged level of public debt. Instead, we analyze debt-repayment shocks
for three reasons. First, by focusing on unit-specific events we avoid a number of
endogeneity issues related to the inter-temporal correlation of fiscal variables and
other equilibrium effects that would arise in a framework with lagged variables. Sec-
ond, within a region public debt levels of neighboring municipalities are likely to be
correlated (e.g. see Borck et al., 2015). This aspect makes it difficult to identify fiscal
competition effects, which only occur when initial debt levels diverge. In contrast,
29This avoids classifying temporary reductions of municipal borrowing with a continuing increase
in public debt as debt repayment shocks.
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the debt repayment shocks that we observe are confined to individual municipalities
and thus constitute an asymmetry in a competitive environment. Finally, in order
to apply an event study design with its various econometric and conceptual advan-
tages, we need to define changes in the initial debt repayment burden as events. A
feasible way to do this is to look at debt repayment shocks.
Our empirical model takes the following form:
yi,t = α−4
t−1998∑
n=4
si,t+n +
−2∑
n=−3
αnsi,t−n +
4∑
n=0
αnsi,t−n + α5
2012−t∑
n=5
si,t−n
+ β2xi,t + ψ + i,t. (5.16)
yi,t is the fiscal policy variable of interest in municipality i at year t, and si,t is a
dummy that indicates whether in year tmunicipality i experienced a debt repayment
shock as described above. Within the first and last year in our sample, 1998 and
2012, we define an event window of 10 years, that is, we observe 4 years before and
5 years after the repayment shock as well as the shock year itself.30 In each year,
we thus compare the treated municipalities to those that did not experience a debt
repayment shock in this particular period. Following Kline (2012), we adjust the
end points of the event window to indicate whether a debt repayment shock has
occurred 4 or more years before (upper window limit) and 5 or more years after
a given year (lower window limit) in order to mitigate collinearity with the year-
fixed effects. The resulting coefficients, however, do not assign the same weights to
municipalities with events early and late in our observation period since the sample
is generally unbalanced in event time. As in Kline (2012), the interpretation of
the results thus focuses on the coefficients for indicators within the event window.
To avoid perfect collinearity among the shock indicators, the regressor in the year
before the repayment shock is dropped and normalized to zero. As a consequence,
the remaining coefficients αt are interpreted as the effect of the shock on yi,t relative
to the pre-shock year.
We test the theoretical predictions by analyzing the response of local business
tax rates and local public investment expenditure to the debt repayment shocks.
Both measures are decided by the municipal council and may be adjusted each year.
Local public investment is measured as the logarithm of investment expenditure of
the municipality.
30Expanding or contracting the event window leads to virtually the same results.
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We complement our model by a vector of lagged control variables, xi,t, including
the logarithm of total population and the logarithm of GDP per capita in the dis-
trict of the municipality. Furthermore, we intend to capture unobserved confounding
factors by including a set of fixed effects which comprises municipality-fixed effects,
year-fixed effects and state-year-fixed effects. The latter take into account that time
trends may vary across states (Länder).
Since our fiscal competition model relies on the interaction between competing
jurisdictions, we are not only interested in the response of the municipality that
experiences the debt repayment shock but also in the response of its competing
neighbors. We therefore rerun the model described above replacing the variables yi,t
and xi,t with the weighted average of the respective variables across the neighboring
municipalities that are within 10 kilometers of municipality i. Using inverse distance
weights in terms of the difference in total population between the municipality and
its neighbor31, we observe how fiscal policy evolves in the neighboring jurisdictions
of a municipality when it experiences a debt repayment shock.
The effect is identified by comparing the neighbors of treated and untreated mu-
nicipalities in each year. Note that the control group includes the whole sample in
both regressions. Following our theoretical analysis, fiscal competition implies that
the neighboring localities are affected by the debt repayment shock as well and are
thus analyzed in a separate regression.
5.5.2 Data
The data set contains information on fiscal variables, including local tax rates, of all
municipalities in Germany from 1998 to 2013. In total, there are 11,064 municipali-
ties in our sample. The effective business tax rates are obtained by multiplying the
base rate (“Steuermesszahl”) of 3.5% (5% until 2007) with the local tax rate (“Hebe-
satz”), which is determined each year by the municipal council. The base rates are
determined at the federal level and are therefore not a local choice variable. The
effective business tax rates in our sample range from 0% to 45% with an average
of 14.9%. About 17.2% of municipalities change their local business tax rate within
the sample period. 57.5% of the municipalities in our sample experience a debt re-
payment shock in the sample period. Only 3.5% of municipalities have more than
two shocks. The empirical framework described above accounts for the occurrence
31In a robustness check we have used distance weights in terms of geographical distance in kilome-
ters and obtained very similar outcomes. Results are available from the authors upon request.
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of more than one event within a unit. The full set of descriptive statistics can be
found in Appendix D.6.
5.5.3 Results
We present our results in the form of event-study graphs. Figure 5.1 displays graphs
for the response of both the municipality itself (panels a and c) and the neighboring
municipalities (panels b and d). We first explore the response of municipalities that
experience a debt repayment shock. Results displayed in panel (a) of Figure 5.1
show that, relative to the pre-shock year, the treated jurisdictions substantially
reduce their investment expenditure in the year of the shock and also in the years
immediately after the shock.32 The main effect occurs instantly, with a decrease
of public investment expenditure of 26.8% in the year of the shock. The negative
effect is smaller in later years and diminishes to an insignificant decrease of 0.1% five
years after the shock. This is consistent with our theoretical analysis. Note that the
level of public investment is also higher prior to the shock. This positive effect does
not match the negative effect after the repayment shock. Yet the finding suggests
that at least part of the increase in initial debt burden may be related to an earlier
increase in public infrastructure investment. We have considered this aspect in our
theoretical model in Section 5.4.2.
We now turn to the response of municipal tax rates. Panel (c) depicts the impact
of the repayment shock on the local business tax rate. We find no effect in the year
of the shock but the tax rate is about 0.02 percentage points lower in each of the
following four years. The delayed response mirrors the dynamics in the theoretical
analysis. While the reduction in investment expenditure is immediate, the tax rate
cut - that is aimed at restoring the jurisdiction’s attractiveness - only occurs in later
periods when a lower level of past investment and thus less public infrastructure
becomes effective. The estimated tax cut is significant but relatively small in absolute
size. We attribute this finding to a generally low level of tax competition among
German municipalities. The lack of fiscal competition among German municipalities
32Since several highly indebted municipalities in Germany have eliminated their debt burden by
selling municipal assets such as real estate to repay outstanding debt, one might be concerned
that these events drive our results. In particular, the reduction in the stock of public capital
induced by the assets sales might have also triggered the subsequent decrease in public invest-
ment. We ensure that this is not the case by repeating the analysis excluding all municipalities
involved in substantial real estate privatizations during the observation period. Information for
this exercise has been provided by the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs
and Spatial Development (BBSR). We obtain virtually the same results when excluding these
municipalities.
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Figure 5.1: Event Study
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Standard errors are clustered on firm level. 95% confidence intervals are reported. Estimations
include municipality-fixed, year-fixed and state-year-fixed effects.
has mainly been explained by the existence of equalization grants for municipalities
in many German states (Baretti et al., 2002; Buettner, 2006; Egger et al., 2010).
Furthermore, previous studies have found only small cross-border effects of local tax
rates in Germany (e.g. Buettner, 2003).
How do competing municipalities react to debt repayment shocks affecting their
neighbors? As described above, we approach this issue in an additional estimation
involving the weighted average of a municipality’s neighbors. Results are presented
in panels (b) and (d) of Figure 5.1. Again, we begin with the response of public
infrastructure investment. Our results suggest that competing neighbors of munici-
palities that experience a strong increase in the debt repayment burden do not alter
their level of public investment expenditure. This implies that in our sample the
strategic interaction in infrastructure expenditure is not very strong. One explana-
tion is that an upward adjustment in infrastructure, as indicated by our theoretical
model, is not easily achieved in practice as new investment opportunities have to
147
Chapter 5 Fiscal Competition and Public Debt
be developed first. In contrast, municipalities can easily reduce current investment
expenditure by postponing or canceling planned investment projects.
With respect to local taxation, our results suggest that neighboring governments
increase their tax rates for local business profits. This finding is consistent with
our theoretical model and is an indicator of tax competition. The decrease in pub-
lic investment in the municipality experiencing a debt repayment shock induces
its neighbor to increase business taxes. Neighboring municipalities thus exploit the
relative decrease in the attractiveness of the treated municipality to increase local
revenue from business taxes without reducing the local tax base. Again, the absolute
effect is relatively small.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a two-jurisdiction, two-period model to analyze a fiscal
competition game with asymmetric initial public debt levels. We first show that in
the absence of government default the level of legacy public debt does not affect the
fiscal competition game. Governments merely shift the repayment burden to future
generations by increasing additional borrowing one by one. We then allow for gov-
ernment default which endogenously imposes an upper bound on public debt. This
restricts inter-temporal redistribution of governments and provides an important
theoretical link between legacy debt and fiscal competition.
In the presence of restricted public borrowing the government’s decision on long-
term infrastructure investment is shaped by its desire to optimally allocate resources
between periods. A higher level of legacy debt causes the government to decrease
public investment in the first period, making the jurisdiction a less attractive location
for private investment in the following period. Governments partly compensate this
disadvantage by setting lower tax rates in the second period. In our two-jurisdiction
model, the jurisdiction experiencing an increase in legacy debt therefore invests less
and sets a lower tax on capital, while the opposite occurs in the other (unconstrained)
jurisdiction. Under mild assumptions, this mechanism is the stronger the higher is
the level of capital mobility. Capital mobility, therefore, leads not only to downward
pressure on tax rates, as is well known, but tends to reinforce the effect of initial
debt.
We show that the fiscal behavior of municipalities in Germany is broadly in line
with the theoretical model predictions. Tax rates diverge when a municipality expe-
riences a debt repayment shock. While the response is statistically significant, it is
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relatively small in value, which may be explained by the strong fiscal equalization
scheme and the large number of interacting municipalities. We also find a strong
negative public investment response by the municipality experiencing the shock.
Neighboring regions, however, do not adjust in a significant way their public invest-
ment, as our benchmark result predicts, perhaps because increases in investment
take more time compared to cuts.
Our results provide insights into current policy debates. For example, in Germany
the federal states (Länder) have little tax autonomy. Some policy makers and many
academics support more tax autonomy for states such as a state income and business
tax. Given that states differ widely in existing debt levels, it is not clear whether and
how existing debt would influence the competitiveness in a subsequent fiscal compe-
tition game. Our model suggests that default on government debt plays a crucial role
and would disadvantage highly indebted regions. Among German states per capita
debt levels differ significantly, including a few with very high levels. Opponents of
more tax autonomy may therefore find support for their view in our model. So far,
however, German states do not appear to be substantially constrained in their bor-
rowing, as an implicit bail-out guarantee by the German federal government and the
collection of all states is provided in the German constitution.
Our model sheds also light on the efforts to harmonize taxes in the European
Union, which in the area of business taxation have proven to be difficult. The eco-
nomic and financial crisis has led to a substantial increase in debt levels, which
in some countries still prevail while others have reduced them back to near pre-
crisis levels. Attempts to harmonize tax rates may have become more difficult now.
Countries with a high debt repayment burden may have very different fiscal policy
strategies than governments with a low level of consolidation requirement.
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A.1 Additional Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Corporate M&As, 2002-2013, Additional Data
This table presents the number and volume of deals with cash payment and corporate sellers per country from 2002-2013 as recorded
in the Zephyr database. Listed targets are excluded. Data is trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile according to deal value. The
deals are assigned to the country of residence of the seller company. The revealed deal volume is the sum of reported deal values.
Only cash payments, domestic targets All payments, all targets
Number of deals Revealed deal volume in
bn US$
Number of deals Revealed deal
volume in bn US$
Australia 1,006 41.55 1,372 66.23
Austria 318 7.17 489 11.13
Belgium 446 9.80 668 24.50
Canada 704 27.08 1,289 56.32
Croatia 67 0.32 75 0.43
Cyprus 50 2.79 345 14.91
Denmark 702 13.53 913 20.69
Finland 1,091 8.47 1,371 14.17
France 1,660 55.93 2,258 93.21
Germany 2,209 60.71 3,088 96.87
Greece 167 2.83 225 5.76
Iceland 45 0.71 95 1.77
Ireland 119 7.02 265 13.89
Israel 108 4.61 154 6.97
Italy 1,130 60.87 1,434 81.04
Japan 2,043 37.97 2,489 52.57
Luxembourg 30 2.64 259 23.77
Mexico 57 5.98 64 6.52
Netherlands 1,608 39.05 2,368 98.03
New Zealand 158 4.73 197 6.17
Norway 822 15.63 1,090 22.60
Portugal 212 10.86 255 12.75
Slovenia 38 0.60 50 0.62
South Korea 203 13.16 254 15.52
Spain 1,188 43.55 1,429 65.26
Sweden 1,445 22.63 1,924 44.02
Switzerland 621 11.80 999 27.19
Turkey 237 22.39 258 24.11
United Kingdom 4,327 157.94 5,908 261.67
United States 5,681 326.36 7,634 465.86
Total 28,492 1,019 39,219 1,635
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A.1 Additional Descriptive Statistics
Table A.3: Capital Gains Across Industries
This table reports the number of deals and the median capital gains for individual SIC divisions over the sample period. The capital
gain in any period is the current stock price minus the low stock price in the 3 or 5 preceding years divided by the low stock price in
the 3 or 5 preceding years.
SIC Division Number of Deals Median
capital gain
over 3 years
Median
capital gain
over 5 years
Mining 587 49.32% 65.27%
Construction 707 48.59% 63.78%
Manufacturing 7,937 49.07% 64.71%
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 3,491 39.58% 51.82%
Wholesale Trade 1,669 47.04% 61.09%
Retail Trade 1,852 47.62% 63.18%
Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate 3,632 24.99% 33.44%
Services 9,158 52.24% 66.67%
Public Administration 166 22.44% 25.13%
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A.2 Additional Estimation Results
Table A.4: Robustness: Nearest-Neighbor Matching
This table replicates Table 2.6 using weighted nearest neighbor interpolation to compute the time between deal announcement and
completion. Distance dij is measured in absolute number of days between the announcement dates of two deals i and j. We include
the five nearest neighbors, use power distance weights with an exponent α = 3 and row-normalize weights so that the weight for
observation j within the 5 nearest neighbors is given by wij = d−αij /
∑5
j=1
d−α
ij
. Estimation with PPML. The dependent variable
is the number of M&A deals per year and country in which a corporate seller disposes of shares in a target firm residing in the same
country. Regression (1), (2), (3) and (4) replicate regressions (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Table 2.6, respectively. All regressions include
country- and year-fixed effects. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are provided in parentheses, except for
column (2) where the parentheses contain Wald test t-statistics obtained from the score wild bootstrap method proposed by Kline &
Santos (2012). Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
(1)
Full Sample
(2)
Full Sample
(3)
Bootstrap
(4)
w/o Holding
(5)
Deal Value
Locations
τCG -0.009** -0.010** -0.010* -0.011*** -0.013**
(0.004) (0.004) (-1.592) (0.004) (0.006)
Audit Quality 0.568*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.346** 0.428***
(0.171) (0.118) (2.423) (0.136) (0.163)
Growth 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.006
(0.011) (0.012) (2.572) (0.013) (0.020)
Trade 1.200** 1.077* 1.077* 1.326** 0.355
(0.610) (0.572) (1.190) (0.537) (1.122)
Credit 0.011 -0.046 -0.046 0.022 -0.832***
(0.127) (0.131) (-0.314) (0.121) (0.258)
GDP -0.739 -0.851 -0.851 -0.594 2.989**
(1.357) (1.128) (-0.692) (1.081) (1.194)
Stock Market 0.228 0.196 0.196 0.295* 0.424*
(0.158) (0.137) (1.250) (0.155) (0.229)
Inflation -0.018* -0.020** -0.020** -0.018* -0.052***
(0.010) (0.009) (-1.319) (0.009) (0.015)
Service Sector 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.059**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.563) (0.014) (0.023)
τCIT 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.016 0.009
(0.014) (0.012) (0.535) (0.012) (0.021)
Start-up Time -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.004
(0.002) (-0.447) (0.001) (0.003)
Jud. Independence 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.184*** 0.064
(0.055) (2.419) (0.055) (0.071)
Ease of Hiring -0.035 -0.035 -0.027 0.034
(0.033) (-1.009) (0.038) (0.058)
Credit Market Reg. 0.080*** 0.080** 0.098*** -0.025
(0.029) (1.749) (0.026) (0.059)
Observations 333 313 313 266 313
No. of countries 30 29 29 24 29
Pseudo LL -1,501 -1,360 -1,473 -1,190 -7.539e+07
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Table A.5: Interaction with location choice fixed effect and acquirer-specific vari-
ables
This table contains the estimated or simulated coefficients for the country-fixed effects and their interaction with the logarithm of
total assets from specifications (2) and (4) in Table 2.5. The United States is the base category.
Conditional Logit Mixed Logit
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
AU × lnTotalAssets -0.037 0.028 -0.021 0.031
AT × lnTotalAssets -0.021 0.052 -0.005 0.059
BE × lnTotalAssets -0.084*** 0.021 -0.045* 0.023
CA× lnTotalAssets 0.005 0.014 0.044*** 0.016
HR× lnTotalAssets 0.015 0.068 0.039 0.069
CY × lnTotalAssets 0.136 0.136 0.180 0.149
DK × lnTotalAssets -0.065*** 0.019 -0.022 0.021
FI × lnTotalAssets -0.011 0.041 0.028 0.042
FR× lnTotalAssets -0.052*** 0.017 -0.024 0.020
DE × lnTotalAssets -0.096*** 0.013 -0.054*** 0.016
GR× lnTotalAssets -0.032 0.032 -0.019 0.036
IS × lnTotalAssets 0.267** 0.108 0.324*** 0.114
IE × lnTotalAssets -0.087** 0.035 -0.046 0.038
IL× lnTotalAssets -0.118*** 0.033 -0.108*** 0.035
IT × lnTotalAssets -0.032 0.022 0.005 0.024
JP × lnTotalAssets -0.040* 0.022 -0.033 0.023
LU × lnTotalAssets 0.147 0.148 0.182 0.158
MX × lnTotalAssets -0.039 0.037 -0.016 0.038
NL× lnTotalAssets -0.107*** 0.020 -0.067*** 0.024
NZ × lnTotalAssets 0.017 0.061 0.052 0.066
NO × lnTotalAssets -0.038 0.027 -0.001 0.030
PT × lnTotalAssets 0.087*** 0.031 0.124*** 0.036
SI × lnTotalAssets 0.012 0.097 0.041 0.104
ES × lnTotalAssets 0.006 0.023 0.048* 0.025
SE × lnTotalAssets -0.059*** 0.018 -0.018 0.021
CH × lnTotalAssets -0.039 0.036 0.004 0.039
TR× lnTotalAssets -0.016 0.031 0.014 0.034
UK × lnTotalAssets -0.076*** 0.022 -0.039 0.025
AU 3.459 2.367 2.725 2.458
AT 1.899 3.245 0.738 3.439
BE 3.780 2.745 1.807 2.828
CA 0.764 1.790 -0.749 1.842
HR 1.585 4.420 -0.004 4.506
CY -2.326 7.346 -4.956 7.789
DK 4.320 2.927 2.136 3.003
FI 2.814 3.622 0.756 3.665
FR 2.314 1.487 1.187 1.582
DE 3.603*** 1.269 1.948 1.350
EL 2.969 3.155 1.842 3.325
IS -6.956 7.061 -10.323 7.294
IE 3.759 3.294 1.598 3.390
IL 5.647 3.512 4.747 3.607
IT 1.895 1.563 0.396 1.631
JP 1.148 1.071 0.888 1.137
LU -5.715 7.501 -7.888 7.950
MX 1.920 2.388 0.864 2.444
NL 4.777** 2.386 2.855 2.483
NZ 1.483 3.978 -0.623 4.127
NO 3.444 2.793 1.568 2.894
PT -1.510 3.241 -3.428 3.375
SI 0.959 5.791 -0.975 6.051
ES 1.136 1.934 -0.639 2.016
SE 4.320 2.714 2.310 2.802
CH 1.892 2.905 -0.223 3.011
TR 2.134 2.643 0.730 2.772
UK 3.284** 1.636 1.710 1.746
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Table A.6: Comparison Group Approach: Control Variables
This table reports coefficient estimates for the control variables and their interactions with the seller-type indicator used in the regres-
sions of columns (2) to (4) in Table 2.8. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the country-level) are provided in parentheses.
Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
Full Sample Only Cash Payments Including Foreign sellers
(2) (3) (4)
Audit Quality -0.042 -0.147 -0.157
(0.218) (0.228) (0.216)
Audit Quality× CORPS 0.485** 0.569** 0.512**
(0.215) (0.224) (0.213)
Growth 0.046* 0.044* 0.038
(0.023) (0.026) (0.025)
Growth× CORPS -0.006 -0.005 -0.014
(0.025) (0.028) (0.027)
Trade 0.018 -0.117 0.013
(0.889) (0.957) (0.900)
Trade× CORPS 1.292* 1.375* 1.201*
(0.670) (0.726) (0.725)
Credit -0.707** -0.781** -0.689*
(0.330) (0.312) (0.354)
Credit× CORPS 0.765*** 0.807*** 0.725**
(0.274) (0.263) (0.314)
GDP -1.927 -1.805 -1.937
(1.886) (2.002) (2.031)
GDP× CORPS 1.038 0.956 1.588
(1.597) (1.688) (1.788)
Stock Market 0.439 0.508* 0.507*
(0.270) (0.297) (0.281)
Stock Market× CORPS -0.260 -0.318 -0.415
(0.307) (0.333) (0.318)
Inflation -0.017 -0.019 -0.017
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Inflation× CORPS -0.004 -0.003 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Service Sector -0.002 0.006 0.011
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023)
Service Sector× CORPS 0.009 0.001 -0.006
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
τCIT 0.028** 0.022 0.024*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
τCIT × CORPS -0.017 -0.013 -0.018
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Start-up Time 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Start-up Time×CORPS -0.008** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Jud. Independence 0.073 0.064 0.059
(0.072) (0.075) (0.067)
Jud. Independence×CORPS 0.097** 0.110** 0.077
(0.049) (0.051) (0.051)
Ease of Hiring -0.105 -0.145 -0.128
(0.103) (0.106) (0.102)
Hiring Restrictiveness×CORPS 0.071 0.113 0.103
(0.092) (0.094) (0.092)
Credit Market Reg. -0.036 -0.034 -0.016
(0.083) (0.082) (0.077)
Credit Market Reg.×CORPS 0.108 0.105 0.077
(0.068) (0.068) (0.065)
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Figure A.1: Kernel Density
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This figure plots the kernel density of the simulated coefficients for τCG obtained in regression (5) of Table 2.5 following the method
of Train (2009). The estimated coefficients have a mean of -0.007 and a standard deviation of 0.037.
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B.1 Productivity Estimation Data Sample
We obtain unconsolidated balance sheet data for the productivity estimation from
Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS and AMADEUS databases. In a first step, missing values
are imputed as described in Gal (2013). In particular, firm value added is replaced
by the sum of operating revenue and material cost if missing. Conversely, material
cost is replaced by the difference between operating revenue and value added if both
items are available.
The second step is to eliminate inconsistent data points from the sample. We
drop all firm-year observations with a sum of EBIT and cost of employees that is
not strictly positive. Furthermore, we drop observations with negative operating
revenue or material cost as well as those with total assets below 1,000 USD. Further
potential mistakes in the accounts are captured by deleting extreme outliers. We
drop observations for which any of the following ratios lies below the 0.1% or above
the 99.9% quantile of the sample within a year: operating revenue to total assets,
number of employees to total assets, number of employees to operating revenue,
operating revenue less material cost to operating revenue, operating revenue less
material cost to number of employees. We also drop observations where the sum of
fixed intangible assets, fixed tangible assets and other fixed assets does not add up
to a figure that is close to the entry for total fixed assets (±5%).
Finally, we adjust the balance sheet items for inflation and cross-border differences
in purchasing power to obtain the evolution of productive factors and output in real
terms. For this purpose we apply the GDP deflator and the Purchasing Power Parity
conversion factor for the GDP for 2005 prices to the nominal balance sheet items.
B.2 Choice of Specification
There are several ways to transform the dependent variable in the deal-level regres-
sion model. Here, we consider four alternatives: the simple difference of TFP before
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Figure B.1: Transformations of Dependent Variable
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and after the merger, Γˆjlk = APostj −APrej , the simple difference scaled by TFP before
the merger, Γˆjlk =
APostj −APrej
APrej
, the difference in logarithms, Γˆjlk = lnAPostj − lnAPrej
and the difference in logarithms scaled by the logarithm of TFP before the merger,
Γˆjlk =
lnAPostj −lnAPrej
lnAPrej
. We regress each of these measures on the absolute tax differ-
ential ∆τjlk and a set of fixed effects which corresponds to the model estimated in
column (1) of Table D.2 and plot the fitted values against the residuals. These plots
are presented in Figure B.1. Among the suggested transformations, only the differ-
ence in logarithms, depicted in the upper left panel, generates a random pattern that
is required to assume a linear relationship after transforming the dependent variable.
All other transformations generate a non-random pattern of residuals which implies
that heteroscedasticity of the error terms is inherent in these models.
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B.3 Additional Control Variables
Table B.1: Results for Country-level Controls of Regression Table 4.5
This table contains the coefficients for the OLS regressions of columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) of Table 4.5. Cluster robust standard
errors (clustered at the acquirer-target country-pair level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed
effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Change in Total Factor Productivity
(2) (3) (5) (6)
CIT (Tgt.) -0.575 (2.072) -0.108 (2.082) -0.659 (2.142) -0.366 (2.143)
Wage Difference 3.315 (2.576) 1.925 (2.509) 3.135 (2.561) 1.373 (2.509)
GDP p.c. Growth (Acq.) -3.857* (2.201) -3.351 (2.115) -3.806* (2.170) -3.202 (2.053)
GDP p.c. Growth (Tgt.) 4.150* (2.366) 3.052 (2.091) 4.095* (2.350) 2.888 (2.054)
Log GDP (Acq.) -2.910 (2.233) -1.303 (2.137) -2.716 (2.240) -0.711 (2.159)
Log GDP (Tgt.) 2.143 (2.195) 1.247 (2.110) 1.959 (2.208) 0.684 (2.107)
EU Member 0.017 (0.366) -0.101 (0.390) 0.012 (0.368) -0.115 (0.391)
Log Distance 0.019 (0.080) 0.013 (0.067) 0.018 (0.081) 0.009 (0.067)
Table B.2: Results for Country-level Controls of Regression Table 3.6
This table contains the coefficients for the control variables in the OLS regressions of columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) of Table 3.6. Cluster
robust standard errors (clustered at the acquirer-target country-pair level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm-
and year-fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Change in Total Factor Productivity
(2) (3) (5) (6)
Cross-border 0.086 (0.147) 0.060 (0.131) 0.101 (0.148) 0.083 (0.147)
Hostile -1.001** (0.403) -0.226 (0.327) -0.972** (0.408) -0.968** (0.409)
Stock-for-Stock 0.292* (0.171) 0.266 (0.192) 0.264 (0.179) 0.276 (0.175)
Capital Increase -0.344*** (0.096) -0.368*** (0.083) -0.331*** (0.095) -0.327*** (0.096)
Horizontal -0.040 (0.034) -0.021 (0.026) -0.041 (0.034) -0.041 (0.034)
Toe 0.052 (0.094) 0.120 (0.095) 0.054 (0.093) 0.054 (0.093)
Relative Size -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Leverage (Acq.) 0.029 (0.041) 0.003 (0.039) 0.034 (0.042) 0.031 (0.042)
Acquirer Listed -0.067 (0.046) -0.051 (0.043) -0.071 (0.046) -0.074 (0.048)
Log Age (Acq.) -0.009 (0.016) 0.000 (0.020) -0.011 (0.016) -0.012 (0.016)
CIT (Tgt.) -0.918 (1.899) -0.292 (1.919) -0.823 (1.904) -0.806 (1.936)
Wage Difference 3.089 (2.443) 1.745 (2.407) 2.958 (2.748) 2.828 (2.467)
GDP p.c. Growth (Acq.) -4.167* (2.171) -3.731* (2.037) -3.884* (2.144) -4.023* (2.139)
GDP p.c. Growth (Tgt) 4.702** (2.344) 3.477 (2.097) 4.417* (2.334) 4.510* (2.282)
Log GDP (Acq.) -2.866 (2.104) -1.193 (2.035) -3.042 (2.417) -2.704 (2.195)
Log GDP (Tgt.) 1.752 (2.090) 0.953 (2.021) 2.124 (2.438) 1.726 (2.152)
EU Member 0.010 (0.360) -0.114 (0.394) -0.004 (0.374) 0.020 (0.366)
Log Distance -0.032 (0.080) -0.018 (0.067) -0.031 (0.078) -0.023 (0.075)
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Table B.3: Results for Country-level Controls of Regression Table 3.7
This table contains the coefficients for the OLS regressions of Table 3.7. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are
provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm and industry-year fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance
level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Combined Combined Target Target Acquirer Acquirer
Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
CIT (Tgt.) 1.049* 1.134** 0.105 0.063
(0.568) (0.567) (0.831) (0.829)
CIT (Acq.) 1.963*** 2.024***
(0.599) (0.598)
Wage Difference 1.274 1.176 3.343** 3.057** 0.614 0.739
(1.213) (1.190) (1.392) (1.373) (1.395) (1.363)
GDP p.c. Growth (Acq.) 0.869 0.896 1.334 1.307 0.493 0.502
(0.568) (0.560) (0.823) (0.798) (0.619) (0.614)
GDP p.c. Growth (Tgt.) -0.414 -0.385 -2.037*** -2.012*** 0.384 0.455
(0.501) (0.488) (0.788) (0.747) (0.606) (0.595)
Log GDP (Acq.) -1.416 -1.354 -2.878* -2.779* -1.309 -1.329
(1.087) (1.069) (1.516) (1.483) (1.298) (1.279)
Log GDP (Tgt.) 1.099 1.091 1.506 1.526 1.278 1.308
(1.091) (1.078) (1.434) (1.406) (1.318) (1.307)
POST×EU Member 0.193 0.183 0.069 -0.016 0.153 0.157
(0.124) (0.113) (0.175) (0.179) (0.111) (0.103)
POST×Log Distance 0.107*** 0.109*** 0.151*** 0.166*** 0.082 0.081
(0.040) (0.040) (0.057) (0.058) (0.053) (0.052)
Table B.4: Results for Country-level Controls of Regression Tables 3.8 and 3.9
This table contains the coefficients for the OLS regressions of Table 3.8 in columns (1a)-(4a) of Table 3.9 in columns (1b)-(4b). Cluster
robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm and industry-year fixed
effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Employment Assets
(1a)
Target
(2a)
Target
(3a)
Acquirer
(4a)
Acquirer
(1b)
Target
(2b)
Target
(3b)
Acquirer
(4b)
Acquirer
CIT (Tgt.) 0.949 0.899 -1.794 -1.617
(0.736) (0.717) (1.247) (1.238)
CIT (Acq.) 0.230 0.151 -0.864 -0.941
(0.592) (0.591) (1.068) (1.062)
Wage Difference 1.706 0.949*** -0.547 -0.467 0.498 1.052 2.160 1.712
(1.349) (0.213) (1.186) (1.174) (2.266) (2.298) (2.062) (2.036)
GDP p.c. Growth (Acq.) 1.045 1.156* 0.303 0.327 0.584 0.461 -0.045 0.119
(0.755) (0.696) (0.526) (0.526) (1.062) (1.045) (0.979) (0.938)
GDP p.c. Growth (Tgt.) -0.698 -0.529 0.160 0.177 -0.383 -0.260 0.144 -0.033
(0.758) (0.709) (0.480) (0.475) (1.038) (1.013) (0.934) (0.881)
Log GDP (Acq.) -1.494 -0.094 -0.006 -0.018 -0.273 -0.491 -2.670 -2.494
(1.419) (0.088) (1.114) (1.110) (2.525) (2.536) (2.010) (1.991)
Log GDP (Tgt.) 1.970 0.195** 0.243 0.237 1.001 1.083 2.010 1.885
(1.364) (0.095) (1.090) (1.089) (2.438) (2.438) (1.976) (1.966)
POST×EU Member 0.090 0.085 -0.037 -0.021 0.088 0.132 -0.227* -0.190
(0.166) (0.145) (0.091) (0.084) (0.217) (0.197) (0.130) (0.125)
POST×Log Distance 0.045 0.004 0.035 0.032 -0.052 -0.056 0.053 0.052
(0.049) (0.048) (0.039) (0.038) (0.090) (0.089) (0.068) (0.067)
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C.1 Patent Boxes and Average Patent Quality
The average profits are given by
Π =
ˆ p˜i
p˜i∗
pisf (pis) dpis.
The change in Π with respect to the tax differential is given by
dΠ = −
(
(1− α) (cp − ch) p˜if (p˜i)
((1− α) ∆t)2 + α
chp˜i
∗f (p˜i∗)
(1− th + α∆t)2
)
d∆t < 0.
C.2 Graphical Illustration of the Theoretical
Framework
Figure C.1: Profit distribution and realized R&D projects
f (pis)
pis
p˜i∗p˜i∗′ p˜ip˜i′ p¯i¯
pi
B′ A B
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In Figure C.1 we display the effect of the patent box introduction graphically. We
plot the density function of the profits of available research projects and mark the
relevant cut-off profits. Initially, the firm realizes projects with profits greater than
p˜i∗ but locates R&D activity of projects with profits greater than p˜i to p. The overall
share of projects realized in h is thus given by A+B. The introduction of a patent
box in p shifts p˜i and p˜i∗ to p˜i′ and p˜i∗′ , respectively, such that the share of realized
projects is given by A + B′. The overall effect relies on a comparison of B and B′
which in turn depends on the setup of the patent box. B′ refers to the increase of
realized R&D projects in h because of the reduction in the user cost of R&D capital
captured in the second term of equation (4.3). B describes the R&D activity which
is shifted to p because of the foreign tax cut that reduces the number of projects
realized in h and is reflected in the first term of expression (4.3). For a patent haven,
α is close to 1 and B = 0 such that we obtain an increase in the share of R&D
projects realized in h by B′. In contrast, when a nexus patent box is implemented,
B and B′ may neutralize each other leaving the number of research projects in h
unchanged. Eventually, the direction of the effect is an empirical question and our
analysis points out that it is important to take into account the precise incentive
structure of the investigated patent box.
C.3 Composite Patent Quality Indicator
Patent quality is a latent variable which is not directly observable in the data. To
approximate it, we follow the approach proposed by Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004)
and employ a multiple-indicator model with one unobserved common factor. We use
three different indicators, namely forward citations, patent family size and number
of patent classifications codes (IPC classes). Therefore, the underlying equations for
the multiple-indicator model are
yk,s = λkvs + βX + ek,s, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where yk,s is the value of quality indicator k for patent s, vs indicates the common
factor, λk represents the factor loading, X contains common controls and ek,s ∼
N(0, σ2) is the idiosyncratic component with Cov(ek,s, ek,r) = 0, s 6= r. Since the
term λkvs is latent, we estimate the reduced form of the equations:
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yk,s = βX + uk,s, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where uk,s = λkvs + ek,s combines a common component λkvs and an idiosyncratic
component ek,s. We estimate these equations using 3SLS where X contains the
year of application and the main technology class of the patent. To gather λk and
vs, we conduct a factor analysis using maximum likelihood to decompose uk,s. The
estimated factor loadings are presented in Table C.1.
Table C.1: Factor loadings
Factor analysis of the residuals from regressing each indicator on year and industry class dummies. Factor loadings represent both
weighting of the indicator and correlation between indicator and patent quality.
Indicator Factor loading
Forward citations 0.6201
Patent family size 0.3593
Patent classification codes 0.1229
We use the estimated factor loadings to calculate the composite quality indicator
for each patent. The composite quality indicator is a relative measure to determine
the quality of patents and is normally distributed with mean zero. To construct
the quality-weighted annual patent count, we transform the distribution by adding
the value of the patent with lowest patent quality so that all composite quality
indicators turn positive. After this transformation the composite quality indicator
for each patent has a positive value and can be used as weight for summing up
patent output. The implied relative ordering of the quality of patents is unaffected
by this transformation.
C.4 User Cost of R&D Investment
The computation of the user cost follows the derivation of Bloom et al. (2002) who
extend its standard expression as presented by Hall & Jorgenson (1967) to R&D
investment. The user cost is defined as the pre-tax financial return ρ for a marginal
R&D investment project (i.e. a project with zero economic rent). The economic rent
of an R&D project is given by
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R = (1 + i) dVt = dDt + dVt+1
=
(ρ+ δ)
(
1− τCIT
)
+ (1− δ)A
1 + r − (1− A)
where dVt is the change in the market value of the firm and dDt is the change in div-
idends paid out by the firm that results from the investment. i denotes the nominal
and r the real market interest rate and δ is the economic rate of depreciation. A is
the net present value of allowances. Following Thomson (2013) and Warda (2002),
we assume the R&D investment to consist of an investment in labor (60%), ma-
chinery and equipment (5%), buildings (5%) and other current expenditures (30%).
A accounts for additional deductions, tax credits and accelerated depreciation. To
obtain the user cost, we set R = 0 and solve for ρ. This yields
ρ =
1−
(
AD + AC
)
1− τCIT (r + δ)
We compute ρct for every country and year and follow Bloom et al. (2002) in setting
δ = 0.3 and r = 0.05. Tax policy variables are obtained from the IBFD database.
C.5 Event-study design
The event-study design follows the setup of Fuest et al. (2018) and is specified as:
Pijct = α−5
t−2000∑
n=5
bHavenj,t−n +
−2∑
n=−4
αnb
Haven
j,t+n +
5∑
n=0
αnb
Haven
j,t+n + α6
2012−t∑
n=6
bHavenj,t+n
+ η−5
t−2000∑
n=5
bNexusj,t−n +
−2∑
n=−4
ηnb
Nexus
j,t+n +
5∑
n=0
ηnb
Nexus
j,t+n + η6
2012−t∑
n=6
bNexusj,t+n
+ βXit + γZjt + δCct + φt + φi (C.1)
Pijct is the number of newly granted patent applications of firm i which is member of
multinational group j and is located in country c in period t, and bHavenj,t (bNexusj,t ) is a
dummy that indicates whether in year t group j has an affiliate in a country where a
patent box with(out) nexus requirement is implemented and zero otherwise. Within
the first and last year in our sample, 2000 and 2012, we define an event window of
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12 years, that is, we observe 5 years before and 6 years after the implementation
of the patent box as well as the implementation year itself. In each year, we thus
compare the treated firms to those that do not have a foreign patent box affiliate.
Following Kline (2012), we adjust the end points of the event window to indicate
whether a foreign patent box has been implemented 5 or more years before (upper
window limit) and 6 or more years after a given year (lower window limit) in order to
mitigate collinearity with the year-fixed effects. To avoid perfect collinearity among
the patent box indicators, the regressor in the year before the implementation is
dropped and thereby normalized to zero. As a consequence, the remaining coefficients
αt are interpreted as the effect of the patent box implementation on Pijct relative
to the pre-reform year. The regression is complemented by a set of control variables
which are identical to the main specification (4.4) as well as a set of firm-fixed and
year-fixed effects.
In our benchmark estimate, we estimate a Poisson model to obtain the coefficients
of the event study. Below, we also plot the results for a linear estimation. In this case,
Pijct is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of newly granted
patent applications.
Figure C.2: Event-study Design (Linear Model)
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
(a) Patent Havens
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
(b) Nexus Boxes
This figure plots the event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands. The model specification is
explained in Appendix Event-study design. The plotted coefficients correspond to αn,n ∈ [−4, 5]. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. The event variables are indicators for the implementation of a patent haven or a
nexus patent box in a foreign affiliate location of the firm.
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C.6 Additional Tables and Figures
Figure C.3: Graphical Illustration of the Conceptual Framework
This figure illustrates the concept of this paper. The focus of the analysis is R&D activity of firm 1, located in
country A with an affiliate in country B. We investigate the response of R&D activity of firm 1 to the patent box
implementation in country B. Empirically, this is done by comparing firm 1 to another firm 2 which may have a a
foreign affiliate in a country C but is not linked via an affiliate to the patent box country B.
Country A
Country BCountry C
R&D
Firm 1
R&D
Firm 2
Affiliate
Affiliate
Patent Box Implementation
Table C.2: Sample Selection
This table displays the sample selection. Patenting sectors are defined by 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes 10-32, 51-53, 58-63, 69-74
and 77-82. Firms that conduct R&D are defined as firms included in the PATSTAT database that have successfully filed a patent
application at any point in time.
Number of Firms in the
Sample
Firms in patenting sectors that conduct R&D with data for 2000-2012 38,844
Excluding firms located in patent box countries 31,023
Trimming at the 99% quantile of the patent count 30,927
Excluding firms with no patent application in the observation period 26,686
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Table C.7: R&D Activity and Corporate Taxation: Controls
This table reports the coefficients of the control variables for the estimations reported in Table 4.7. Estimation of a Poisson fixed
effects model. The dependent variable is the number of new domestic patents per year and firm. Cluster robust standard errors
(clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients
indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
No. of New Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Domestic Firms Full Sample Full Sample
R&D exp. 0.373*** 0.308*** 0.360*** 0.365***
(0.076) (0.087) (0.057) (0.057)
Log GDP p.c. -0.963*** -0.306 -0.574*** -0.575***
(0.357) (0.255) (0.208) (0.208)
GDP Growth -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
User Cost of R&D -1.489* -6.291*** -4.551*** -4.607***
(0.887) (0.610) (0.503) (0.504)
Real interest rate -0.031 -1.898*** -1.215*** -1.165***
(0.642) (0.662) (0.445) (0.445)
Log no. of affiliates 0.084* 0.111** 0.069** 0.073***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.028) (0.028)
Log Age 0.066** 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.074***
(0.030) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020)
Log Total Assets 0.066*** 0.034*** 0.046*** 0.045***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Working Capital -0.000 0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Capital Intensity 0.021** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Table C.8: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated Using Matching
Results from propensity score matching based on firm characteristics in year 2000 (single nearest neighbor matching). ATT denotes
’average treatment effect of the treated’ and is calculated using a Poisson model. The calculation of the ATT includes firm-fixed
effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No. of New Patents No. of New Patents (quality-weighted)
ATT BOXHaven 0.192***
(0.055)
0.174***
(0.062)
0.222***
(0.059)
0.178***
(0.067)
ATT BOXNexus -0.006
(0.035)
0.000 (0.034) -0.019
(0.036)
-0.018
(0.035)
N 55,328 54,191 57,060 54,587 53,658 56,501
Number of firms 4,378 4,281 4,503 4,321 4,240 4,460
Pseudo R2 (Matching) 0.592 0.561 0.556 0.592 0.561 0.556
Pseudo LL -43,698 -43,882 -45,675 -29,378 -28,943 -30,054
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Table C.9: Summary Statistics: R&D Expenditures
Data source R&D expenditures: SV Wissenschaftsstatistik GmbH, RDC, R&D Surveys 2001-2011, own calculations. Minimum and
maximum values are not reported because of data confidentiality. All R&D expenditures in 1000 EUR.
Number of
Observations
Mean
(logged)
Standard
Deviation
(logged)
Mean Standard
Deviation
R&D Expenditure, Total 13,633 7.772 1.633 2,373.213 3,946.653
R&D Expenditure, Equipment 13,633 5.442 2.426 230.904 560.171
R&D Expenditure, Employment 13,633 6.527 2.535 683.345 1,732.280
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D.1 Second-Order Conditions for Case I
The Hessian for the system of first-order conditions (5.9) to (5.11) for jurisdiction i
is given by
H =

∂2U i
∂m2i
∂2U i
∂τi1∂mi
∂2U i
∂bi1∂mi
∂2U i
∂mi∂τi
∂2U i
∂τ2i1
∂2U i
∂bi1∂τi
∂2U i
∂mi∂bi1
∂2U i
∂τi1∂bi1
∂2U i
∂b2i1

=

∂2U i
∂m2i
0 ∂2U i
∂bi1∂mi
0 ∂2U i
∂τ2i1
0
∂2U i
∂mi∂bi1
0 ∂2U i
∂b2i1

In the second term, we insert the first-order condition for taxes (5.9) to verify that
∂2U i
∂mi∂τi
= −h′′i1 ∂(Ni1(1+γτi1))∂τi1 γc′ = 0 and ∂
2U i
∂bi1∂τi
= γh′′i1
∂(Ni1(1+γτi1))
∂τi1
= 0. For (5.9)-(5.11)
to yield a maximum, H must be negative definite which is the case if and only if
∂2U i
∂m2i
= h′′i1 (γc′)
2 − h′i1γc′′ + βh′′i2
(
∂N˜i2 (1 + γτ˜i2)
∂mi
)2
+ βh′i2
γρ2
9ν < 0, (D.1)
∂2U i
∂m2i
∂2U i
∂τ 2i1
> 0, (D.2)
∂2U i
∂τ 2i1
∂2U i
∂m2i
∂2U i
∂b2i1
−
(
∂2U i
∂bi1∂mi
)2 < 0. (D.3)
Condition (D.1) is fulfilled for any sufficiently convex public investment cost function
c (mi). In particular, noting from (5.11) that h′i2 = h′i1, we know that c′′ (mi) > βγρ
2
9ν
is a sufficient condition for (D.1) to be satisfied. This relation holds for a wide
range of parameters and functional forms. Since ∂2U i
∂τ2i1
= −h′i1 γν < 0, (D.2) must
hold whenever (D.1) holds. Furthermore, note that ∂2U i
∂b2i1
=
(
h′′i1 + 1βh
′′
i2
)
γ < 0 and
∂2U i
∂bi1∂mi
= −γ2h′′i1c′ − γh′′i2
(
∂N˜i2(1+γτ˜i2)
∂mi
)
> 0 such that for (D.3) to hold, we must
have ∂2U i
∂m2i
∂2U i
∂b2i1
>
(
∂2U i
∂bi1∂mi
)2
. Inserting the first-order conditions (5.10) and (5.11), it
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is straightforward to show that this condition is satisfied if c′′ (mi) > βγρ
2
9ν (i.e. the
cost function must be sufficiently convex) such that condition (D.3) holds whenever
(D.1) is fulfilled.
D.2 Comparative Statics for Case II
If Condition 1 is binding in jurisdiction 1, the system of first-order conditions is
given by
∂U i
∂τi1
= h′i1
∂ (Ni1 (1 + γτi1))
∂τi1
= 0, i = 1, 2 (D.4)
∂U1
∂m1
= −h′11γc′ + βh′12
∂
(
N˜12 (1 + γτ˜12)
)
∂m1
= 0 (D.5)
∂U2
∂m2
= −γc′ + β∂
(
N˜22 (1 + γτ˜22)
)
∂m2
= 0 (D.6)
Condition (D.6) is obtained by inserting the first-order condition for b21, (5.11), into
the first order condition for m2, (5.10), as in Case I. The Hessian for the system of
first-order conditions for jurisdiction 1 (D.4), and (D.5) is given by
H =

∂2U1
∂m21
∂2U1
∂τ11∂m1
∂2U1
∂m1∂τ11
∂2U1
∂τ211
 =

∂2U1
∂m21
0
0 ∂2U1
∂τ211

In the second term, we insert the first-order condition for taxes (D.4) to verify that
∂2U1
∂m1∂τ11
= 0. For (D.4) and (D.5) to yield a maximum, H must be negative definite
which is the case if and only if
∂2U1
∂m21
= h′′11 (γc′)
2 − h′11γc′′ + βh′′12
(
∂N˜12 (1 + γτ˜12)
∂m1
)2
+ βh′12
γρ2
9ν < 0, (D.7)
∂2U1
∂m21
∂2U1
∂τ 211
> 0, (D.8)
Condition (D.7) holds if−∂(N˜12(1+γτ˜12))
∂m1
c′′
c′ <
γρ2
9ν which is true for any convex function
c. Since ∂2U1
∂τ211
< 0, (D.8) must hold whenever (D.7) holds. The first-order conditions
176
D.2 Comparative Statics for Case II
for taxes (D.4) yield again (5.12). The Dixit (1986) stability conditions are
∂2U i
∂m2i
< 0, ∂
2U−i
∂m2−i
< 0, ∂
2U i
∂m2i
∂2U−i
∂m2−i
>
∂2U−i
∂m−i∂mi
∂2U i
∂mi∂m−i
. (D.9)
Taking the total differential of the first-order conditions with respect to b10 we arrive
at the following system of equations

∂2U1
∂m21
∂2U1
∂m1∂m2
∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
∂2U2
∂m22

 dm1
dm2
+

∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
0
 db10 =
 0
0
 (D.10)
which can be rearranged to yield
dm1
db10
= −1
φ
∂2U2
∂m22
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
< 0, dm2db10
= 1
φ
∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
> 0 (D.11)
with φ = ∂2U1
∂m21
∂2U2
∂m22
− ∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
∂2U1
∂m1∂m2
> 0. The first effect is obtained because of the
Dixit (1986) stability conditions and since ∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
< 0. The second effect results
from ∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
= −γρ29ν < 0. From Proposition 1 we know that the effect of a change
in bi0 on τ ∗i2 and N∗i2 is given by
dτ ∗i2
dbi0
= ρ3
d∆qi2
dbi0
= ρ3
(
dmi
dbi0
− dm−i
dbi0
)
,
dN∗i2
dbi0
= ρ6ν
d∆qi2
dbi0
= ρ6ν
(
dmi
dbi0
− dm−i
dbi0
)
(D.12)
where ∆qi2 = mi−m−i (assuming that q¯1 = q¯2). It follows from (D.11) that dτ
∗
12
db10
< 0,
dN∗12
db10
< 0, dτ
∗
22
db20
> 0 and dN
∗
22
db20
> 0.
Adjustment in period 1 borrowing only occurs in jurisdiction 2 as jurisdiction 1 is
constrained. We derive jurisdiction 2’s borrowing response by totally differentiating
the corresponding first order condition for b12 (5.11) with respect to m1, m2 and b12
which yields
∂2U2
∂b221
db21 +
∂U2
∂b21∂m2
dm2 +
∂U2
∂b21∂m1
dm1 = 0. (D.13)
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Substituting (5.14) and (5.15) for dm1 and dm2 we solve for
db21
db10
= 1
φ
(
∂U2
∂b21∂m1
∂2U2
∂m22
− ∂U
2
∂b21∂m2
∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
) ∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
∂2U2
∂b221
> 0 (D.14)
where the inequality follows because ∂U2
∂b21∂m2
> 0, ∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
< 0, ∂2U2
∂m22
< 0, ∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
< 0,
∂2U2
∂b221
< 0 (see Section D.1) and ∂U2
∂b21∂m1
= −γh′′i2
(
∂N˜22(1+γτ˜22)
∂m1
)
< 0.
D.3 Comparative Statics for Constrained Borrowing
in Both Jurisdictions
Taking the total differential of the first-order conditions we arrive at the same system
of equations as in (D.10) which can be rearranged to yield expressions for dm2db10 and
dm1
db10 as in (D.11). Since
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
< 0, the Dixit (1986) stability conditions (D.9) again
imply dm1db10 < 0. However, since the first-order condition for b20 does not necessarily
hold, it cannot be substituted to yield ∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
< 0 which leads to the unambiguous
result obtained for jurisdiction 2 in (D.11). If h′′2 = 0 such that U2 is quasi-linear,
we can show that dm2db20 < 0 by verifying that in this case
∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
= −βh′′22
(
ρ
6ν +
γρ
3
( 1
2ν τ12 +N12
))2
− γρ
2
9ν βh
′
22 = −
γρ2
9ν βh
′
22 < 0.
The effect of a marginal increase in b10 on tax rates and the number of firms is again
given by (D.12). Substituting from (5.14) and (5.15) and noting that
∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
= −βh′22
γρ2
9ν − βh
′′
22
(
ρ
6ν (1 + γτ22) +
ρ
3N22
)2
,
∂2U2
∂m22
= h′′21 (γc′)
2 − h′21γc′′ −
∂2U2
∂m2∂m1
allows us to rewrite the effect of a marginal increase in legacy debt on taxes and the
number of firms in period 2 as
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dτ ∗12
db10
= −1
φ
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
ρ
3
(
h′′21 (γc′)
2 − h′21γc′′
)
< 0,
dN∗12
db10
= −1
φ
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
ρ
6ν
(
h′′21 (γc′)
2 − h′21γc′′
)
< 0,
dτ ∗22
db10
= 1
φ
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
ρ
3
(
h′′21 (γc′)
2 − h′21γc′′
)
> 0,
dN∗22
db10
= 1
φ
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
ρ
6ν
(
h′′21 (γc′)
2 − h′21γc′′
)
> 0.
The inequality is a result of the convexity of c and the strict concavity of h1. Note
that in the derivation above, the indices for jurisdiction 1 and 2 are interchangeable
because, with both jurisdictions constrained in their borrowing, it is irrelevant where
the marginal increase in initial public debt that we investigate in the comparative
static analysis occurs.
D.4 Interaction Between Initial Public Infrastructure
and Initial Public Debt
Unrestricted Borrowing Let q¯i = q¯i (bi0) , i = 1, 2. Condition (5.13) must be
modified and reads
c′ (mi) =
βρ
3
(
1 + ρ3ν∆mi +
ρ
3ν∆q¯i (1− δ)
)
, i = 1, 2. (D.15)
Taking the total differential of (D.15) with respect to mi and bi0 we obtain
dmi
dbi0
=
βρ2
9ν (1− δ)
c′′ (mi)− βρ29ν
q¯′i, i = 1, 2 (D.16)
where q¯′i =
∂q¯′i
∂bi0
. Again, we assume that the cost function is sufficiently convex,
c′′ (mi) > βγρ
2
9ν , such that the second-order conditions are fulfilled. Then (D.16)
implies
dmi
dbi0
Q 0⇐⇒ q¯′i Q 0. (D.17)
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Restricted Borrowing in Jurisdiction 1 The sign of (5.14) depends on ∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
.
Let q¯1 = q¯1 (b10) and differentiate (D.5) w.r.t b10 to obtain
∂2U1
∂m1∂b10
= h′′11 γ
2
β
c′ + (β (1− δ) η12 + η11) q¯′1,
η11 = −h′′11γc′ ∂(N11(1+γτ11))∂q¯1 > 0, η12 = h′′12
(
∂(N12(1+γτ12))
∂m1
)2
+ h′12 γρ
2
9ν .
(D.18)
The first term in (D.18) captures the effect of b10 on the marginal utility of pub-
lic infrastructure investment ( ∂U1
∂m1
) that results from its impact on the incentives
for inter-temporal redistribution as described in Proposition 3. The second term
(β (1− δ) η12 + η11) q¯′1 represents the change in ∂U
1
∂m1
caused by a change in q¯1 =
q¯1 (b10) that is due to the variation in the marginal utility of public infrastructure
investment in period 1, η11, and period 2, η12. In order to obtain a reversal of the
result in Proposition 3, such that a rise in jurisdiction i’s legacy debt (bi0) leads
to an increase in i’s infrastructure investment (mi) and period 2 tax rate (τi2), the
following assumption must hold.
Assumption 1. An increase in initial public infrastructure q¯i raises the marginal
utility of public infrastructure investment in period 1. It does so at a rate greater in
magnitude than the coinciding marginal change in the repayment burden.
The first part of Assumption 1 ensures that a higher level of initial public in-
frastructure incentivizes governments to raise infrastructure investment in period 1.
This holds if public investments are strategic substitutes. In the reverse case, any
positive relation between initial infrastructure and initial debt would merely rein-
force the effect described in Proposition 2 as an increase in bi0 would unambiguously
reduce the marginal utility of public infrastructure investment in period 1. The sec-
ond part of Assumption 1 states that the positive effect of q¯i on the marginal utility
of public infrastructure investment dominates the overall effect.
The effect of initial infrastructure investment depends on the sign of the second
term in (D.18), (β (1− δ) η12 + η11) q¯′1. It is assumed to be positive (first part of
Assumption 1). The assumption is satisfied in the quasi-linear case with h′′12 =
0, because then η12 = h′12 γρ
2
9ν > 0. If (β (1− δ) η12 + η11) q¯′1 > 0, and
∣∣∣h′′11 γ2β c′∣∣∣ <
|(β (1− δ) η12 + η11) q¯′1|, as stated in the second part of Assumption 1, we have
dm1
db10
Q 0⇐⇒ q¯′1 Q 0. (D.19)
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Under Assumption 1 the negative effect of an increase in initial public debt on infras-
tructure investment in period 1 is reinforced when there is a negative relationship
between legacy debt and initial public infrastructure (f ′ < 0 =⇒ q¯′1 < 0).
D.5 A Tax on Domestic Income
We consider an additional tax on an immobile tax base. We assume that a fraction
0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 of the local benefit of firm investment Nit is taxed at τwi1 . One may
think of ωNit as a wage which is taxed with a labor tax. We also introduce a welfare
loss from taxation by assuming that the corresponding tax revenue is reduced by
administrative costs which are a convex function of τwi1 .1 The budget constraints
thus read
gi1 = τi1Ni1 +
(
τwi1 − ξ
(τwi1)
2
2
)
ωNi1 − c(mi)− (1 + r) bi0 + bi1 (D.20)
gi2 = τi2Ni2 +
(
τwi2 − ξ
(τwi2)
2
2
)
ωNi2 − (1 + r) bi1, (D.21)
and governments maximize
U i = h1 (ui1) + βh2(ui2) =h1 ((1− ω)Ni1 + (1− τwi1)ωNi1 + γgi1)
+ βh2 ((1− ω)Ni2 + (1− τwi2)ωNi2 + γgi2) .
(D.22)
Solving by backward induction, the set of first-order conditions in period 2 - given
by (5.7) - is extended by the optimal choice of τwi2 :
U iτwi2 :=
∂U i
∂τwi2
=h′2
∂ui2
∂τwi2
= 0. (D.23)
The optimal labor tax equals τw∗i2 = γ−1γξ . Substituting into (5.7), we can determine
capital tax rates and the number of firms in a similar way as stated in Proposition
1:
1Ignoring administrative costs yields an equilibrium where τwi1 = 1 since γ > 1 and the results of
the main analysis are immediately obtained.
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τ˜i2 (mi,m−i) = ν − 1
γ
+ ρ∆qi3 −
(γ − 1)2
2γ2ξ ω (D.24)
N˜i2 (mi,m−i) =
1
2 +
ρ∆qi
6ν (D.25)
τw∗i2 =
γ − 1
γξ
(D.26)
κ˜i (bi1) =

0 if bi1 ≤ bwtp
1 if bi1 > bwtp
(D.27)
g˜i2 (mi,m−i, bi1) = τ˜i2N˜i2 − (1− κ˜i)(1 + r)bi1, (D.28)
Solving period 2, we begin with the case where the Willingness-to-pay Condition
is not binding in both jurisdictions. The maximization problem of jurisdiction i is
given by
max
τi1,mi,bi1,τwi1
U i =h1 ((1− ω)Ni1 + (1− τwi1)ωNi1 + γgi1) (D.29)
+ βh2
(
(1− ω) N˜i2 + (1− τw∗i2 )ωN˜i2 + γg˜i2
)
which leads to the first-order conditions
∂U i
∂τi1
= h′1
∂ui1
∂τi1
= 0, (D.30)
∂U i
∂mi1
= −h′1γc′ + βh′2
∂u˜i2
∂mi
= 0, (D.31)
∂U i
∂bi1
= γh′1 − βγ(1 + r)h′2 = h′1 − h′2 = 0, (D.32)
∂U i
∂τwi1
= h′2
∂ui1
∂τwi1
= 0. (D.33)
The Hessian for the system of first-order conditions (D.30) to (D.33) for jurisdiction
i is given by
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H =

∂2U i
∂m2i
∂2U i
∂τi1∂mi
∂2U i
∂bi1∂mi
∂2U i
∂τwi1∂mi
∂2U i
∂mi∂τi1
∂2U i
∂τ2i1
∂2U i
∂bi1∂τi
∂2U i
∂τwi1∂τi
∂2U i
∂mi∂bi1
∂2U i
∂τi1∂bi1
∂2U i
∂b2i1
∂2U i
∂τwi1∂bi1
∂2U i
∂mi∂τwi1
∂2U i
∂τi1∂τwi1
∂2U i
∂τwi1
∂2U i
∂(τwi1)2

=

∂2U i
∂m2i
0 ∂2U i
∂bi1∂mi
0
0 ∂2U i
∂τ2i1
0 0
∂2U i
∂mi∂bi1
0 ∂2U i
∂b2i1
0
0 0 0 ∂2U i
∂(τwi1)2

In the second term, we insert the first-order condition for taxes (D.30) to verify that
∂2U i
∂mi∂τi
= −h′′i1 ∂(Ni1(1+γτi1))∂τi1 γc′ = 0 and ∂
2U i
∂bi1∂τi
= γh′′i1
∂(Ni1(1+γτi1))
∂τi1
= 0. For (D.30)-
(D.33) to yield a maximum, H must be negative definite which is the case if and
only if
∂2U i
∂m2i
< 0, (D.34)
∂2U i
∂m2i
∂2U i
∂τ 2i1
> 0, (D.35)
∂2U i
∂τ 2i1
∂2U i
∂m2i
∂2U i
∂b2i1
−
(
∂2U i
∂bi1∂mi
)2 < 0. (D.36)
∂2U i
∂τ 2i1
∂2U i
∂ (τwi1)
2
∂2U i
∂m2i
∂2U i
∂b2i1
−
(
∂2U i
∂bi1∂mi
)2 > 0. (D.37)
Conditions (D.34), (D.35), and (D.36) are identical to the benchmark model (see
Section D.1). Condition (D.37) holds whenever (D.36) holds because ∂2U i
∂τ2i1
< 0 and
∂2U i
∂(τwi1)2
= −γξ < 0.
The system of first-order conditions (D.30)-(D.33) can be solved to obtain equi-
librium tax rates and the number of investments in period 1:
τ ∗i1 = ν −
1
γ
− (γ − 1)
2
2γ2ξ φ, τ
w∗
i1 =
γ − 1
γξ
, N∗i1 =
1
2 . (D.38)
Noting that ∂u˜i2
∂mi
= γρ3
(
1 + ρ∆mi3ν
)
, we can substitute (D.32) into (D.31) to obtain the
modified first-order condition for infrastructure investment c′ (mi) = βρ3
(
1 + ρ∆mi3ν
)
which is identical to (5.13) such that the results stated in Proposition 2 prevail.
Turning to the case where borrowing is constrained in jurisdiction 2, we note that
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the comparative static analysis is unaffected by the introduction of the additional
tax instrument because ∂u˜i2
∂mi
is independent of the choice of τwi1 . As a consequence,
the results stated in Proposition 3 are also valid with a tax on the immobile tax
base.
D.6 Empirical Evidence: Additional Tables
Table D.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Business Tax Rate 165,873 14.880 2.698 0 45
Property Tax Rate 165,878 1.451 0.670 0 4.55
Log Local Public Investment Expenditure 151,360 12.819 2.071 1.138 20.416
Shock (si,t) 165,880 0.054 0.225 0 1
Log GDP p.c. 121,985 10.075 0.227 9.484 11.580
Log Population 165,880 7.568 1.491 1.099 15.073
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Table D.2: Event Study: Regression Results
This table contains the regression results of the event study design. All regressions contain year, municipality and state-year fixed
effects. The dependent variable is the logarithm of public investment expenditure in columns (1)-(2) and the local business tax rate in
columns (3)-(4). In columns (2) and (4), the dependent variable and the control variables refer to the corresponding inverse distance
weighted average (weighted according to difference in population) of all neighboring municipalities of municipality within 10km.
Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the municipality level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the
significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Public Investment Expenditure Business Tax Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated Neighbor Treated Neighbor
si,t+4 0.031** (0.015) -0.016 (0.011) -0.023** (0.010) 0.005 (0.008)
si,t+3 0.115*** (0.017) -0.015 (0.012) -0.012* (0.007) -0.009 (0.006)
si,t+2 0.107*** (0.014) -0.011 (0.010) -0.005 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005)
si,t -0.268*** (0.013) -0.009 (0.010) -0.007 (0.005) 0.011*** (0.004)
si,t−1 -0.106*** (0.016) -0.012 (0.011) -0.016*** (0.006) 0.015*** (0.006)
si,t−2 -0.036** (0.017) -0.008 (0.012) -0.020*** (0.007) 0.018*** (0.007)
si,t−3 -0.021 (0.017) -0.001 (0.012) -0.020** (0.009) 0.016** (0.008)
si,t−4 -0.010 (0.018) 0.009 (0.013) -0.022** (0.010) 0.018** (0.009)
si,t−5 -0.022 (0.015) -0.015 (0.011) -0.039*** (0.011) 0.011 (0.010)
Log GDP p.c. 0.404*** (0.091) 0.269*** (0.083) -0.123* (0.072) -0.141*** (0.044)
Log Population 0.106 (0.133) 1.107*** (0.071) -0.206** (0.102) 0.144 (0.118)
Observations 116,463 103,103 121,985 104,666
Municipalities 8,132 6,979 8,137. 6,981
R2 0.110 0.206 0.957 0.972
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